At the same time, the Chinese Government has made new efforts to properly resolve the Hong Kong issue in accordance with the established policy. In December 1982, the Fifth Session of the Third National People's Congress adopted Article 31, which states that "the State may establish special administrative regions when necessary, and the systems to be implemented in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law by the National People's Congress in accordance with specific circumstances." This provides a legal basis for the implementation of "one country, two systems" after China recovers Hong Kong. At the same time, we have conscientiously listened to the opinions of people from all walks of life in Hong Kong, and formulated the basic guidelines and policies for Hong Kong, that is, the "12 Articles," which are intended to be used as the basis for the second phase of negotiations or, if necessary, to be promulgated separately.

After learning of these circumstances, Margaret Thatcher sent a letter to the Chinese Premier in March 1983, stating that Britain had no objection to China's position on sovereignty over Hong Kong, and that "as long as the British and Chinese governments can reach agreement on administrative arrangements to ensure the future prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, and are acceptable to the British Parliament, the people of Hong Kong and the Chinese government, she is willing to propose to the Parliament that sovereignty over the whole of Hong Kong should be returned to China." In April, the Chinese side replied that the Chinese government agreed to hold formal negotiations as soon as possible.

At the end of May 1983, China and Britain reached an agreement on the procedural issues and three agenda items for the negotiations. 1. To make arrangements for maintaining the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong after 1997; 2. To make arrangements for Hong Kong from now until 1997; and (3) to make arrangements for the transfer of power.

After entering the second phase of the negotiations, the main obstacle was the British side's initial insistence on the "separation of sovereignty and governance", that is, "under the principle of recognizing China's sovereignty over Hong Kong, the British will govern Hong Kong largely as in the past". China, on the other hand, adheres to the position that sovereignty and governing power are inseparable, and the so-called "sovereignty belongs to China and governance belongs to Britain" in essence negates China's sovereignty and replaces the old unequal treaty with a new unequal treaty, which is absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese people. No progress was made in the first three rounds of negotiations, and the fourth round ended unhappily.

Because there was no progress in the talks, the outlook was uncertain, Hong Kong's hearts were fluctuating, and the Hong Kong dollar exchange rate and stock market fell sharply. The British government and the British authorities in Hong Kong not only did not take measures to stabilize the situation, but instead added fuel to the fire, taking the opportunity to play the "economic card" and exert pressure on China. This is known as the "September Storm". People from all walks of life and media circles in Hong Kong have strongly criticized Britain's attempt to use the "economic card" to pressure China to make concessions, and citizens have held rallies and demonstrations to demand that the Hong Kong Government take measures to stabilize the situation as soon as possible. Seeing that the "economic card" would be played again, it would shoot itself in the foot, and on October 15, the Hong Kong government announced the implementation of a linked exchange rate pegged to the US dollar, and at the same time abolished the interest tax on Hong Kong dollar deposits. The "economic card" played by the British ended in failure.

On October 14, 1983, Margaret Thatcher sent a letter to the Chinese leadership, saying that the two sides could explore a permanent arrangement for Hong Kong on the basis of China's proposal. The British side no longer adheres to the position of "exchanging sovereignty for governing power", and the talks have made some progress.

But Margaret Thatcher wanted to give the British a role in Hong Kong's administration after 1997, such as retaining a British governor, which she said was essential to Hong Kong's prosperity. The Chinese side categorically rejected this proposition. In the end, Margaret Thatcher had to back down.

From December 1983 to April 1984, China and Britain held six rounds of negotiations (the 7th to the 12th), the main topics of which were post-1997 arrangements and issues related to the transition period. From May to September, the two sides held 10 rounds (13th to 22nd) rounds of negotiations, the main topics of which were to discuss the arrangements for the pre-1997 transition period and the transition of power, and to agree on the content of the final document. Negotiations on these issues have not been smooth sailing, and some issues have been hotly contested. For example, the Chinese side proposes that the SAR government officials should be composed of locals and that "Hong Kong people administer Hong Kong", and that British and foreign nationals can serve as advisers or up to the level of deputy director-general in some government departments, but the British side proposes that foreigners can serve as officials in the civil service up to the highest level, in an attempt to make Britons play a pivotal role in the future SAR government. Another example is China's claim that the Central People's Government is responsible for the defence of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and that the Central People's Government has the right to station troops in Hong Kong. The British side has repeatedly suggested that there is no need for Hong Kong to send troops. These propositions of the British side directly run counter to the principle of China's sovereignty and are naturally rejected by the Chinese side. Later, there was a dispute over whether to set up a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group.

After a fierce contest between China and the UK, an agreement was finally reached after two years of negotiations on the Hong Kong issue. On September 26, 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Hong Kong Question was initialled by Zhou Nan and Evans, heads of delegations of the two countries. On December 19, 1984, the official signing ceremony was held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, and a delegation of more than 100 people from all walks of life in Hong Kong was invited to attend. The heads of government of China and Britain solemnly signed their names on the joint statement on behalf of their respective governments. The Sino-British Joint Declaration announced to the world that the Chinese Government would resume the exercise of its rights over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, and that Britain would return Hong Kong to China on the same day.

The Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong issue have a special historical status and significance in the diplomatic history of New China. It has succeeded in bringing about the smooth return of Hong Kong, washed away the humiliation suffered by the Chinese nation over the past century and a half, advanced the great cause of the motherland's reunification, and set a model for the international community to settle disputes and issues left over from history by peaceful means, and is a major contribution made by the Chinese Government to safeguarding world peace.

After the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, during the long 13-year transition period, China and the UK have conducted arduous diplomatic negotiations in many fields in order to implement the Joint Declaration and fulfill each other's commitments. Apart from the constitutional issues, the negotiations between China and Britain eventually achieved positive results, ensuring the smooth return of Hong Kong.

Looking back on the whole process of the Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong issue, I deeply feel that a strong motherland is the fundamental guarantee for victory in the diplomatic struggle. When talking about why the Hong Kong issue could be negotiated, Mr. Deng Xiaoping pointed out that "the main reason is that our country has developed in recent years, and it is a prosperous country, a powerful country, and a country worthy of trust." "The corrupt late Qing government lost Hong Kong, and the Chinese who reformed and opened up and rushed to a well-off life took back Hong Kong peacefully, which vividly verified Mr. Deng Xiaoping's thesis.

Mr. Deng Xiaoping also pointed out another reason for the conclusion of the Hong Kong issue

"It is the fundamental policy or strategy of 'one country, two systems' that has been done correctly, and it is also the result of the joint efforts of China and the UK."

"This concept has played a decisive and most important role in resolving the Hong Kong issue."

The concept of "one country, two systems" has not only removed many obstacles in the Sino-British negotiation process and ensured the smooth return of Hong Kong, but also ensured Hong Kong's long-term prosperity and stability.

(More than eight of my nearly 40 years of diplomatic career have been directly related to Hong Kong's return to the motherland.) From 1991 to '98, I was involved in 17 rounds of Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong's 1994/95 electoral arrangements, Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong's handover ceremony, and the work of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group for a period after Hong Kong's handover.

This diplomatic experience was very memorable for me, and it also filled me with affection for Hong Kong. I saw it with my own eyes

With the successful implementation of "one country, two systems" in Hong Kong, I firmly believe that Hong Kong will have a better tomorrow. Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Training, Entrepreneurship Training, Thank you for visiting this site.