In fact, the real reason for the defeat of the Japanese army was in this battle plan. First of all, Yamamoto Isoroku, commander of the Combined Fleet, because Yamamoto had served as the captain of the "Akagi" aircraft carrier, the technical director of the Naval Aviation Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Air Force, and the director of the Naval Aviation Headquarters, and also planned and commanded the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, so many people think that Yamamoto was an aviation faction that recognized the role of aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft in modern naval warfare relatively early, but in fact, Yamamoto is still a giant ship cannon faction in his bones, which is doomed to despise aircraft carriers in the deployment of campaigns, "Zuizuru" and "Xianghe" The two aircraft carriers, because they were injured in the Battle of the Coral Sea and recuperated at home to recuperate, can recover their combat strength in a month at most, but Yamamoto did not wait for the two aircraft carriers to return before launching the Midway operation, which also shows that Yamamoto still does not pay enough attention to aircraft carriers. In the Battle of Midway, he still used the battleship as the main force, and the aircraft carrier was just a pioneer, and the aircraft carrier was used to attack Midway Island first, which could not only weaken the strength of the US military, but also serve as a decoy to lure the US fleet out, and then personally lead the main fleet with the battleship as the core to engage in a traditional decisive battle at sea. On the way to Midway Island, Yamamoto's combined fleet overheard the radio signal of the US aircraft carrier in the waters near Midway.

In order to show off his ability, Kuroshima Kametosa, the first staff officer of the joint fleet, who was responsible for formulating the battle plan, made the whole plan extremely complicated and cumbersome, and obviously his strength far exceeded that of the US army, but he still had to go to great lengths to make a trick of attacking the Aleutian Islands, and the main attack direction of Midway Island was also divided into three routes, one was the landing fleet, the other was Nagumo's aircraft carrier fleet, and the last road was the battleship fleet under the personal command of Yamamoto, and there was a distance between the three fleets, especially the distance between the Nagumo aircraft carrier fleet and the Yamamoto battleship fleet was 300 nautical miles, that is, it would take at least ten hours to sail, once a situation occurred, simply unable to support each other.

At that time, the strength of the Japanese army was almost three times that of the US army, if it were not for such a complicated plan to disperse its forces, all the ships were concentrated in the direction of Midway, there was no need for any tricks to attack the east and the west to divert the tiger from the mountain, it was the simplest whole army attack, with the overwhelming momentum of Mount Tai to attack Midway, the US army was to decipher the code, know the direction and time of the Japanese attack, in the face of the disparity in strength, it is difficult to have a chance to turn the tables. As long as the Japanese army relies on its absolute superiority in numbers, it will attack and fight hard in a dignified manner, and if the US aircraft carrier fleet avoids the battle, it will take Midway Island directly, and if the US aircraft carriers meet the battle, then it will be a pot of stew. Therefore, the root of the Japanese army's defeat in the Battle of Midway lies in this plan, and the more complex and elaborate the plan, as long as there is a problem in one link, the easier it is to lose everything. When the Japanese army's plan was introduced, the foreshadowing of failure had already been laid.

Japan HNA is not in a state of limbo

The four aircraft carriers of the Japanese 1st Air Fleet in World War I at Midway were all sunk by the U.S. military, so many people think that the Japanese naval aviation has suffered a great loss of vitality, but in fact, this is not the case. The Japanese lost a total of 322 carrier-based aircraft, of which only 39 were lost in air combat, and the remaining 283 were lost with the sinking of the aircraft carrier, while the loss of pilots was only 110, of which 81 were lost in air battles and 29 when the aircraft carrier sank. However, the number of pilots on the four aircraft carriers, including the pilots who were preparing to serve as the shore-based air force at Midway, totaled about 700, and the 110 casualties accounted for only 15 percent of the total number of pilots participating in the battle. Compared with the U.S. military, the U.S. military lost 208 pilots in this battle, almost twice as many as the Japanese army.

However, the Japanese army took the route of elite soldiers, and the flight students were selected one in a hundred, and the elimination rate of the flight students in the process of completing flight training reached 50%, so the pilots who were carefully selected and trained by a high elimination rate were absolutely elites, so the quality of the Japanese pilots in the early days of the war generally exceeded that of the American and British armies, and the fighter pilots needless to say, coupled with the excellent performance of the Zero, 300 Zeros were already able to sweep through Southeast Asia, and the Allied pilots had "Zero phobia" , and when he saw the Zero, he fled from the wind. The Japanese torpedo pilots were also masters, and in the battle to sink the British battleship "Prince of Wales", 15 torpedoes were fired, and 7 of them were hit, with a hit rate of 46.7%, which was simply unimaginable. The horizontal bomber pilots also performed well in the battle of sinking the British battleship "Prince of Wales", and the hit rate of horizontal bombs at an altitude of 3,000 meters reached 7.7%, which was a very rare high level at that time.

Although the loss of four aircraft carriers was lost, there were still six aircraft carriers, including the "Zuizuru", "Xianghe", "Longxiang", "Xiangfeng", and "Hayabusa", while the US military only had three aircraft carriers in the Pacific, the "Enterprise", the "Hornet", and the "Wasp" (the "Saratoga" was still repairing on the mainland due to injuries), and the advantage was still on the side of the Japanese army. Only from August 1942 to January 1943 in the battle for Guadalcanal, the elite pilots trained by the Japanese army before the war were gradually lost, and from the second half of 1943, the number of skilled pilots in the Japanese army began to be short, so they had to use the method of shortening the training time of flight cadets to speed up the replenishment of pilots, but the evil result of this method of drinking and quenching thirst was that the rookie pilots who were not trained enough lost quickly in the battle, and had to shorten the training of subsequent flight trainees, which eventually led to the vicious circle of shortening the training time, the faster the loss of novice pilots, and the faster the loss of new pilots, it was necessary to further shorten the vicious circle of training。 In the meantime, the Japanese naval aviation lost its last blood, and finally fell to the point where pilots who had undergone more than 10 hours of flight training could only fly planes to carry out suicide attacks.

It can be seen from this that it is obviously an exaggeration to raise the outcome of the Battle of Midway to the level of determining the course of the war.