Chapter 839: The International Situation
The situation in Kazakhstan is changing, but for a country with a population that is not as large as the magic capital, many of Abisevic's ideas in this turbulent and chaotic world may be beautiful, but they are involuntary.
Kazakhstan's southern railway renovation project, under a series of operations by Nazarbayev, quickly developed in a strange direction.
As a brilliant and successful politician, Nursultan Nazarbayev is well versed in the art of fighting for the right to speak.
New Year's Day has just passed, and Kazakh officials quickly set off a public opinion counterattack.
In response to the economic turmoil caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Abishevich proposed a striking policy.
A tenth of the oil produced and exported by Kazakhstan will be used to support grain imports. In the same period, the international grain price of maize, for example, was about US$1 per 50 kilograms. That is, as many tons of oil as Kazakhstan transports, it imports as many tons of grain.
This disguised oil-for-food program cleverly binds Almaty and the whole of Kazakhstan to ethnic Russians.
The reason is actually very simple, Kazakhstan's oil production capacity is mainly in the hands of ethnic Russians. Abishevich tied food relief benefits to oil, and any political action against ethnic Russians would have to be extremely risky.
The growth of the voice of Russians in Kazakhstan means that Russia's influence on Kazakhstan has grown, which incidentally suppresses the call for the reconstruction of the southern railway.
Once the voice of the political response is lost, then the mere propaganda from the media seems to be a bit thin.
With the announcement of the 1993 budget, Abisevic complied with the people's will and promulgated the plan for the reconstruction of the southern railway.
This plan can be said to be quite beautifully written, and it has considered the needs of the southern railway connection in detail, and tries to make any southern region enjoy the convenience and improvement brought by this plan. If this plan can be implemented in accordance with this plan, it is believed that Kazakhstan's national strength will inevitably be greatly enhanced, and the economy and cohesion of the entire country will be raised to a great level.
However, while this plan is good, there is one bad thing. How can we prepare at least $10 billion in investment for the 2,000-kilometer-long railway line? If we look at the bottom of Kazakhstan's state treasury, they can't get 10 million yuan.
Soon, as the news of the Almaty Daily's rectification spread, other media outlets quickly began to change their tune. There is no doubt that the oil-for-food exchange will improve the living standards of the people of Kazakhstan who are struggling to survive today than the costly railway project.
In fact, many residents of Almaty do not really care about the so-called southern railway reconstruction project, as a nomadic country, Almaty is home to one-tenth to one-fifth of Kazakhstan's population. Outside of Almaty, settlements of several thousand people are municipal administrative units, and the average population per unit of land is outrageously low.
The reason why the Almaty people, who have the right to speak, reacted so violently to the previous reports is that the whole society has found a suitable outlet for the backlog of grievances caused by long-term economic difficulties.
Is it important to have a railroad that runs through the country? Of course it is, but it's not that important. If Kazakhstan really spends 10 billion US dollars to build this railway, it will be able to make use of Kazakhstan's losses, and I am afraid that most of the time, they will never be able to make use of this railway volume based on their own transportation needs alone.
Reasons such as rapid response to disasters and building national cohesion are a bit ambitious.
Soon, some newspapers began to shout again: "Please slow down the railways in Kazakhstan, wait for the appetite of the people!". Well, anyway, they have been told on the left and right, who dares to take money to build the railway at this stage, it seems that this is the reason why the people can't eat!
After public opinion was almost ready, Abisevic finally threw out his killer idea.
The government certainly doesn't have the money to build the railway, but considering that the southern railway reconstruction project is also expected, it is better to put the railway out for public bidding.
No matter who is behind the project, he has the ability to pull out $10 billion in real money! In order to win over Kazakhstan, can the Americans really give up such a large sum of money?
Okay, if you're so generous with the Yankees, what does it matter if I make you a licking dog?
As for saying that if the Americans can't come up with this money, then don't blame me for going to Russia.
It was only in the face of Abishevich's flattering glances from time to time that Bush, the head of Shefron in Kazakhstan, could only ask from the bottom of his heart inexplicably: Who am I, where am I, and what am I doing?
While Abisevic was complacently waiting for the Americans to react, the international situation took a drastic turn.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union after 819 in 1991, the Caucasus region of Russia has been plunged into constant turmoil. Dudayev was elected president of the Chechen Republic in parliamentary elections immediately after the armed overthrow of the Russian regime there. By the end of 1991, the Chechen Republic had declared formal independence and had formed a large regular armed force.
By early 1992, the Ingushetia region in western Chechnya had seceded from Chechnya and announced its accession to Russia.
Against this background, the political situation in the Russian Federation suddenly became confusing.
It is impossible not to go to the Ingushetia region, people bring their own dry food to defect, and if the Khitans still want to kill the president, it is impossible to send the ducks in hand.
And the geographical location of Chechnya is so important!
The Caucasus is between the Caspian and Black Seas, Georgia and Azerbaijan to the south, and the Volga Essence of Russia to the north. It is not only the main oil-producing region of Russia, but also the main petrochemical industry, as well as an important grain-producing region, a mineral region, a large number of mechanical engineering and metalworking industries.
Including the famous Gorky Automobile Plant, as well as the Volgograd Tractor Plant, the Red October Metallurgical Plant, the Volgograd CC Company, the Barricade Plant......
Just from the names of these factories with distinctive era and regional characteristics, we can know what kind of history and status these factories have, and even the scenes of the Battle of Stalingrad can be seen in front of you.
Therefore, in the event of turmoil in the Caucasus, the most direct impact is that the production and export of oil in the Volga basin are threatened. This is not at all aggravating the situation for the entire Russian economy, but immediately felt the cold of Siberia like a cold snap falling to the bone marrow.
Originally, the time for Chechen independence made it impossible for the Khitans to spare their hands, and Dudayev was speechless from armed independence to elections. However, the secession and return of the Ingushetia region has put the Russian Federation on fire.
The strategy that was supposed to be "invisible" failed, and the question of Chechen independence was brought to the fore.
Since mid-1992, the Russian Federation has been engaged in protracted and arduous negotiations with the Chechen armed forces.
In the original history, the bad situation in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the Khitans having to let Chechnya independence. In the negotiations, not only did they blindly compromise with Dudayev, but they could even be said to have aided and abetted him.
Not only to recognize the independent status of Chechnya, but also to give Dudayev a pension. The Chechens not only had their own passports, but also advanced equipment from the Russians, including the most advanced T-80 tanks of the Soviet army.
It can be said that Chechnya started with a winning hand.
However.
There is a slight difference between this and the previous history, and the biggest difference is that the CPSU has not died yet!
Chechnya's good calculation is de facto independence, but it nominally retains the status of a Russian Federation republic.
It's a pity that this example is not easy to open after all, a Chechen is just the size of the imperial capital, gritting his teeth and temporarily admitting the status quo.
On the other hand, although the CPSU suffered heavy losses in 1991, it was transferred to the Far East in an organized way, and now it is clear that it has gained a foothold. If the Russian Federation dares to sign the treaty on the withdrawal of troops from Chechnya, it is likely that it will lose not only Chechnya, but also the Far Eastern Republics!
If Russia does not even dare to fight Chechnya, but you dare to attack the Far East? If the loss of Chechnya is only dictated by the times, then the loss of the Far East will inevitably lead to the loss of the legal basis for the ruling Russian Federation. The Russians may be able to accept the loss of Chechnya, but they are by no means indifferent to the loss of the Far East.
The existence of the CPSU has left Russia in its throat, and even if it wants to compromise, there is no room for compromise. The Khitans dared to bombard the White House in their original history, and that was because Russia had no rivals at that time, and no matter how bad it was, he would not be ousted from the position of president.
But now that the CPSU is eyeing the Far East, if the Khitans and the Russian Federation do not do as well as the Soviet Union, the Muscovites can praise him, and they will be able to invite the CPSU back as it is.
Even before things came to this, Schönin had already published more than a dozen articles in the newspapers in a row attacking the fact that Yeltsin's weakness towards Chechnya had led to the violation of Russia's sovereignty and threats to its national interests.
By the beginning of 1993, as the inside information of the negotiations between Russia and Chechnya was constantly revealed by the CPSU, the Khitans and the nascent Russian Federation were forced into a corner, and there was no room for reversal.
Under the pressure of public opinion of the CPSU, the Khitans had to withdraw Lieutenant General Strogov, who had negotiated with Dudayev, announcing the breakdown of negotiations with Chechnya.
The Khitans, who had tasted the sweetness of armed blackmail against Germany, may have some unrealistic illusions about the Russian army.