A mistake is made once, and if he does not correct it, it is obvious that a person will make that mistake again.

And they will become more and more emboldened, or play with fire more and more.

After Nicolisson got rid of that £60,000 deficit, it was just the beginning.

Soon the next time Lisson asked his employee George to sell 100 September futures, all of which were bought by him, worth up to 8 million pounds, this George was a subordinate, a colleague and his friend, and asked for his help.

If he didn't help, he was afraid that he would expose the last time he had lost £60,000.

Once reported......

Nick Lisson didn't want to lose the life he was happy with now, and it was a big deal for Lisson to put George's few mistakes on the "88888" account.

But there were three questions that bothered him: first, how to make up for these mistakes; the second is how to evade the internal audit of the London headquarters at the end of the month after the error is recorded in the "88888" account; The third is that SIMEX asks them to make a margin call every day, they will calculate how much the Singapore branch loses every day, and the "88888" account can also be displayed on the big screen of SIMEX.

In order to make up for George's mistakes, Lisson transferred the commissions he earned to the account, but the premise was, of course, that these mistakes could not be too large, and the amount of losses caused was not too large, but the mistakes made by George were indeed too big.

In order to earn back enough money to compensate for all the losses, Lisson took on more and more risks.

He was involved in a large number of straddle trades, as the Nikkei was stable at the time, and Lisson earned option premiums from this trade. If you're unlucky and the Nikkei moves drastically, this trade will cost the Bank of Bahrain a lot of money. Lisson did a great job in a while.

By July 1993, he had turned the $6 million loss in account "88888" into a slight surplus, with an annual salary of £50,000 and an end-of-year bonus of almost £100,000. If Lisson stops, then Bahrain's history will change as well.

In addition to covering up for George, Reeson made another serious mistake in order to win over Bonifoy, Nikkei's biggest customer in the market.

In late 1993, for several days in a row, market prices soared by more than 1,000 points a record, computer screens used to settle records malfunctioned frequently, and countless transactions were backlogged. Because the system didn't work properly, the transaction records were manual, and by the time the errors were discovered, Lisson had lost nearly $1.7 million in a single day. With no way out, Lisson decided to continue hiding these blunders.

In 1994, Lisson had become numb to the amount of losses, and the losses of the "88888" account had gone from 20 million to 30 million pounds to 50 million pounds by July. Many of the trades that Lisson has made have been led by the nose by the market, not because of what he expects from the market, but because he has become a puppet manipulated by his risky position.

At that time, all he could think about was which direction of market changes would turn him into a winner, and if he could make up for the losses in the "88888" account, he tried to influence the market to move in that direction.

When the losses reached £50 million, the Bank of Bahrain sent someone to investigate Lisson's accounts. In fact, every day there is a balance sheet, and every day there are obvious records, which can tell the problems of Lisson.

Even at the end of the month, the false accounts that Lisson created to cover up the problem were extremely easy to uncover – if Bahrain really had strict censorship. Lisson faked that Citibank had £50 million in deposits, but the £50 million had been misappropriated to compensate for losses in the "88888" account.

After checking the accounts for a month, no one went to check the accounts of Citibank, so no one found that there was no £50 million in the Citibank account.

With regard to the balance sheet, Peter Barin, Chairman of the Bank of Bahrain, also commented in March 1994 that the balance sheet was useless because its composition could change significantly in a short period of time. As a result, Peter Bahrain said, "It would be naïve to think that revealing more balance sheet data would increase our understanding of a group." Bahrain's chairman who doesn't pay attention to the balance sheet is destined to pay a terrible price

In addition, on 11 January 1995, the Audit and Taxation Department of the Singapore Futures Exchange sent a letter to Bahrain raising some of their concerns about the funds required to maintain the "88888" account. Moreover, by this time, Lisson had to ask London to remit £10 million a day to cover his margin call. In fact, from 1993 to 1994, the Bank of Bahrain invested more than £100 million in the SIMEX and Japanese markets, exceeding the Bank of England's limit of 25% of total overseas funds for British banks.

To this end, the Bank of Bahrain has held several talks with the Bank of England. In May 1994, the Bank of Bahrain received the "tacit approval" of the senior officials of the Bank of England in charge of the supervision of commercial banks, but this acquiescence did not leave any supporting documents, because the top officials of the relevant departments of the Bank of England were not consulted, which violated the internal regulations of the Bank of England.

Most incredibly, the Bank of Bahrain was not alert to the lax and negligent internal controls of the Bank of Bahrain at the end of 1994 when it discovered that it had shown a difference of £50 million on its balance sheet. In the two months between the discovery of the problem and the subsequent closure of Bahrain, there were many senior and senior Bahraini personnel who were concerned about the issue, and the audit department at the Bahrain headquarters formally investigated it.

However, these investigations were deceived by Lisson in a very easy way.

Lisson's description of this period is: "I find it strange that there was no one to stop me. People in London should know that my numbers are fake, and they should know that the cash I ask for every day at the London headquarters is wrong, but they still pay it. “

From the perspective of financial ethics, if all of the above financial practitioners involved in the "Bahrain incident" are scored, they should be given a failing grade. In particular, many of Bahrain's top managers do not go into the possible problems at all, but blindly believe in Lisson and expect him to make money for Bahrain arbitrage. It is particularly ironic that two months before Bahrain's bankruptcy, at a conference on Bahrain's financial outcomes held in New York in December 1994, 250 Bahraini bankers around the world embraced Lisson as a hero of Bahrain and gave him a long and enthusiastic applause.

On January 18, 1995, after the earthquake in Kobe, the island nation of Kobe, and in the days that followed, the Nikkei in Tokyo fell sharply.

On Jan. 30, Reeson received money from London at a rate of £10 million a day, bought 30,000 Nikkei futures and shorted island government bonds. On Feb. 10, Lisson had a record number of 55,000 Nikkei futures and 20,000 island government bond contracts on the Singapore Futures Exchange.

All these transactions go to the "88888" account. The transactions on the account can be concealed because of the fact that they are also responsible for the clearance, but the additional margin cannot be hidden. Lisson continued to transfer money under various pretexts. The level of looseness is incredible.

In mid-February, Bank of Bahrain had only £470 million in shares.

On February 23, 1995, the last day of Bahrain futures, Lisson's efforts to influence the direction of the market failed completely. Nikkei shares closed down to 17,885 points, while Lisson's Nikkei futures long risk position has reached more than 60,000 contracts; While the price of its Japanese government bonds has been rising, its short risk position has reached 26,000 contracts. The loss that Lisson brought to Bahrain finally reached a high of 860 million pounds when Bahrain's senior executives were still dreaming of next-day dividends, and caused the fate of the world's oldest Bahrain bank.

This 233-year-old commercial bank with a good track record has disappeared from the city of London and the global financial world.

The Bank of Bahrain is going bankrupt, what does this have to do with Li Jun, this has a lot to do with it, because as long as the reverse operation is reversed, the profit will be great.