Qiong Tan Liufei, maple oak Ning Dan, rattan basket Bodhisattva purple, Jiangtian rain ink, is the thick and thick.

The new amount of dripping green, catkins flying white, smoke cage cold water, sparse shadow and horizontal oblique, is the light is light.

The spring water and autumn Hong, the long pavilion and the short bridge, the painting of the boat wind lotus, the person who looks like the moon on the edge of the wine"

On the Shanghai-Nanjing High School, a convoy galloped by, unhurriedly drove into the urban area of Wucheng, and headed for the Wucheng Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government on Sanxiang Road.

On April 2, the Xinlan Consortium of the United States announced the establishment of Xinlan Technology Asia Refining Co., Ltd., referred to as Xinlan Asia Center, in Wucheng Industrial Park, China. Located in the Asian center, the opening center will be responsible for the coordination of all the research, production and sales resources of Xinlan Technology in Dongfang, Wucheng, Liangxi, Chang'an and Beijing.

According to the news released by Xinlan Group, Xinlan Technology Asia Center located in Wucheng Industrial Park is a joint venture established by Xinlan Technology and Huaxin Wucheng Industrial Park Venture Capital Co., Ltd., and the entire project plans to invest about two US dollars, of which Xinlan holds shares of 2 gills, and Huaxin Wucheng Industrial Park Venture Capital Co., Ltd. holds 7 shares of Bibi Xinbi, mainly in the form of land use rights.

It is reported that Xinlan Technology Asia Center will include various software, hardware product factories and four and two parts. According to the relevant person, Xinlan had previously established a memory packaging factory in Wucheng, according to the new plan, the production capacity of the original Wucheng factory will be increased in stages, and after the completion of the full completion, the production plant of Cisco and other enterprises under the Xinlan consortium in Wucheng will become a number of employees in Wangkou and the world's largest production scale of computer chips and network communication products.

In addition to the production plant, the Xinlan Asia Center also includes a Yubour. The tasks of the center include undertaking the automation construction of the Wucheng factory and supporting the activities of Xinlan Technology Group in the Asia-Pacific region, and the support content mainly includes production, development and service.

It is reported that before the establishment of the Asia Center, Xinlan Technology already had a branch organization in Huaxia: Dongfang is the headquarters of Huaxia, which is mainly responsible for research, marketing and customer service; The former Wucheng factory was mainly responsible for the packaging of storage products; The Liangxi plant is responsible for the production of control chip products including Liberty brand and logic company; According to the analysis of industry insiders, Xinlan has continued to invest in China in recent years, and has formed a complete industrial chain including research, production and sales.

At the same time, the establishment of the Asia Center has greatly reduced the role of its Huaxia headquarters, and the Wucheng Asia Headquarters will replace the Huaxia headquarters in Dongfang City and begin to exercise the overall planning power of Xinlan Technology, including the entire Asian region.

Xinlan Group announced that Qin Qin, chairman of the consortium, will personally serve as the chairman and student of the Asia Center, "Heinz Hans will be the president of the Asia Center, William Helena will be the vice president of the Asia Center, and Shu Xin will be the chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Asia Center.

Cisco, the fourth subsidiary of Xinlan Group, the main enterprise in the industry, also said that in the old ten years, Cisco Huaxia will get a total investment of no less than one US dollar, which is a historical fact, Cisco originally had this plan, and I have not changed it".

The news was transmitted back to Wucheng, the Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government Compound and Wucheng Industrial Park were boiling instantly, and the total task of Wucheng's investment promotion in four years was 2 US dollars, and as a result, Secretary Xiao's investment promotion group went to the United States and brought back the investment of Xinlan Group's huge US dollars! This is not a highly polluting chemical enterprise, but a high-tech enterprise with almost no pollution! This investment of 100 million dollars was smashed, and the whole Wucheng was a little dizzy! You must know that this investment of two dollars will be how many factories will be built, how many high-tech talents will be absorbed, and the most important thing is "how many supporting manufacturers will be needed!" How much production, marketing and transportation capacity do you want! This is a huge driving force for the Wucheng Economic Exhibition!

Xiao Zhen hasn't rushed back yet, and Wu Cheng's celebration banquet has already been prepared! Not only Wu Cheng, but even the Jiangdong Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Government were excited and called Xiao Zhen, who was in the United States, to congratulate him. In addition, the provincial party committee also said at the same time. As a member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee, Xiao Zhen should come to the Provincial Party Committee more often, for example, there is an important meeting now, and when the new century comes, he should review the achievements of reform and opening up over the years, and of course, more importantly, discuss a blueprint for the development of Jiangdong in the next five or even 10 years or even longer. In this meeting, to be honest, Xiao Zhen knew that he couldn't interject anything, don't look at himself as a member of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee, he was naturally one of the thirteen giants in Jiangdong Province, but he knew that his own position was correct, and the hat of this Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee was thrown to him in order to let him control Wucheng Industrial Park, a special zone that is equivalent to the sub-provincial authority, and it was basically his turn to intervene in matters other than Wucheng. Of course, in this meeting, if Secretary You Jing needs him to help say a few words, or help vote on something, it will still have some effect, but in any case, Xiao Ke doesn't attach much importance to this meeting.

Xiao Zhen valued another meeting, which was also the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee, but it was an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee, which was dedicated to studying the work in southern Jiangsu. Now Xiao Ke is a serious busy man, coming back from the United States, staying in Wucheng for only one day, he drove to Jinning for a meeting, he himself only felt busy, only tired, but the cadres in the compound of the Wucheng Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government were very envious, the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee, as soon as this hat was put on, the effect was suddenly different. If when Xiao Ke first came to Wucheng, everyone was just in awe of the secretary out of habit, then now they really don't dare to have other ideas, the Standing Committee of the Provincial Party Committee and the Secretary of the Municipal Party Committee, this official is no longer one level bigger, at least two levels! The first level of the official university crushes people to death, let alone two levels? Look at the convoy when Secretary Xiao goes to the provincial party committee meeting now, there must be a police car to open the road, in addition to his own car and an accompanying municipal party committee office, a police car in front of him is ironclad, and a police car in the back is escorted, this is the treatment, even if Xiao Zhen doesn't like it, he can't refuse, everyone takes the car like this outside the rest of the Standing Committee, you are an exception?

The promotion is to improve the salary. As the rank of the post increases, the political, spiritual, and material benefits should rise. However, if the treatment of Chinese officials is only in accordance with government regulations, I am afraid that no one can see it. What is really tempting is naturally the tangible, intangible, and covert interests behind the position.

Is there a secret to being an official? It seems that there is, and there is a wonderful description of this in "The Strange Status Quo Witnessed in Twenty Years":

"Cast peaches, repay plums, pat horses, and cheer for the scene, this wrist is also; flaunting, co-opting, bowing, and fraging, but also wrists; Crowding out, spreading rumors, plundering merit, and blaming trouble, and also being tricky. How to be ambiguous, how to deal with it, how to brag, how to pretend to be sick, all kinds of things, invincible. Everything is a wrist, that is, everything is a posture, everything is fake, and it is an official. Playing official words, telling lies. Do official articles, write fake also.

The morality of officialdom, fake morality also. The affairs of officialdom are also fake public and private affairs. ”

There is such a plot in "Romance of the Three Kingdoms": Sun Ce said to Sun Quan on his deathbed: "Ask Zhang Zhao if you don't decide on internal affairs, and ask Zhou Yu if you don't decide on foreign affairs, but the strange thing is that Sun Quan didn't let Zhang Zhao be the prime minister." Instead, he let Gu Yong, who was more than Zhang Zhaokoufei, be the prime minister. And for nineteen years, his greatest advantage is that he has six alum teeth

One of the reasons why Zhang Zhao can't be a prime minister is that he has no city government and no mouth. I have always known everything, said everything, even if it is immature opinions, I am in a hurry to express it, the original intention is to provide reference for the master when making decisions, but if you say too much, you will lose.

The second reason why Zhang Zhao can't be a prime minister is that he is disrespectful and unkind to his superiors. And Gu Yong can pay attention to maintaining the image and dignity of his master everywhere. Such a knowledgeable and trouble-free subordinate, who doesn't like to be a leader.

The third reason why Zhang Zhao can't be a prime minister is that he is reserved and too upright, and he can't get along with the masses. Thereupon. If the boss doesn't like it, he can't do it as the prime minister. Sun Quan was later called the emperor, even if he was not called the emperor, he was actually the king of a country, and naturally he had the skill of being a vassal.

The art of stationing in ancient China mainly refers to the deceitful means of the monarch to control and control his vassals. At the same time, the basic principles and techniques of the art of stationing in the bureaucracy are also applied to various relations between superiors and subordinates within the bureaucracy. As a means of political struggle, the art of controlling ministers was highly valued by the ancient rulers of China.

The use of the art of garrisoning is nothing more than two purposes, one is to drive the vassals to serve the monarch; The second is to prevent subordinates from committing rebellion. The main methods are as follows:

The first is the art of enveloping rewards. The basic means of the monarch to control his subjects are nothing more than inducements and threats of replanting. Enveloping rewards is the most common and basic means of controlling ministers in ancient China, and its main role is to lure and use ministers. In the process of actually using the technique of encompassing rewards, rulers generally have the following principles: choose the content of wisdom, divide the process of wisdom, grasp the timing of wisdom, and pay attention to the posture of wisdom.

Under the ancient Chinese bureaucratic political system, official positions represented a certain amount of power, status, fame, and wealth. For the vassals who are floating in the sea of eunuchs, the pursuit of official positions is undoubtedly the most important motivation for loyalty to the monarch. Therefore, the monarchs of ancient China usually chose official positions as the main content of Shi Hui. However, there is no end to the promotion of subordinates, and the promotion of official positions cannot be without restrictions. In the face of this conundrum, the cunning monarch pursued the principle of "dividing" favors, that is, dividing the official positions more and more finely, as many types and ranks as possible. Only by allowing the subordinates to climb step by step on the many career steps is equivalent to increasing their hope for continuous promotion and the number of times of psychological satisfaction. It is precisely for this purpose that the exhibition of the ancient Chinese official system has shown a trend of becoming more and more varied and detailed.

The second is the art of prevention and punishment. Prevention and punishment are the same as enveloping rewards, and it is also the most basic means of stationing subjects of ancient Chinese rulers, and its role is small, mainly in preventing ministers and controlling subjects. The basic means of ancient monarchs to prevent and punish their subordinates included the principles of severe punishment, punishment before imminent, and psychological deterrence. For the monarch, the focus that needs to be guarded against is, of course, those important ministers, meritorious heroes, and capable ministers. ** The monarch cannot tolerate the power or ability of his subjects. When the power of the retainers is strong enough to rival the monarch, their end is not far off. Those capable ministers who are arrogant and sharp are the objects that the monarch will want to get rid of.

The third is the art of establishing authority. Majesty is one of the important conditions for the effective exercise of power. Only by maintaining a dignified image can the monarch be able to submit and be a minister. In order to establish their own prestige and dignity, and to promote the sense of respect, trust, obedience, and fear among their vassals, the ancient Chinese monarchs often used these methods.

Showing talent and political achievements, deliberately creating a sense of mystery, using the law to maintain dignity, using power to increase majesty, etc. There is a close relationship between power and majesty, majesty contributes to the effective exercise of power, and the deceitful use of power also contributes to the increase of majesty.

Fourth, the art of balancing and containing. The art of balancing and containing was one of the important means for ancient Chinese monarchs to control their ministers. The basic principles of this method are: under the premise of a high degree of centralization of power by the monarch, a certain balance of power is sought over the years, and a power structure is formed that is convenient for the monarch to manipulate; Taking advantage of the contradictions between different groups and factions in the vassals, the practice of "using vassals to control vassals" is so that the monarch is in a natural position.

The main means are to suppress the power of the minister, to control the ministers with micro-ministers, to control the ministers with close ministers, to control the ministers with cool officials, and to take advantage of the contradictions between the ministers. There are always various groups and factions among the vassals, and taking advantage of the contradictions between them is one of the political balancing tricks often played by ancient Chinese monarchs. As long as the interests of the monarch are not affected, the monarch will not only not strive to eliminate the contradictions between his subjects, but will deliberately create and maintain the situation of antagonism between his subjects to a certain extent. Fighting among the ministers will only create a favorable situation in which the monarch is manipulating and dividing and controlling.

The so-called art of stationing ministers is actually a means of political struggle to deal with the relationship between the monarch and bureaucracy, and it should be said that it is the inevitable product of the monarchical system in ancient China. In the rule of the ancient Chinese monarchy, the bureaucracy has a special and important position. The absolute ** of the monarch can only be realized through the mediation of the bureaucracy. Therefore, it was more important for the monarch to control and control the bureaucracy than to rule the people directly. The so-called "art of politics" in ancient China is actually the main content of "the art of the south of the king", that is, the art of controlling the ministers. "The ruler is more important than the people, and the role of art is to govern the officials." Although the monarch and the bureaucracy belong to the same ruling group, there are inevitably various contradictions and conflicts in terms of specific interests.

The height of the art of garrisoning the ministers has had a profound impact on the development of ancient Chinese politics in many aspects.

In terms of the political system, the influence of the art of the retainer is the most obvious. An important feature of the art of the retainer is the institutionalization of the form of expression. The starting point of formulating a political system is only based on how to facilitate the monarch's presence and control of his subjects, and this situation will inevitably lead to the irrationality of the established system and will produce all kinds of drawbacks in actual operation.

In terms of political morality, all power tactics emphasize "art" rather than "morality", and they will do whatever it takes to achieve their goals. Although the art of the monarch's retainer is often dressed in the cloak of "institutionalized moralization", it cannot completely hide the insidious, vicious, and cunning nature.

In terms of political relations, the influence of the art of the courtier is more direct. The relationship between monarchs and ministers was one of the most important political relations in ancient China. Whether this relationship is properly handled or not is often related to the safety or death of the entire country and the life and death of a particular regime. In practice, the art of the retainer may play the role of a "lubricant", regulating the relationship between the monarch and the minister, and maintaining the unity within the ruling group; Or it can play the role of a "corrosive agent", intensify the contradictions and antagonism between monarchs and ministers, and create turmoil in the political situation. In addition to the relationship between the monarch and the minister, the influence of the art of the retainer can also be seen in the official relationship. Under a hierarchical bureaucracy. The boss is tantamount to a small "monarch" to his subordinates, and the monarch's retainer technique will inevitably be effective and extended, and it will become a means of taking "down" from "up" in a broad sense.

In the course of its historical exhibition, the art of the vassals inevitably led to its own opposite, that is, the creation of the art of the vassals. Its specific techniques include: the art of resisting the king, the art of deceiving the king, the art of avoiding the king, the art of deceiving the king, etc.

In the book "Subordinate Studies" by the corrupt official Zhang Erjiang, there is: In front of the superiors, you must pretend to be confused and pretend to be Sun Xiaozi's "high opinion"

This reflects the "unspoken rule" of officialdom from one side.4 Promotion is not based on who has virtue and talent, but on who is good at "pretending to be confused and pretending to be a grandson"

In the officialdom, you must have a good "pretence", pretend to be serious when you should pretend to be serious, pretend to be a grandson when you should pretend to be a grandson, and pretend to be a fool when you should be a fool. For example, the leader talks to you. What he said is that you should also pretend to be convinced and understand, if you don't know how to pretend and show a disapproving attitude, then you will not have good fruit to eat.

What are rights? Power is wealth, dignity, satisfaction, doing whatever you want, and everything. Therefore, after looking at the history of China, "people die for money, and birds die for food." It should be changed to, "Man dies for power, and birds die for food". Because it is difficult for ordinary people to obtain power, they regard wealth as the purpose of life, in fact, having wealth does not necessarily mean that they can have power, and having power can lead to wealth. Therefore, "human power death" is the most appropriate. How to grasp power and how to protect power has always been a permanent topic for the Chinese emperors.

In ancient China, there was such a strange phenomenon, the real benevolent and intelligent people could not be the founding emperor, and the founding emperor often belonged to such two kinds of people: one is the hooligan, the other is the heroic, because the hooligan has no scruples, and the powerful and powerful.

The standard of Eastern wisdom is scheming. The standard of Western wisdom is to create clearly. Therefore, the wise people in the minds of the Chinese people are often Zhuge Liang and other powerful sorcerers, city government families, world historians and people who know the times; Westerners, on the other hand, are theorists and thinkers such as Clemenceau or enlightened and creative artists such as Edison. People have endless fun fighting with things, and we are fighting with people and having endless fun.

What is the most sophisticated and profound knowledge in our country since ancient times? Or humanitarian, it is Taoist thought, it is Confucianism, it is Legalist thought, it is Mohist thought, it is I Ching; Or some people say that it is the art of war, Chinese medicine, and literature. It is Zu Chongzhi and scientists such as Zhang Heng, Guo Shoujing, and Shen Kuo.

Actually, these are not the most essential. A Chinese history is said to be 5,000 years up and down, and it can be verified for more than 3,000 years, the most fierce of which is to be an official. From the emperor to the small people, from the scholar to the poor and sour center of discourse, what is it? It's all about being an official. Reading is to be an official, "learning and being a good officer."; The reward is promotion, three levels in a row; The greatest value of life is to glorify the ancestors, relying on "the best officials, the deterrence of the government and the opposition, and the majesty of the small."

What's more, a Confucianism is even more of a naked study of the world. What is Jingshi? In fact, it is to be an official. It's just in the name of serving the people. Confucianism means that it is difficult to serve the people without being an official, so it is necessary to "learn to become a literary and martial artist and sell it to the emperor's family".

When you become an official, can you serve the people? No, no, no. What do you rely on to be an official to ensure official toughness, not by the people, but by the emperor. The emperor can't incarnate tens of millions, so he needs officials, so how to deal with the emperor has become the first knowledge of being an official. This is a systemic problem, not that the ancients were stupid, but that they were wise. If you don't rely on the emperor, do you rely on the people? Isn't that?

Of course, among the thousands of officials, there will still be some people who are willing to work for the welfare of the common people, and there are also some people who have to work for the welfare of the common people because they want to maintain their rule.

Xiao Ke has been at the grassroots level in recent years, and his understanding of China's reform has gradually begun to deepen from the theoretical understanding of the year, and at the same time, he has also seen more aspects and more problems.

The need for reform is rooted in the actual process of Chinese society, whether it is the emergence of internal problems or the pressure of external system competition. All of them make political reform an urgent need. The urgent need has been forcibly suppressed because there is another, more urgent need, another, more serious hidden crisis: the need to maintain basic stability, the fear of the extreme consequences of the political transition process.

The success of the great transformation of society depends on maintaining stability throughout the process.

The biggest difficulty in reform lies in the redistribution of interests, from top to bottom.

In China, any reform must be supported by the highest authority and given as much power as possible, otherwise, you will achieve nothing.

In ancient and modern times, in China and abroad, any reform will inevitably be a reshuffling of the pattern of vested interests, and the beneficiaries will naturally applaud, while the victims will inevitably resist with all their might.

In the previous reforms in Chinese history, from Shang'an to Zhang Juzheng, most of them focused on economic reform, and the rule of officials was the main content of the reform, and Fan Zhongyan was the first student. Judging from the history of China, as long as any reform touches vested interest groups, it is like seeking the skin of a tiger, and there is no time that it does not end in failure. Handing over the power to employ people to one or two officials will inevitably lead to the will of the chief officials of "employing people only for their relatives and for themselves," resulting in an unhealthy trend of trusting relations, going through the back door, colluding with superiors, and flattering power. Without supervision outside the system, don't want to touch the slightest bit of officialdom.

At that time, the officialdom, regardless of whether there was virtue or not, talent or not, ability or incompetence, survived the years, fought for qualifications, as long as there was no fault, there was no worry about not being promoted. Therefore, Fan Zhongyan's reform of official governance was doomed to the fate of inevitable failure from the beginning. Because this reform touches on huge vested interests.

Any dynasty, a country, a system. The "sorrows" that brought disaster to it, and eventually led to its demise, were almost inherently related to the dynasty, the country, and the system. This is like a person, when he was born, the genes that caused his death were already latent in his body. Xiao Zhen knows very well that a political regime should boldly and immediately make concessions to society when it can still basically control the situation, when both soft and hard forces are relatively strong, so as to grasp the leading power of reform and social development. Once the soft power is lost, the strength of the hard power is meaningless. Because it is impossible for a regime to last for a long time by hard power alone. Whether a traditional government can successfully transform depends fundamentally on whether it can retain people's hearts; And whether we can retain people's hearts depends on whether we can seize the opportunity. At a turning point in history, people's hearts are often fleeting.

Sitting on the O'Ao forced tire that went to Jinning for a meeting, Xiao Zhen looked at Lin Lei's hand holding the steering wheel, and at the same time remembered the exchange with his aunt when he was in the United States. Xiao Ding knows very well that reform is different from revolution, and the biggest difference between the two is that reform is the reform of political order carried out on the premise of maintaining social stability. The premise of social stability is the stability of the social structure, especially the stability of the social balance of forces. This means that reform is carried out on the basis of the original balance of forces, and a certain pattern of balance of forces determines a certain pattern of distribution of interests. In the process of reform, because the powerful groups are still strong, they have mastered the superior resources in all aspects and have the ability to influence the direction of reform. Reforms that harm the fundamental interests of the powerful will inevitably be prevented, and only reforms in which the disadvantaged groups bear the main costs will be able to move forward relatively smoothly, because the latter are unable to protect their own rights and interests.

Unless the original balance of forces is fundamentally changed, reform is unlikely to lead to an upside down of the pattern of interests. The sources of benefits, the benefits and the groups of people who suffer may be different, but the main targets of the strong and the weak and the rich and the poor are difficult to change. Once the original balance of forces is changed, reform will suddenly turn into revolution. Revolution is the mobilization of the lower strata of the population, which accounts for the majority of the population, to change the relative relationship of forces, so that the weak can become strong. Only on the basis of a fundamental change in the pattern of this balance of forces can the pattern of interests be turned upside down, and the costs of social change can be borne mainly by the original powerful vested interest groups.

However, revolutions are marked by the destruction of order and stability, and generally have to pay the price of consuming the material stock of society and making it difficult to sustain the increment. Due to the special population and natural resource constraints, this kind of cost means that a large number of people in China have lost the material security necessary for survival, which is a price that China cannot afford. Therefore. Avoiding revolution is the Huaxia Society

Social evolution is non-linear, and human beings should be cautious in making proactive efforts. Refuse to take risks and make room for the contingencies of history. In the absence of a change in the established pattern, the government must win the support of the powerful in order to move forward with reforms, which is why the powerful group is called strong: strong not only in relation to society, but sometimes also in relation to the government.

At this stage, the main forces that can make adjustments are the government and public opinion. Although the government is powerless to fundamentally reverse the fact that the cost of reform is mainly borne by the disadvantaged groups, it can compensate the disadvantaged groups by intervening in secondary distribution and using transfer payments.

In the game of interests between the strong and the weak and the rich and the poor, intellectuals should choose to stand on the side of the disadvantaged groups. Through the intervention of public opinion, the balance of power at specific game points should be changed, and the situation of vulnerable groups who are unable to protect themselves should be improved, so that they can have a certain ability to protect themselves and reduce the harm they suffer. This intervention of intellectuals and public opinion is crucial to social stability. It can limit the harm of the powerful group, the so-called elite alliance, to the weak group, and the most basic rights and interests of the weak group are expected to be protected while bearing the cost of reform, and social contradictions will not be excessively intensified, and conflicts will not go to extremes.

The reform goal has been put forward and widely recognized because it is in line with the overall and long-term interests of the whole society. However, in a sense, reform is also the adjustment of interest relations, and the adjustment needs space, and someone needs to bear the cost of interest adjustment; Under the established pattern of balance of forces, the implementation of reform will inevitably temporarily harm the interests of vulnerable groups.

No one has the power to demand sacrifices for the overall or long-term good, so such sacrifices are inherently coercive: vulnerable groups are prone to coercion, so it is often them who make the sacrifices.

China's reform should have standards suited to China's national conditions, that is, the standards of the social ownership system and the people's standards. We know that reform can liberate the productive forces, but revolution can also liberate the productive forces. If the reform changes the productive forces of China to the point where revolution is needed to further emancipate them, then the reform of China will lose its role in historical progress. In Xiao Zhen's view, the simplest way to put it is: the bottom line of China's reform is not to reform the people to the opposite side; The reform of state-owned enterprises cannot be changed to the "27th strike".

Rules determine values, but rules are set by people who have a tendency to make profits. The market economy in the era of globalization is defined by Westerners.

The position of the so-called "efficiency" is the position of capital, the position of profit, not the position of the people. The capital in the Chinese market economy must be controlled by the people under the leadership of the people, and the efficiency is separated from the fairness, and the capital is separated from the people, and the exhibition of China is not sustainable.

According to pure economics, social equity is also productivity and part of a good investment climate. The marketization of state-owned enterprises and the control of profits will lead to the inevitable result of urban polarization. When profits are in charge, the rules of enterprise competition will change. Under the profit rule, "state-owned enterprises. Semi-sure defeat of "private enterprises" because the latter can do whatever it takes, while the former has the responsibility of social fairness. State enterprises have a duty of fairness, as well as a duty of confidentiality; Secrecy is an intangible cost, which there is no way to get by. Private companies do not have such a heavy burden, so of course they are flexible.

Regardless of ideology, a minimum level of social security is necessary for any society to be stable in order for it to be stable. The people should be the core value of China's reform. Reform cannot be changed out of the people's revolution, and this is a bottom line of our reform. At present, a large number of social problems that have emerged in China have already involved the road of reform in China. China's reform cannot be separated from the socialist road, which is to take the people as the core value rather than the capital as the core value.

China's pre-reform political structure was one of extreme inequality in the distribution of political power. From the perspective of human historical practice, the extreme inequality in the distribution of political power rarely leads to the extreme equality in the distribution of economic benefits without exception. However, in socialist countries, there are exceptions: extreme inequality in the distribution of political power and relative equality in the distribution of economic benefits. This is mainly due to strong ideological constraints. However, the historical practice of mankind shows that this strong ideological constraint lacks continuity, so the distribution of economic benefits returns to an unequal structure. Therefore, the inequality in the distribution of economic benefits that people complain about today stems from the inequality in the distribution of political power that has been set in the past.

In essence, socialism is to achieve two goals: first, the relatively equal distribution of the fruits of social labor in the economy; Second, politically, the broad masses of the people are the masters of the country, that is, political democratization.

Huaxia 2. The reform process over the years can be roughly divided into two stages: the first stage ended in the middle of the Na era, which was a reform led by the central government to decentralize power and give benefits to the general preferential manner. general benefits for all strata of society; The second stage is now, which is led by the executive branch, "taking power and passing responsibility." of reforms. The interest groups of the executive branch have become the main beneficiaries of the reform, and the other strata of society have become the main bearers of the cost of the reform.

Many of the reform policies that are now being introduced are no longer generally for the benefit of the whole people and for the progress of society. Rather, it is to consolidate and expand monopoly power in order to seize monopoly profits; It is no longer for the good of citizens and the state, but for the private interests of departments and individuals. For example, the purpose of stock market reform is not to optimize the allocation of resources and protect the interests of shareholders, but to shirk the government's responsibility and defraud tens of millions of shareholders of their money to bear the losses of state-owned enterprises. The purpose of the reform of state-owned enterprises is not to increase employment and tax revenue, but to enable security officials to abuse their power for personal gain, seize enterprise property, and make groups of officials and businessmen get rich out of thin air. The reform has obviously embarked on a path of serious imbalance of "power and wealth are brought in, and responsibility is pushed out". It has become a means for some government departments to legally record and seize the interests of the public. Xiao Zhen paid special attention to this issue when he was in Langliu.

It is important that the impetus for reform is profit inducement. However, this motivation is very suspicious in some industry reforms and grassroots reforms. Some of the reforms we are seeing are an inflated increase in sectoral interests. This kind of "insider-led reform." The phenomenon has become very common in China. Various departments have adopted "sectoral legislation" to protect vested interests and powers and prevent others from reforming themselves. This kind of "insider-led reform." On the surface, it seems that it is a time of prosperity in China's legalization, but in fact, it is a "overlord clause" that is completely contrary to the rule of law to consolidate power. In the past, the reform of state-owned enterprises in China was basically decided by the leaders of state-owned enterprises, and at most, with the addition of local security personnel, in fact, it was decided how to carve up what was beneficial to insiders. Such a reform, of course, will not have the benefit of ordinary employees, and it is certainly impossible to make the majority of people prosperous.

This kind of "insider-led reform" has actually become one of the "capitalization of power" in China. Process. The reason why the reform has not been changed is that we have not paid attention to this process of transformation of public reform. "Insider-led reforms. This has led to low participation in reform. Governments are prone to self-aggrandizement.

Later, Xiao Zhen realized that only "social participation reform" can effectively solve the problem of "reform risk sharing", or "reform pressure sharing". Because it can allow many departments, many localities, many institutions, many organizations, and many stakeholders to have a kind of pressure for reform, rather than all the pressure for reform being concentrated in the central government.

For intellectuals, reform has entered the "deep waters." If it cannot be proved that the benefits of reform will outweigh the costs and risks, then he will not dare to say that he sees less of the constructive forces caused by the decentralization of powers, and sees more of the destructive and predatory forces caused by the brush, and even points the spearhead of criticism at the entrepreneurs, or at the private enterprise owners. Review of China's economic reforms. The most successful is to decentralize power to the local government, and then form a reform competition with local participation. However, Xiao Zhen feels that this decentralization is not enough, not only should the power be delegated to the local government, but also a considerable part of the power should be delegated to the society, to the employees of enterprises, and to trade unions, so that they can play an active role in institutional innovation

In Xiao Zhen's view, the trend of reform is that the reform of the economic system drives the reform of the social system and the reform of the political system, and the reform is becoming more and more high-end. High-end reforms are not something that can be done all at once. Constitutionalism is a natural consequence. Prior to this, the formation of a pattern of decentralization, the relative balance of resources and forces, and the formation of people's constitutional consciousness were crucial. Without this inherent balance of forces and resources, and without a new constitutional consciousness, there will only be a persistent "overlord clause." Others do not have any resources in their hands to confront others, so they can only accept their fate, or subvert the rules of the game to "break the net, only when resources become dispersed and power becomes divided, will the situation of insider-led reform change accordingly, and a real new system can emerge." And the most important thing is still to form a relative balance of resources and forces.

The market economy is an economy with low moral requirements, and this ideal form of market economy exists only in an environment where the rule of law is perfect and power is well regulated, while in an economy in transition, these conditions do not exist. On the contrary, in such a transition economy. Power is the greatest resource, and at the same time, power is also the most important market entity, which is deeply involved in the process of market transactions. On the one hand, government power has become a resource for various market players, and power is facing the possibility of being captured. On the other hand, in the absence of the rule of law, the ** of power rent-seeking benefits has become very strong. The phenomenon of rent-setting, rent-seeking, and power buying and selling is very common; And all this was once called "reform" by some.

Later in the decade, the reformist coalition was divided, and in some places there was a union of power and capital. For them, how to maximize future benefits. How to safeguard vested interests has become the highest goal. They are also in the name of reform, but their reform is becoming less and less public.

After analysis, Xiao Zhen believes that the formation mechanism of China's current social conflict is composed of four parts: first, the benefits of reform have not been fairly distributed; secondly, the possession of power and resources formed during the period of the planned economy has not been adjusted in a timely manner; Third, in the process of marketization, some local governments have become the highest goal pursued by the government, and the government's function as a provider of public goods has been placed on the back burner; Fourth, the power orientation of the judicial system is often captured by the government or powerful groups, which is unfair.

There are many examples of problems that arise in the course of reform, and even more serious crises, that are related to the existence of power and the failure of the market and the judicial system. From the perspective of power and balance of power, behind these imbalances and conflicts are the result of the absence of power and the failure of power to enter the track of the rule of law.

Since there is a division of power between the classes, and there is no communication between them, the sharing of the dividends of reform is naturally unfair. For those who have been excluded from the field, economic growth is someone else's, not theirs.

Xiao Ke is well aware that the government and the judiciary alone cannot accomplish social reform. Only through the citizens' movement can they be reformed, only civil rights can balance and constrain the power of the government and the power of the judiciary, and only civil rights can force vested interests to change their greedy character and share the fruits of reform with the people. Therefore, such a reform is a reform that takes rights as the foundation, a reform that targets vested interests, and a reform that takes citizens' rights as the core value, and jointly opposes a market economy that has been hijacked by certain vested interests.

However, the problem is that in the current situation where political power has penetrated into all corners of the economy and society, it is impossible for every step of reform to be carried out without involving politics.

Since the beginning of the yo era, every economic reform measure in China has also been a measure of political reform. Of course, the political reform we are talking about here is in a broad sense. Many people assume that reform is only economic reform because they define political reform in a narrow sense.

Over the years, every step of China's reform has been political and economic, because from an economic point of view, reform is a process of gradual economic slackness; From a political point of view, it is a process in which the party and the government gradually withdraw from the economic field, and it is a process in which the party gradually changes its way of governing.

Of course, the mother said that the protection of the rights and interests of the Chinese people is not sufficient, and that China needs to build a democratic political system with Chinese characteristics. Generally speaking, can we understand the previous Chinese reform in this way: This is a dual economic and political reform? However, the political reform in the meantime was to gradually return freedom and rights to the market and individuals in the form of decentralization and concession of profits. The main thrust of this reform is the gradual withdrawal of political power from economic and social activities, rather than how to restrain political power and protect people's rights. The reform has directly led to a gradual change in the way the ruling party governs and the way the government governs.

It is true that there are many problems in China's reform over the years, and the most alarming thing is that we must not allow power to distort the reform. Specifically, state-owned assets have been eroded by the unscrupulous managers of state-owned enterprise units, the lack of protection of privately obtained property and the aggravation and breeding of social injustice are concentrated manifestations of the abuse of administrative power. Some officials have embezzled the name of the party and the government and adopted all kinds of unconstitutional administrative regulations and documents, devouring the rights of citizens that have been clearly stipulated in the constitution and laws in the dark. There is a serious lack of public participation and oversight in the formulation of regulations in some departments and local governments.

The abuse of power in the mid-to-late years led to the division of the camp. For many ordinary people, the partially deformed reforms mean an increase in the cost of living and an increase in the burden of living. In some localities and departments, there is a combination of power and capital, which is what Xiao Zhen handed to Xiao Lao last time, and the economist called crony capitalism.

The reason why power can distort and deform reform is, from a conceptual level, because in the previous reforms, we fell into the misunderstanding that "trust in power is higher than trust in the rule of law". In practice, however, the previous reforms were mainly focused on "delegating power to make profits, opening up and invigorating," did not pay attention to the restraint and regulation of power, and did not give enough consideration to the rights and freedoms of citizens, and did not fundamentally change the situation of "power playing tricks on rights." To sum it up, it is as follows: the degree to which political power has withdrawn from the economic and social fields is far from enough, and the problem of restraint and regulation of political power has not yet been solved.

China's biggest risk now is delaying the necessary reforms. If we want to maintain healthy, stable, and sustained economic growth and achieve coordinated economic and social development, the only choice is to continue to persist in and deepen reform.

However, the reform has never been smooth sailing, for example, the southern Jiangsu model, although it has achieved huge economic benefits, but it is still criticized by many people. This time, Xiao Zhen came to the provincial party committee for a meeting, and although he had a foundation for foreign investment, he may not be able to escape some doubts.

Send a lot of words.

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