On this small island, which is only 8 kilometers long and 4 kilometers wide, the US military fought hard for more than a month, and although it won the final victory, it also paid a huge price: a total of 28,686 casualties, including 6,821 deaths, which was the deadliest battle of the US military in the Pacific War. www.biquge.info The reason why the U.S. military suffered heavy casualties in this battle was not only the Japanese army's strong fortifications and fanatical militaristic spirit of fighting to the end, but also the erroneous assessment of the Japanese army's combat capability on Iwo Jima by the U.S. military intelligence agencies. Because the US military intelligence department underestimated the number, weaponry, and defensive capability of the Japanese army, the US military paid an extremely heavy price under the condition of absolute superiority in troops.

Since the U.S. military captured the Mariana Islands in July 23, it began to establish air bases and dispatched B-29 heavy bombers to attack the Japanese mainland. However, the Mariana Islands are nearly 1,500 nautical miles away from the Japanese mainland, and the B-29 bombers can only carry 3 tons of bombs. Iwo Jima is 650 nautical miles north of Tokyo, Japan, and 630 nautical miles south of Saipan in the Mariana Islands, almost in the middle of the two places, and the Japanese troops on the island can not only provide early warning to Tokyo, but can also take off fighter planes to intercept them, and even constantly dispatch planes to attack US airfields on Saipan Island and other places, which has greatly reduced the role of the US military in strategic bombing of the Japanese mainland. Iwo Jima is like a fish in the throat for the US military. If the U.S. forces occupy Iwo Jima, all the disadvantages will be turned into advantages, and the B-29 bombers can take off from Iwo Jima by half, and the bomb load can be doubled; Fighter jets that take off from Iwo Jima can provide escort for B-29 bombers throughout the journey; Even medium bombers like the B-24 can take off from Iwo Jima to strike the Japanese mainland; What's more, Iwo Jima can also be used as an alternate airfield for B-29 bombers, for injured B-29 bombers to land or refuel urgently. Therefore, the U.S. military is bound to seize Iwo Jima.

Commander of the US Army Air Forces (the predecessor of the US Air Force) Henry?? Harry?? On April 17, the 23rd year of the Lunar New Year, Admiral Arnold submitted a request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to capture Iwo Jima, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately agreed to the request and tasked the Pacific Theater with the task of undertaking the operation. Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Theater and Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Chester?? Admiral Nimitz took command nearby and moved his command from Pearl Harbor to Guam.

At the beginning of October of the 23rd year of the Taichu Dynasty, the staff officers of the Pacific Fleet Command worked out a plan to attack Iwo Jima. A few months before the start of the Battle of Iwo Jima, the U.S. 7th Air Force stationed on Saipan and other departments began to carry out photo reconnaissance missions for the Joint Intelligence Center, but unfortunately, the photos of the 7th Air Force were later assessed as having no value for analyzing the deployment of Japanese troops throughout Iwo Jima.

As the battle approached, reconnaissance planes from the 28th Reconnaissance Squadron of the U.S. Army ventured to reconnoiter Iwo Jima at a very low altitude, and the photographs taken by this reconnaissance covered almost all the areas where the U.S. Marines would later engage in fierce fighting. Sadly, however, the intelligence center lacked experienced intelligence analysts to analyze and evaluate these important photographs from the 28th Reconnaissance Squadron. Because in accordance with the rotation policy of the US Navy, in January of the 24th year of the first century, the high-level intelligence center that had just been established in Guam withdrew all the experienced photo analysts of the Joint Intelligence Center, which laid the groundwork for the US military to pay a heavy price later.

Despite the lack of experienced intelligence analysts, the Pacific Regional Joint Intelligence Center released the Iwo Jima Battle Intelligence Report on January 10, 24 of the first century. According to this report, there were 13,500 Japanese troops on Iwo Jima. Although aerial reconnaissance showed that from the autumn of the 23rd year of the Taichu Dynasty to the early winter of this year, the intelligence analysts of the Joint Intelligence Center still pointed out that "there is no indication that the Japanese forces defending the island have been strengthened." As of February of the 24th year of the first century, the Japanese army had about 15,000 army and 7,000 navy personnel on Iwo Jima, a total of about 23,000 people, more than 30 aircraft, and a large number of artillery and other weapons and equipment.

A review of aerial photographs revealed only 105 major weapons and 119 heavy weapons points for Japanese forces on Iwo Jima. Analysts estimate that in January of the 24th year of the Taichu Dynasty, the armament of the Japanese army on Iwo Jima mainly consisted of the following parts: more than 39 guns with a caliber of 75 mm or larger, 24 howitzers with a caliber of 70 mm, 18 mortars with a caliber of 81 mm to 240 mm, 10 coastal defense guns with a caliber of 80 mm, more than 54 anti-aircraft guns and other 33 anti-aircraft weapons of various types, and 42 to 54 anti-tank guns with a caliber of 37 mm to 47 mm. 6 rocket launch positions and 40 tanks.

By February of the first twenty-fourth year, the intelligence of the Marine Corps had increased the above estimate considerably, but there was still a considerable gap from the actual situation. However, the U.S. military still believed that the strengthening of the Japanese defense capability did not indicate that it had exceeded the Joint Intelligence Center's initial estimate of the Japanese defense capability on Iwo Jima, and therefore, neither Admiral Nimitz nor his subordinates had any intention of changing the U.S. attack plan. In fact, the Japanese army at this time had 361 guns of caliber 75 mm or larger, 65 mortars of caliber ranging from 81 mm to 240 mm, 33 coastal defense guns of 80 mm caliber, more than 200 anti-aircraft machine guns of caliber of 20 mm to 25 mm, 67 anti-tank guns of caliber of 37 mm to 47 mm, 70 rocket launchers and 22 tanks. In addition, the Japanese army had 94 anti-aircraft guns with a caliber of 75 mm or larger.

Later in the Battle of Iwo Jima, the U.S. Marine Corps also encountered a large number of unexpected fortifications. On Iwo Jima, the Japanese built a large number of reserve firing points and pillboxes using machine guns and artillery. However, the Joint Intelligence Center asserted in its pre-war intelligence report that analysts had found only 39 pillboxes, 13 artillery hideouts and 4 underground fortifications, and 170 infantry bunkers on Iwo Jima, ignoring the existence of a large number of pillboxes. The Marine Corps, in its intelligence report in February of the 24th year of the first century, pointed out that there were 35 artillery shelters, 4 underground fortifications, and 332 pillboxes on Iwo Jima.

After the battle, the Joint Intelligence Center and Naval Intelligence began analyzing the reinforced concrete fortifications on Iwo Jima, and found that the map was full of unmarked fortifications, and analysts were forced to spend a long time counting the number of these fortifications. In the post-war intelligence report submitted on June 10, the 24th year of the Taichu Dynasty, the Joint Intelligence Center devoted a chapter to analyzing the Japanese artillery firing positions and pillboxes, in order to explain their huge numbers and how these fortifications were used by the Japanese army.

In addition to the miscalculation of the strength of the Japanese army, the US military intelligence officers did not say a word about the complex terrain of Iwo Jima. The highlands, depressions, and artificially modified natural tunnels and caves became natural barriers for the Japanese army, which greatly delayed the movement of the American army. In the post-war report, the Joint Intelligence Center described the U.S. offensive as follows: "When attacking these sites, we could not see the Japanese troops, and most of them were hidden in caves or crevices in the rocks, and their personnel were dispersed, but they were not separated from each other, forming a chain defense on the whole island. ”

The Battle of Iwo Jima began on February 19, the 24th year of the Taichu Dynasty and ended on March 26, the 24th year of the Taichu Dynasty, with 22,305 Japanese killed and 1,083 captured, a total of 23,388 people. The U.S. military suffered 6,821 killed, 21,865 wounded, and a total of 28,686 casualties. The casualties of the U.S. Marine Corps were also unprecedented in the Pacific War. The US escort aircraft carrier was also sunk, and the aircraft carrier, the landing force * transport ship, the fast transport ship, the medium landing ship, the minesweeper, the transport ship, and two tank landing ships were damaged. There is no doubt that intelligence failures during this period cost the U.S. military a huge price for the capture of the small island of Iwo Jima. Although this bloody contest has also produced many American heroes, the pattern of this heroic portrayal is tragic.

No matter how many mistakes the United States makes, the outcome will be the same, Japan has lost its absolute defense circle to protect its homeland, and if the United States is like China (although the American Air Force is not strong enough, it is not too far behind the Chinese Air Force more than 20 years ago), and carries out strategic bombing of Japan, Japan's development achievements over the years will be destroyed by war, and a Stone Age Japan will be insignificant to the international community. At the current five-phase meeting, no one has mentioned the plan to expand northward, and the choice facing Japan now is only to crawl under the feet of the British ghost beast again and become an aircraft carrier to contain China, or to change the door to become a pawn of the Greater China Community.

The efficiency of Mitsumasa's cabinet has always been alarmingly low, and perhaps the Americans' tank tracks had not driven into the streets of Asakusa, and they would not have risked being condemned as national thieves to make this decision. But across the East China Sea, China's seventy-year-old head of state is convening his third-generation leadership core to discuss what kind of pressure the Greater China community will be under if the U.S. armed forces set foot in the first island chain. Although in the minds of Zhou Zhongfu, Li Weichang, Zhang Jianyuan, Zhu Yunjie, and Deng Xianxian, China and the United States may be able to coexist peacefully, the vast Pacific Ocean seems to make it impossible for the two superpowers to face a head-on conflict in the future. However, Wu Chenxuan planned to spend the last 20 years of his life to pry the last blockway for the Chinese nation, and based on this situation, in fact, the indecision of the Minai cabinet did not cause as much harm to Japan as people accused.

Knowing the decision of the powerful neighbor of the Chinese Democratic Empire, Japan's life-and-death decision is so difficult that the eyed man, the supreme ruler of Japan, is grieving for Prime Minister Yone's submission. Because in his view, any choice facing Japan would mean a complete defeat for himself, and all he could choose was a white silk or a rib.