The merger and reorganization of the Bank of Italy lasted for more than one month, and it was completed ahead of schedule without urging it.

After the completion of the integration, the six major banks, including Credit Bank of Italy, Commercique Italia, Bank of Immi, Banco Sanpaolo, Bank of Naples and Bank of Milan, jointly held a press conference, and announced that "in order to promote the integration of Italian resources, drive the development of Italy's economy, meet the challenges of future European economic integration, and enhance the international competitiveness of the Italian banking industry, from today, the six major banks will merge to form a new large bank." ”

"The bank will be headquartered in the city of Milan, so we named it "Banco di Milano", which means the largest bank in Italy, a bank that cannot be beaten. ”

We will continue to innovate the concept of bank management, bring a new experience to the Italian people, let the bank truly serve the society, let the bank truly facilitate the country, we believe that with the support of the people, the first Milan bank, Biyi has a better tomorrow! ”

A brief press conference brought a shock, and the Italians generally believed that Italy was about to have a consortium that could have a place in the world economy, and at the same time, this press conference also brought a new era, the era of the future of Italy's bipolar pattern.

The day after the Milan consortium was announced, several more consortia, large and small, were formed, of course, only for soy sauce.

Then, after weeks of bō turns, the Italian parliament is finally ready to give the green light to the center-right government's austerity budget package today. And even at this moment, investors are pondering what more Rome needs to do to stop a potentially fatal cycle of debt.

Due to some of the decisions and policies of the previous Bank of Italy governor Chapi, the Italian economy fell into a crisis, so the current series of measures of the Italian government are aimed at calming the Italian economic crisis.

In order to save the entire financial system, Italian regulators can allow the bankruptcy of small financial institutions and even ordinary financial institutions, but have to bail out systemically important financial institutions. Since there are multiple institutions that supervise systemically important financial institutions, and rescue measures can also be implemented by multiple regulators, how to allocate the cost of rescue in the event of a crisis has become an important issue for the supervision of systemically important financial institutions.

The issue of apportioning the cost of bailouts is currently reflected in the fact that different regulators have different opinions on the definition of the scope of systemically important financial institutions. In developing the list of systemically important financial institutions, the Italian Deposit Insurance Corporation preferred a broader scope, including large hedge fund companies, insurance companies, and asset management companies, while the Italian Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Italy preferred a narrower range, hoping to limit the number of companies on the list to no more than ten. Since the Italian Deposit Insurance Corporation is liable to pay statutory insurance premiums when member banks are unable to meet depositors' withdrawal requests due to bankruptcy, the Italian Deposit Insurance Corporation tends to reduce the probability of bankruptcy of member banks through bailouts of banks by the Ministry of Finance or the Bank of Italy, or can adopt higher insurance rates depending on the systemically important financial institution status of some member banks. However, the inclusion of more financial institutions in the scope of systemically important financial institutions will increase the regulatory costs and rescue costs of regulators, so there are incentives for the Italian Ministry of Finance and Italy to reduce the scope of systemically important financial institutions.

Therefore, the mechanism for the allocation of bailout costs among the various regulatory authorities is an important prerequisite for the effective incentive of systemically important financial institutions, and although the Bank of Italy is the main regulator, the issue of the allocation of regulatory costs among the various regulators in the supervision process cannot be ignored either.

The identification of systemically important financial institutions as government guarantees may distort the allocation of market resources. When the regulator classifies some large financial enterprises in the scope of systemically important financial institutions, it is equivalent to acknowledging that the government will bail out these financial enterprises when they have operational difficulties, so as to prevent the collapse of the entire financial system. Thus, while stricter regulatory measures for systemically important financial institutions (such as increased capital surcharges) can absorb losses and act as a buffer, they also institutionalize bailouts of systemically important financial institutions and in fact strengthen government guarantees for these large financial firms.

As far as financial enterprises are concerned, having this credit guarantee from the government will greatly enhance their competitiveness in the financial market, put other financial enterprises in a disadvantageous position in the competition, and thus weaken the survival of the fittest mechanism and self-correction mechanism in market competition.

Although the business expansion of systemically important financial institutions can be curbed by various financial regulatory measures, these large financial institutions are often also the birthplace of financial innovation, and regulatory measures are difficult to have the desired effect.

The credit guarantees provided by the designation of systemically important financial institutions will also distort the allocation of resources throughout the economy. Similar to the massive expansion of mortgage securitization in the United States, government guarantees enable systemically important financial institutions to operate in industries with higher yields than other financial and non-financial sectors, thereby helping to attract capital inflows. This resource distortion will form a positive feedback: government guarantees will lead to more capital inflows, and the scale of the industry to which the systemically important financial institutions belong will expand, and the expansion of the industry scale will make the external impact of the collapse of the systemically important financial institutions stronger, thus strengthening the government's identification of their systemically important financial institutions.

Local media in Italy referred to the Italian parliament's proposal as the "Milan Conference", meaning that it was a separate meeting for the Milan consortium, at which Mario Draghi, a young executive of the Italian Ministry of Finance and who will be the governor of the Bank of Italy from August, presented the largest plan for the adoption of the Italian economy in Italy and all of Europe to date.

According to media reports, Italian Finance Minister Giulio Tre Méngti is preparing to meet with domestic and foreign investors, including representatives of sovereign wealth funds, in Rome this month to discuss Italy's next round of asset price reductions.

It remains to be decided which assets to fire off. Officials referred to state-owned real estate and local government-owned utilities, but not water utilities, as Italians decided in a referendum in June that they should remain under government control.

The sale of more than 30 billion euros could raise more than 30 billion euros from the sale of the Italian government's state, the country's largest electricity utility and the oil and gas conglomerate Eni, has not yet been resolved, officials say.

Several officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the Italian government would negotiate with local Italian funds or billionaires over the upcoming sale of state-owned assets.

An Italian official said: "Their interest is in buying the real thing. This is very different from their strategy in the United States, where they simply invest in Treasury bonds. ”

The Italian government has hinted that it will buy both government bonds and energy equities. Negotiations between the two sides are expected to continue.

In fact, this is all Lin Yu's arrangement, no matter how good the relationship between the Milan consortium and the Italian government is, it can't openly grab money from the rich people in Italy, so sometimes the necessary negotiations are still necessary, and in addition, some things must be made public, so Lin Yu bought several more influential newspapers in Italy.

With the completion of the sī commercialization of the Italian banking sector and the sale of Italian government bonds, the Italian government has finally begun the second wave of sī is.

The main enterprises of SĪ are state-owned railway companies, tobacco monopoly agencies, postal companies, Italian television and radio stations, Rome airports, public insurance service companies, water companies,

State Grid Corporation, National Electricity Company, Alitalia, Precision Machinery Company, Eni Group, Ina Insurance Company and Telecom Italia.

These public practices can be said to be the most direct motivation for the reform of state-owned enterprises. Since the 70s of the 20th century, the vast majority of state-owned enterprises have been inefficient.

For example, in 198 the national power company lost 2,225.7 billion lira, and the ratio of income to expenditure of the state-owned railway company in 1982 was 23.1 percent.

Another example is the three major state-owned holding companies of Yili, Eni, and Efim, from 1974 to 1984

In the past ten years, it has basically lost money year after year.

Because of this, the government has to pay a large amount of subsidies to these loss-making companies, resulting in a huge fiscal deficit.

In 1977 alone, the state subsidy to Eni and Efim amounted to 458 billion lire, and in 1978 it gave 1,649 billion lire to the entire state-owned participatory enterprises, resulting in the loss of Italy from 1970

By 1982, the fiscal deficit had risen to 11.9 per cent.

However, despite this, the difficulties of the state-participation system have not been alleviated, but have formed a vicious cycle. State subsidies weaken the sense of competition and increase inertia of enterprises, which in turn further increases the burden on the state. In order to get out of this predicament, the reform of state-owned enterprises has become the only option. However, because these companies are extremely sensitive companies in Italy, they are almost always in a monopoly or absolute dominant position in their respective fields, and they can be said to be the lifeblood of the whole country. As a result, these companies were not included in the original wave of Italian sī ownership, and even the government increased the degree of nationalization of these enterprises, but now history has changed to a great extent.