From the Opium War to the Eight-Nation Alliance, and the Gengzi Indemnity, even if China was reduced to a semi-colonial country and divided its territory by many countries, it was not as afraid of Japan as it was at the beginning of the Republic of China. Because of the "open door" policy, the Chinese government, whether it was the Manchu Qing Dynasty or the Republic of China, was recognized by the foreign powers as a legitimate regime.

Yuan Shikai commanded the entire negotiation process of the 21 Articles, and what we can see now is the text of Yuan Shikai's ultimatum to the original of the 21 Articles, the revised version of the 21 Articles, and Japan. For these three original books, Yuan Shikai used a red pen, a red pen, and an ink pen to make approvals, and made key circles in many places. In addition to these circles, Yuan Shikai's instructions on the 21 articles have more than 70 long and short approvals, pointing out that there is absolutely no mention of the territorial sovereignty of the state.

Japan has expanded its rights and interests in China and developed its influence into the hinterland of the Yangtze River and to the southeast coast of the fifth content. Not only can this article not be recognized, but it cannot be discussed at all, and it cannot be talked about if we stick to this article. He instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to recognize the disparity between strength and weakness at that time, negotiate patiently, and be able to talk about the conditions that are most favorable to him. At the same time, he said that he hoped to delay the negotiations with Japan as long as possible, because Japan proposed that it was a secret negotiation, and he wanted to use the process of procrastination to attract the attention of the European and American powers and carry out international interference. This dragged on for several months, until May.

On May 6, Yuan Shikai said in "President Yuan Shikai's Telegram to the Provinces" that China's coastal harbors and islands should not be transferred or leased to other countries, and that the hiring of Japanese advisers and the joint police and ordnance of China and Japan were "the most important points to control China's death." It is not appropriate for our country to break with each other and trample on the overall situation because of this. But every effort should be made to save a point, that is, to take back a point. The Japanese government finally became angry and issued an ultimatum to Yuan Shikai's government on May 7, limiting it to reply by 6 p.m. on May 9, otherwise it would carry out the necessary means. At this time, Japan put on the posture of a big war, warships cruised in the Bohai Sea, Shandong and Mukden increased their troops, the Kwantung martial law was imposed, and Japanese overseas Chinese returned home one after another.

When Japan put forward the ultimatum, none of the European and American countries came out to support it, and even Russia, like Russia, planned to take advantage of the fire to loot. The British minister to China, Zhu Erdian, also went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at noon that day to talk to Lu Zhengxiang, and said: "China is facing a serious juncture of life and death. I have been in China for 40 years and have had a friendship with the president for 30 years. The ultimatum can only answer yes or no, there is no room for bargaining. At this time, the European countries had no time to look eastward, and the Chinese government had no other way to be self-satisfied than to accept Japan's conditions. U.S. Minister to China Rick Ryan also advised Yuan's government to "avoid a head-on conflict with Japan."

Yuan Shikai held a special meeting in Chun Lotus Zhai, Zhongnanhai, and consulted the opinions of the civil and military officials of Yuan Zheng's government: "You say, should we accept it, or will we fight Japan?" "The civil and military officials unanimously agreed that there is only acceptance, not fighting!

Yuan Shikai held that Japan had withdrawn the No. 5 clauses, which were the most unfavorable to China, and that the other clauses were no longer a condition for the death of the country, and that they could be signed in order to avoid the escalation of the situation. So in the afternoon of that day, the ministers were summoned and announced that they would accept some of the demands of the "21 Articles".

At 23 o'clock on May 9, the Beiyang government did not wait for the expected foreign aid, and announced that it would accept some of the requirements of Nos. 1 to 4 in the 21st Article on the grounds that "the national strength is not yet fully sufficient and it is difficult to meet each other in arms". Later, Yuan Shikai informed the whole country, "As a last resort, only to sign it, this is actually a great shame." Before the Chinese people said that this was a great shame, he admitted that it was also a great shame. At that time, this kind of negotiation was under such historical conditions, and there was no way. At that time, Hu Shi, who was an elite of Chinese studying abroad and was already very famous at that time, said, "This negotiation should be said to have never been done in the previous history of China.

When Wang Yunsheng edited "China and Japan in the Past 60 Years" in the early 30s, he also said that in reviewing the entire negotiations, Yuan Shikai's command and leadership should be said to be not a big mistake, and some historians at that time, such as Chen Gonglu's "Modern History" and Jiang Tinghuang's "Modern History", also affirmed it. At this time, it should be said that this kind of conclusion in the 21 negotiations is pertinent. To say that he betrayed the country is at least without historical basis.

On May 25, China and Japan signed the Treaty on Shandong Province, the Treaty on South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and 13 exchanges of letters, collectively known as the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Civil Treaty, in Beijing.

Therefore, the last 21 articles were forced to accept under conditional circumstances, and May 9 was designated by the state as the National Shame Memorial Day, saying that it was a great shame, which is indeed true.

All of the above can be seen in the official history, and the author does not hesitate to foreshadow the foreshadowing, which confirms that at this moment, the humiliating position of the Chinese state and the remarkable efforts of Yuan Shikai in this far-reaching treaty in modern history. As part of a rigorous history, no matter how bad the influence of the Yuan family on China's development later was, to be honest, the Yuan family was a patriotic hero.

Moreover, Yuan Shikai's biographer believes that the signing process and results of the "21 Articles" demonstrate Yuan Shikai's diplomatic skills and show his true qualities, which is a great success under the pattern of "weak countries without diplomacy". For example, commentator Zhang Lifan believes that under diplomatic pressure, China finally signed the "Sino-Japanese Treaty of Civil Affairs." However, at a time when the East Asian region was plunged into an international power vacuum due to the outbreak of the European war, in the face of the tremendous pressure of Japan's independence as a single country, and under extremely unfavorable conditions, Yuan Shikai tried his best to safeguard his national interests, and the Yuan Shikai government did its best to resist the demands of the Japanese side of the "21 Articles" and rejected the clauses that were most harmful to China.

Hu Shih called the negotiations on the "21 Articles" a victory for the diplomacy of weak countries. After Japan's own negotiations, Foreign Minister Takaaki Kato showed his responsibility, and Zhang Lifan believed that this might show that the Japanese themselves believed that their diplomacy had failed and that Yuan Shikai had made achievements.

If we further analyze Yuan Shikai's entire political career, we may also come to this opinion, and there is no reason to conclude that Yuan Shikai, who hated Japan and hated Japan, could make a 180-degree turn in 1915 and easily turn to Japan and become a useless traitor. In other words, Yuan Shikai's 21 traitorous theories lack both subjective motives and historical facts.

When the 21st Article was implemented, it was met with resistance from all sides. The Japanese demarcated a large number of mines and forests in South Manchuria, and immigrated and cultivated land on both sides of the South Manchurian Railway, all of which deeply touched the interests of the Chinese people. As a result, when people protested, they also thought, why did Yuan Shikai sign such a traitorous agreement? After the "Preparatory Security Council" in Beijing issued a call for a constitutional monarchy, public opinion began to say that Lao Yuan had betrayed the interests of Northeast China in order to gain the support of the Japanese. It makes sense to think about it, and this protest is based on this understanding.

However, when Yuan Shikai became emperor, the focus of the opposition was on whether Yuan signed the 21 Articles in order to gain the support of the Japanese. Later generations have argued about this so-called 21 articles, and some history books have also had a very incisive analysis of this, and the general view is that these 21 articles are true, and whether Yuan Shikai really won Japan's support for the Hongxian Empire because of the signing of this treaty is a matter of opinion, and the wise see the wisdom.

Many historians and novelists have said that when Japan submitted the 21 texts to Yuan Shikai, it said: "Please take another step forward to the president." It means that you accept the 21st Article, and I, Japan, support you to be the emperor, and we will reach this political deal, which is the most important basis for Yuan Shikai to betray the country. In fact, as early as the early 30s, when Wang Yunsheng was writing the compilation "China and Japan in the Past 60 Years", he pointed out that this statement was unfounded, unreasonable, and unacceptable.

It is certainly necessary to provide a further narrative of history with the expansion of historical sources and to give it a "sympathetic understanding". But in any case, what the "21 Articles" left to the Chinese people is still a sense of humiliation. The historical tone of this pathos will not be changed by the diplomatic efforts of the principals and the mournful statements made afterwards. This exposition clears up the suspicion of Yuan Shikai's betrayal, but it cannot be further argued that the 21 Articles have nothing to do with the later imperial system, or that there is no historical logic involved.

Although it is not enough to sell the country, it is not necessary to say that there is any achievement. Historian Tang Degang believes that although Yuan Shikai and others fought hard against this treaty, it was still a treaty that lost power and humiliated the country. For example, it is inconceivable to extend the lease of both Lushun and Dalian to 99 years, and to allow the Japanese to colonize Manchu and Mongolia without restrictions. Yuan Shikai later vowed to work hard and "see each other" with Japan. If he really did what he said about the trajectory of history later, no matter what, the Chinese people would only bow a tear of sympathy and say "Xiao Yuan, I have suffered you", and then Yuan Shikai, as China's first sad president, "In trouble in the country, the nickname is 'Han'!" "Death without a broken name.

But after Yuan Shikai finished speaking, he forgot what he said, and he didn't do anything about enriching the country and strengthening the army, but went to buy a dragon robe to be the emperor. The one who is good at dying will be crowned emperor immediately after the 21st Article is established. Because of this, there were all kinds of speculations about this fact later: no one can guarantee that they have no behind-the-scenes political exchange. Political opponents use it as a target against him, and rightfully so.

Who made his ass unclean!