Two cavalry, adding up to nearly 100,000 troops, actually fought a sports war, what should be the situation?

This is something that many later generations may find difficult to imagine, and it may be difficult for them to understand why the cavalry of the two clans would fight like this.

According to common sense, everyone is a Mongolian cavalry, no one has to have poor horsemanship, the movement speed should not be much different, and the level of riding and archery is half a catty.

In this case, there is almost no point in continuing to use the tactic of approaching and shooting, and the same is true of Mangu's tactics, and the other party still doesn't know what you want to do. If you want to retreat, I will hang you unhurriedly and want to shoot, and I will shoot at you.

Therefore, the conventional Mongolian cavalry tactics had no effect in the civil war of the Mongol cavalry, and only the two sides gave up those tricks and directly charged the battle was the right means to win.

But is it really that simple? Of course, it's not that simple.

Because one of the most critical differences is the logistics of both sides.

The Mongol cavalry has always been known for its so-called "non-logistical expedition" ability, but this ability is only occasionally mentioned in later literature, and most people's attention is still focused on the Mongols' mangu gangsters, even if they mention their logistics, they don't say much, as if the Mongols only need to drink mare's milk for an expedition of 100,000 miles.

This is a kind of assumption that does not do research.

Even if he only drank mare's milk for ordinary people in later generations for a month, he could maintain his life at most, how could he maintain a high-intensity march or even fight?

Mongolians are also human beings, and naturally it is impossible to live by drinking mare's milk alone, and besides, are all horses mares and remain in the lactation stage?

The mare is, of course, an important source of food, but in fact the Mongols also had logistics. The traditional Mongolian diet of fried rice, milk tofu and beef jerky is easy to preserve after dehydration and can be stored for up to several months.

These foods can be eaten after simple processing, such as fried rice, which is obtained by frying millet rice and then grinding off the shell, which can be eaten dry or soaked in hot water before eating

Milk tofu is a food made of milk, goat's milk, mare's milk and other foods that are coagulated and fermented, similar in shape to ordinary tofu, and can also be eaten dry or steamed

Needless to say, beef jerky can be eaten directly, plus milk, goat's milk, milk tea, etc., all of which are easy to obtain and can be eaten without spending too much cooking time.

However, it was already two hundred years ago to travel thousands of miles with only this food, and in fact it is difficult for the Mongols to do so now, so when Tumen Khan went on the expedition, he also brought a batch of cattle and sheep.

Cattle and sheep can not only take milk, but also eat meat, is the basic necessary guarantee for the Mongols when they go out on the expedition now, and the Chahar Department will naturally carry a lot of cattle and sheep as a supplement when the main force is out this time.

When the army of 60,000 set out, Tumen Khan brought more than 3,000 cattle and more than 70,000 sheep.

This number alone is quite large, but in fact, 60,000 people are not much, and it is necessary to add more than 10,000 people who have lost their foundation, and this logistics is actually somewhat insufficient.

At that time, Tumen Khan's idea was that as long as this batch of cattle and sheep lasted until he joined Xin Ai, it would be almost enough, because the rest of the part could be solved by Xin Ai, and if Xin Ai could not solve it completely, then it would be possible to take Hannaji and Naturalization City, and it could also be properly resolved.

But something went wrong, Xin Ai lost all his people, of course, he also lost all his cattle and sheep, and even his subordinates can't do the usual double horses of the Mongol cavalry now, and many people only have one war horse.

Tumen Khan not only failed to throw the logistical burden to Xin Ai, but Xin Ai himself became Tumen's oil bottle, and at this time, Tumen Khan's 3,000 cattle and 70,000 sheep were even more burdened.

Before, Tumen and Burihatu originally discussed to launch an offensive in Shacheng on the 10th day, but the first wave of temptation began only six or seven days, one of which was due to the logistical urgency, forcing Tumen Khan to fight a dozen in advance, hoping to take Shacheng as a supplement Since Shacheng was guarded by the Ming army, then according to the habits of the Ming army, there must be a large number of materials in the city, including grain storage.

It's just that I didn't expect the Ming army's defensive ability to be too strong, and the artillery fire was too fierce.

At the suggestion of Buzhhatu, he chose the strategy of breaking the Eastern Route Army first, in this case, of course, these cattle and sheep had to be taken away, so as not to stay under the city of Shacheng, and finally cheapened Hannaji, who came from the west.

However, the speed of cattle and sheep was obviously not as fast as that of war horses, so Tumen Khan had to divide his troops, forming a situation in which the main force of about 55,000 cavalry was in front, and 5,000 cavalry escorted and protected cattle and sheep in the rear.

On the other hand, Chataiji is different, the south is the Ming Dynasty, and there is a high pragmatic Jinghua as a guarantor, he can rest assured that the cattle and sheep are left in the Jinghua trading company at the border of the various horse market branches because of the trade of horses and cattle and sheep, Jinghua has large horse farms in these places, and it is not a problem to put some cattle and sheep at all.

Why did Gao pragmatic choose the battlefield on the southern front? Better logistical support capabilities are also one of the important reasons.

In such a situation, with Chataiji's rich combat experience, how could he not see the inferiority of Tumen Khan?

Attacking the other with one's own strengths is the unified law of military affairs in the world, so Chataiji did not choose to engage in a battle with Tumen Khan, who was close to twice his strength, as soon as he engaged, but chose to personally go out and lead a small number of elites to drag Tumen Khan, and at the same time sent Qing Jiangdu, Da Erhan Ruo Bulang and others to lead 15,000 Great Khan escorts from the flank to the rear of Tumen Khan, and the target was the cattle and sheep brought by Tumen Khan.

Tumen are not stupid, the opponent's strength is obviously not 30,000, but the Chinese army has raised the banner of the main general of Chataiji, which is almost clear that the other side still has the main force to carry out other tasks.

There are only two possibilities for other missions, one is to plan to suddenly fight from the flank when he and Chataiji are inseparable, and strive to defeat him directly. But he felt that the other party should not be so confident, and half of the troops wanted to play this hand with him. After all, the main reason why he couldn't defeat the Chataiji in front of him for a while was that the terrain was inconvenient to deploy.

The terrain here was said before to be the junction of the mountains and the steppes, and the Khategi offensive was carried out along the junction line, which meant that the front of Tumen Khan was only half as wide as usual. Although he could choose to take a detour on the left, it could also force Chataiji into the mountains to the south.

"Feng Lin Mo enter" is one of the marching rules of the cavalry, but if Chataiji chooses to enter the mountain in order to avoid the sharp edge of the Tumen, there is no problem at all, but after he enters the mountain, the Tumen do not dare to chase the cavalry into the mountain, it must be inconvenient to operate, and it is difficult to play the advantage of more troops.

Of course, they don't want to fight this kind of bad battle.

Since they are unwilling to outflank from the left, they can only fight Chataiji under half the width of the frontal battlefield, and on this kind of battlefield that is not conducive to the deployment of troops, although the Tumen can rely on the advantage of troops to gain the initiative, it seems that they are pressing Chataiji to fight, but it is reasonable that they can't take it for a while.

At this time, Tumen could not help but consider the whereabouts of the other fifteen thousand cavalry, and since it was unlikely that these people were trying to kill the main force attacking him from the flank, it was only possible that they would go around the cattle and sheep in the rear.

Although they were not very worried, but they could not think of it, they had to divide their troops to rescue the "logistics troops" in the rear.

He thought about it for a while, and simply sent Xin Ai over There are more than 10,000 men and horses in Xin Ai, plus there are already 5,000 cavalry escorting cattle and sheep in the rear, which has exceeded the bypass troops sent by Chataiji, and the Tumen feel that it is not a big problem.

Thank you for the monthly ticket support of "Steel 913", thank you! The previous chapter was supposed to be "The Decisive Battle of Sand City Sixteen", but it was missed when it was sent