is catching wolves, and evil tigers are coming, the situation is really tight! At this time, front-line commanders are most likely to make mistakes in decision-making and command, and mistakes do occur. The front-line command then decided to temporarily stop the attack on Dong Qiwu's troops under Jining City, leaving the 11th Brigade and the defending troops in the city to surround and monitor it, and immediately transfer the main force to the west, advance towards Brain Baoshan, and annihilate the 101st Division of Fu's department. Although the 358th Brigade and the 1st Independent Brigade captured part of the position of the 101st Division in Baoshan, and one regiment of the First Column also entered the battle at the right time to engage in a fierce battle with the 101st Division, due to mistakes in decision-making and command, they not only failed to achieve the plan of annihilating the 101st Division of the reinforcements, but also missed the great opportunity to gather and annihilate Dong Qiwu's troops under Jining City.

Nie Rongzhen also expressed regret for the loss of the fighter plane: At this time, he should have annihilated the enemy who was about to be annihilated first, and then hit the enemy's reinforcements, but he did not expect the front command of our army to decide to turn the main force and immediately move westward, asking for the 101st Division that rushed to reinforce first. This decision is clearly extremely wrong. At that time, after receiving this order, the troops were reluctant to abandon the enemy who was about to be annihilated, but in the end they carried out the order of the front command. However, the troops only knew how to advance to the 101st Division, and they did not know the enemy's position, the marching route of our army, the specific deployment of the operation, the mutual coordination of the troops, and the communication and liaison on the battlefield. How can we command operations like this? As a result, not only did the reinforcement plan not materialize, but the fighters who gathered and annihilated the remnants of the enemy under Jining City were also lost.

On the morning of the 13th, Dong Bu took advantage of the main force of our army to go west to send reinforcements, and resumed the positions of Wolong Mountain, Tianmen Mountain, Lime Mountain, etc., and attacked the Cerebellar Bao Mountain, in order to respond to the eastward advance of the 101st Division and flank our reinforcements.

The battle with the 101st Division to aid the enemy was also extremely unsmooth, the first line of troops and the 101st Division fought fiercely in Dongtukeng Mountain, the PLA brigade reinforcements were ordered by Zhang Zongxun to rush to reinforcements, the brigade was moving across the mountain, when the 101st Division attacked the defenders on the top of the mountain, because the infantry attack was close to the top of the mountain, the artillery fire had to be extended to shoot, but because the gun position was low, the distance was close, and the top of the mountain was high, the aiming elevation angle must be increased, and the elevation angle was increased, and the shells would pass beyond the top of the mountain. More than 100 such cross-mountain shells were fired. In a hurry, Guo Jingyun stomped his feet and sharply ordered the artillerymen to immediately correct the angle, and then hit the shell over the top of the mountain, and he would be shot.

In fact, he didn't know that these erroneous shells had helped him a lot, and these artillery shells that crossed the mountain fell impartially in the crowd of reinforcements of the People's Liberation Army in Qianshan, and the front-line command made a mistake in judgment, thinking that this was the arrival of Fu Zuoyi's large army, and there was a danger of being attacked by the enemy, so he ordered the troops to retreat and lost all the fighters. At the same time, at 12 noon on the 13th, Li Mingding's new 32nd Division of the 35th Army and the 4th Cavalry Division followed the 101st Division to reinforce and storm our position.

In the afternoon, the newly formed 32nd Division and the newly formed 4th Cavalry Division of Fu Zuoyi's division swarmed to join up with the 101st Division and quickly launched a counter-siege operation. At this point, six divisions of Fu Zuoyi's troops had gathered on the outskirts of Jining, and the troops of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei and Jinsui Military Regions were both tired and hungry after several days and nights of fierce fighting, especially a whole night of round-trip movements. The plan to annihilate Fu's reinforcements near Jining is no longer possible, and if the war continues, the situation will be even more disadvantageous. Under these conditions, the troops were forced to abandon Jining that night, withdraw from the battle, and move to the northeast.

After the defeat in the First Battle of Jining, the main force of Fu Zuoyi's troops continued to approach Datong, trying to cooperate with the defenders of Datong to carry out a flanking attack on the besieging troops. The situation is very unfavorable to the implementation of the established siege plan, and Datong should not be besieged again. On 16 September, in order to seek new fighters, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region decided to withdraw from the siege of Datong, and Yang Chengwu and other troops drove to Yixian, the old base area, to assemble. The Battle of Datong Jining came to an end.

In the first battle of Jining, Fu Zuoyi was out of the limelight. On September 20, he got carried away and published an "Open Telegram to Mao **" in Suiyuan's "Struggle Daily", ridiculing the CCP in every possible way:

However, you believed in the omnipotence of force, and mobilized 17 brigades and 51 regiments to try to annihilate the national army at Jining, and the field battles on the outskirts of the city and the tragic street battles continued for four days and nights, and finally you were defeated.

The day before you retreated, Yan'an announced that the national army in the theater was completely surrounded, completely defeated, and completely annihilated by you, but the facts of the next day immediately gave a ruthless proof that it was not the national army that was surrounded, defeated, and annihilated, but the entire main force of He Long's department, Nie Rongzhen's department, as well as Zhang Zongxun, Chen Zhengxiang, Yao Zhe, and so on, who you boasted of participating in the 25,000-mile Long March.

Zhu Dete sent this telegram to all the soldiers, "Please be better than the general."

The Battle of Jining in Datong lasted one and a half months, and the troops of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei and Jinsui Military Regions closely coordinated and fought side by side, annihilating most of the enemy's 1 division and 1 division of each of the 3 divisions, totaling more than 12,000 people, dealing a heavy blow to the Kuomintang army. However, the campaign failed to achieve the expected goal of attacking the city and sending reinforcements, especially failed to annihilate the main force of Fu Zuoyi's army under the city of Jining, which made Zhangjiakou and even the entire liberated area face a more unfavorable situation.

Nie Rongzhen took the initiative to take responsibility, believing that he had "misconsidered", and at the same time believed that there were mistakes in the front-line command:

Judging from the results of practice, there were inappropriate considerations for launching the Datong Campaign. Because although the enemy's forces in Datong are not strong, the city defense facilities are quite strong. At that time, our army had neither heavy weapons nor experience in attacking fortified positions, so where could we be sure of capturing Datong? Under the conditions of poor equipment at that time, it was only possible to fight the weak first, and then the strong. If we had focused on reinforcements at the same time as the siege had begun, concentrating superior forces and striving to annihilate the enemy who had come to the rescue of Datong in the movement, the consequences would have been very different. …… Coupled with the mistakes of the battlefield command on the Jining side later, it led to the defeat of this battle.

As the specific organizer of the campaign, Zhang Zongxun also reflected on it, believing that there were "tactically underestimated enemies" including himself:

The battle was not fought well for many reasons.

First, many units have just been formed from guerrilla units, their combat effectiveness is not strong, and they are not yet mature in waging sports warfare, so they are very reluctant to fight large-scale battles of fortified positions.

Second, this campaign was of the nature of a first battle, and if we were careless in the first battle, we opened our mouths wide to attack Datong, which had strong defenses, and failed to give full play to our army's strong points in fighting a mobile war and attacking small strongholds.

Third, at that time, there was a trend of seizing the enemy's occupied towns, and Zhuozi Mountain and Jining became our burden, and if we did not defend Zhuo Zishan and Jining, we would have taken the initiative to concentrate the 10,000 troops of Jinsui and cooperate with the Jin-Cha-Ji troops in a mobile war. According to the strength of our army, it is a mistake to stick to Zhuozi Mountain and Jining.

Fourth, our army is well equipped, and heavy equipment such as tanks have no fuel, which leads to the failure to play a role, although there are a large number of mines in Datong, they have not used them to bomb the enemy's pillboxes to make up for the lack of experience in our artillery fire. …… As a result, even the enemy's outer fortifications could not be swept away, so that the battle was delayed for a month, giving the enemy ample time to prepare reinforcements.

Fifth, the defense of Datong and Fu Zuoyi's reinforcements were underestimated, and the enemy was tactically underestimated. …… I didn't expect Fu Zuoyi's reinforcements to be dispatched, and they came so quickly, without adequate preparation in advance. The whole campaign was prepared in a hurry, and only 10 days were given to prepare, and some troops had already started fighting before the Yanggao meeting, and the command structure was temporarily set up, and the terrain did not have time to see, and the troops were not familiar with the situation. Communication and liaison were not done well, and staff officers were mainly relied on to send letters and deliver orders, and the report of the enemy's approach to Jining could not be received, and orders to Chen Zhengxiang's column could not be sent, and a good opportunity to annihilate the enemy was missed under the city of Jining.

First, in terms of guiding ideology, the idea of fighting a war of movement and a war of annihilation has not yet been truly established...... The consciousness of trying to annihilate its living forces is still not strong, so that it pushes down the outlying strongholds, causing the defenders to shrink into the city; The reinforcement of the defenders in the city is not to take the opportunity to intercept and encircle and annihilate, but simply block and defeat; Jining sent reinforcements, was not good at creating and capturing fighters, and even failed to grasp the appearance of advantageous fighters, coupled with the scattered use of forces, resulting in the long-term failure of Datong to attack the fortifications, and Jining's reinforcements fell into passivity.

Second, in terms of campaign command, the breakthrough point for seizing the strategic task of seizing the "three roads and four cities" was chosen as the Datong offensive point, rather than the campaign goal of destroying the enemy's vital forces.

Third, the enemy's situation was underestimated, preparations were not sufficient, and the speed of troop build-up was slow.

The implication is that if the Pinghan Campaign is organized in accordance with Mao's opinion, it may be a different situation.

In fact, Fu Zuoyi was also frightened by the battle of Jining, he once said: "The battle of Jining, according to the situation at that time, we were quite dangerous, and there was a great possibility of failure, and we could win in the end, I think it was a fluke." After the 101st Division participated in the battle, the Communists made a mistake, that is, on the night of the 12th, they did not attack the newly formed 31st Division, but went to fight the 101st Division with all their might, which was the reason for the defeat of the Communists. If he had gone to attack the new 31st Division that night, our situation would have been quite dangerous

After the defeat of the Jining Campaign, the chairman convened an internal military meeting, and did not point too much at the front-line commanders, wrong commands, or ineffective commands, but patiently analyzed the shortcomings of our army, the poor combat effectiveness, the fact that guerrilla tactics were not too mature, and that guerrilla warfare was not suitable for siege warfare of large corps。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。

Then he pointed out that heavy weapons did not play a role, and there were no heavy weapons in the siege, and the difficulty can be imagined. . . Therefore, weapons and equipment must be coordinated in combat, and then this plan was written into the infantry code for the chairman, and the commander must keep it in mind, remember to remember。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。