The number of tanks of the Type 1943 integrated armored division has surpassed the strength of the two Soviet tank armies, considering that the Soviet tank army was also equipped with some light tanks at this time, and the German army's superiority in tank performance and personnel quality, the combat effectiveness of an integrated armored division is enough to be equivalent to a Soviet tank army (usually under the jurisdiction of 3-4 tank corps and 1 mechanized corps, with 550-650 tanks), and such an integrated armored division is currently only two in Germany, and all of them are in the Southern Army Group - The first was the 16th Panzer Division, and the other was the Guards Flag Division. Pen % fun % Pavilion www.biquge.info

In addition, Manstein also assigned 3 Tiger heavy armored battalions and 12 independent rocket artillery companies to the front-line troops, concentrated more than 1,000 No. 4 or Tiger tanks in the main assault direction of the Don River valley, and added overwhelming air power, the overall attack capability was very powerful, and the Don Front army of General Rokossovsky was defeated one after another -- he had only one tank 4th Army under his command, which is why Manstein had a quip about "advancing too fast".

At first, only Guderian of the main generals unswervingly agreed with the idea of the new integrated division, believing that the armored division should have 350-400 armored forces, and he even hoped that the assault gun battalion would also be replaced by a tank battalion, because practice proved that the assault gun was a good hand in defense, but the effectiveness of the offensive was still not comparable with the tank, and the front-line commanders, including Manstein, were skeptical at first, believing that the new establishment was too large and the command was not satisfactory. Instead of concentrating 750 tanks (or assault guns) in 2 divisions, it would be better to split them into 3 general armored divisions of about 250 tanks. However, after the actual compilation of the two model divisions is completed, the advantages of the integrators are reflected:

On the one hand, there is the superiority of command; it is true that the command of a complete four-unit integrated division is more complicated than that of an ordinary division under the three-unit system, but after the abolition of the army-level establishment, the group army can directly command the division, and the command transmission system of the group army headquarters, the integrated division, and the regiment is less complex than that of the group army, the army, the ordinary division, and the regiment transmission system, and the commanders of the first batch of four-unit armored divisions to complete the refitting of the integrated divisions -- whether it is Hube or Dietrich, are well-known and well-known generals. Hoffman's idea was simple, instead of having mediocre commanders lead ordinary troops, it was better to let good generals bring more troops.

On the other hand, there is the advantage in the allocation of troops, and a four-unit integrated division with the same number of troops has more combat strength than an ordinary division with a three-unit system -- this sounds very contradictory; when it is clear that the number of troops is the same, how can there be such a strange thing as an integrated division having more combat strength than an ordinary division? The reason lies in the difference in composition, the former has more melee (field) troops, no matter how many men and horses a division has, only the melee forces that can actually be put into battle, and when the melee forces are lost, the division basically loses its combat effectiveness. With the same 40,000 troops, 750 tanks (assault guns), the integrated division only needs 2 division commanders, 2 armored regiment commanders and 8 tank battalion commanders, while ordinary divisions need 3 division commanders, 3 regiment commanders and 9 battalion commanders.

Optimizing the composition of troops and strengthening the front-line combat strength is the idea that Hoffman has repeatedly insisted on, and he knows the problems in the organization of the Wehrmacht forces in history: first, the combat strength is not systematic with the support and support forces, and the total strength is empty but lacks the actual combat strength, the most prominent example is the air force, so although the total strength of the Third Reich was as high as 12 million at its peak (the total number of the three armed forces + reserve army + SS + auxiliary military personnel), it always feels overstretched to use; On the other hand, they are accustomed to forming new divisions without giving priority to supplementing the old ones, and even repeatedly add water to their establishments in order to form more new units, and the key equipment is becoming less and less; on the surface, it seems that there are a lot of troops, but in fact, two new divisions are not as good as one old division, and when a unit with the name of "national grenadier division" appears, it can basically be declared surrendered.

Hoffman carried out a general economic mobilization, but not further mobilization of troops, but on the contrary reduced the number of troops from 9.5 million in the summer of 1942. By the end of February 1943, when the High Command recounted, the total number of German armed forces was about 9 million, including 4.4 million in the field army, 1.3 million in the army reserves, 1.4 million in the air force, 600,000 in the navy, 250,000 in the waffen-SS and 1.05 million in military auxiliaries.

The biggest change was in the Army Reserve, which had a net decrease of 500,000 from the 1.8 million strength in the summer of 1942, of which 700,000 were added to the Army (an increase of 300,000 recruits during the same period, a net decrease of 400,000), and 100,000 were dismissed due to their age and physical condition. On the basis of doubling the total number of front-line aircraft, the Air Force has directly reduced its strength by 300,000, and a large number of redundant personnel have been dismissed to the army and other auxiliary departments, and the total number of naval forces has basically remained the same, but due to the increase in the tonnage of combat ships and the number of aircraft, and the establishment of the Marine Corps, the proportion of its front-line strength has increased a lot. Through this adjustment, Hoffmann for the first time increased the proportion of the actual front-line combat strength of the German armed forces to more than 50%, and the 500,000 strong laborers who were discharged could be put into various production positions to play a greater value.

Due to the absence of losses in the battles of Stalingrad and El Alamein, and the calm of the two army groups in the north and center, the strength of the German elite army on the front line increased by nearly 600,000 compared with the same period in history -- and it was with half of these elite troops that Hoffmann won the war in North Africa and the Middle East.

Hoffmann has read the archives and the original data: the infant birth rate in Germany between 1925 and 1927 was basically maintained at about 2% (the population in this age group will gradually reach the age of 18 and serve at the appropriate age), and in 1927 it was even only 1.84%, considering that the total population of Germany at that time was only 45 million, which means that in the case of full calculation, the annual new service population is only more than 400,000 (men), even if you add the German national age population in Austria and some other regions, The total number of new school-age population will not exceed 550,000 each year. With this figure, he finally understood from a demographic point of view why Germany was finally collapsing after the complete defeat at Stalingrad and North Africa in early 1943 - these two wars lost more than 600,000 troops (including the total number of killed, wounded and captured who could not return to the battlefield), which is more than the number of new service-age people in the whole year!

Based on such population figures, he gave Keitel an order that seemed strange to the latter: the average monthly permanent loss of the German armed forces should not exceed 50,000. Considering that the Third Reich faced more than 10 million square kilometers of battlefields, this figure is simply ridiculously low. But after a few months, Keitel was shocked to find that because the Eastern Front adhered to the rule that no high exchange ratio would rather not fight, the number was never broken, and the biggest loss was just over 50,000 a month. From October last year to March this year, the total number of troops permanently lost less than 200,000 in six months - a miracle! The gap was easily filled by the transfer of forces from the reserve army, and not only was it completely filled, but the front-line forces began to increase significantly, and even an additional Army Group Eastern was assigned to serve as a strategic reserve.

While the Red Army pushed all sorts of men and even women directly into the troops and pulled them to the front line, Field Marshal Blomburg, the commander-in-chief of the reserve army, was still giving German recruits 12 weeks of intensive training, or up to 20 weeks in the case of armoured, artillery, engineer and other technical arms. After completing the intensive training, the recruits are not sent directly from the training camp to the field troops, but first report to the field troops' bridging training brigades, and the overall replenishment process operates in accordance with the two-stage recruit replenishment system unique to the Wehrmacht.

In addition to receiving the recruits sent by the new training camp, the wounded soldiers discharged from the field hospital and the soldiers who have completed the vacation are also here to connect and standby, and then the recruits and veterans are mixed and organized to receive 3-4 weeks of synthetic tactical training, usually each division independently has 3 such training brigades, the process can allow the recruits to adapt to the actual situation of the field troops, and the veterans who have met the actual troops are of great help to the psychology of the recruits, and at the same time, they can also exercise the command and coordination ability of the veterans. The centripetal force of the troops has been further strengthened.

In Hoffman's view, this training and replenishment mechanism was very important, and the Third Reich was able to win the war without being superior in equipment or numbers, and Marshal Blomburg, who had served as head of the Military Training Division, director of the Army Administration, and minister of defense, obviously understood the importance of this system more deeply than any of his predecessors, and was bent on consolidating and improving his position in the eyes of the Führer.

"I'm relieved to see the success of the new establishment." Hoffman said with a smile, "Commander Keitel has been suffering from this matter and can't sleep well, at least he can rest assured when he goes back this time, I believe that he will be able to complete the reorganization of 12 armored divisions this year." ”

Keitel smiled wryly and shook his head, looking only at Speer, and the meaning was obvious: I can produce enough equipment to complete this task.

A group of people were in the headquarters observing the map and sand table, judging the advance of each unit, and while they were talking, the telephone rang suddenly, and Lieutenant General Weller, chief of staff of Army Group South, answered the phone and asked, "Führer, this is a wireless phone call from General Hube using a large walkie-talkie, do you want to listen to the voice of the battlefield?" (To be continued.) )