Octopuses hate those elite old ghosts. As long as there are elite old ghosts, it means that no matter how perfect the battle plan is, there will be amazing casualties. Once in Grozny, octopuses suffered this loss.

Many of his comrades-in-arms died there, and it was that huge sacrifice that forced the Emperor to start paying attention to the European-American special operations model. Despite their victory. But if the two sides are in the case of reciprocal support, the octopus itself does not dare to imagine what it will face.

It is obviously an area that has been flattened by artillery fire and missiles, and as long as they dare to step in, they will inevitably be attacked by RPGs and snipers. It looks like it's been blown up, and there are some cockroach-like guys who have survived. It can also kill them.

In the end, the octopus has been nerved. As long as there is a suspicion that someone may be hiding, it is a bang. Whether it's artillery fire or bazookas, let's talk about it first. Even if there is no one after the bombardment, they don't think it's a waste.

This is the experience of hundreds of lives before, and they can really survive the shelling in ways you don't know how cockroaches are. And launch a counterattack against you. What the octopus doesn't know is that this is what the Americans learned from the battlefield to resist US aggression and aid Korea.

In those years, the volunteers during the period of resisting US aggression and aiding Korea made too deep an impression on European and American countries. The excellent tunnel warfare has repeatedly maintained the power of counterattack in the frantic bombing and repeated shelling of the US military. This surprised them immensely, and at the same time increased their research on the tactics of the volunteer trenches after the war.

The reason why the U.S. military was so surprised by the trench tactics of the volunteers was because of a failed military operation. That operation was called "flogging".

At 3 a.m. on January 12, 1953, a reinforced company of the 31st Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division of the U.S. Army, guided by four tanks, launched an attack on the 205 heights south of Zhisandong. Because the shape of this high ground resembles the English letter "T", this high ground was called "T" high ground by the attacking American army.

At that time, only one platoon of the 1st Company of the 201st Regiment of the 67th Division of the 23rd Army of the Volunteer Army was defended on the T heights. Four American tanks and a reinforced company fought for a morning and launched four attacks. There were more than 50 casualties, but they did not take a position. After the war, according to intelligence, the volunteers lost one person and six were wounded. The U.S. military was defeated.

On the one hand, this major defeat has dealt a blow to the morale of the US military, and at the same time, many people in the US military have become dissatisfied. They believe that this is a problem of lack of preparation, that it is impossible to be equipped with advanced equipment, have just experienced the Second World War, and they have failed in the situation of absolute superiority when they are at the peak of their military strength.

The representative figure among these people was General Van Vliet, commander of the Eighth Army of the US Army at that time. He believed that this defeat was extremely unscientific, and after repeated discussions, studies and summaries, he believed that the reason for the failure was that the preparations were not done well, and he decided to personally command this platoon-level positional battle.

His superior, General Clark, supported this, and personally named the operation "Air-Ground Cooperative Operations Experiment", codenamed "Whipping". On the one hand, this is to restore morale, and on the other hand, they are indeed unconvinced. This failure is considered extremely low-level.

When the action was decided, the U.S. military began preparations in advance. First, Clark and Van Vliet repeatedly conducted deductions and verifications at the General Staff. Constantly confirm that his combat plan can definitely take the T heights. Subsequently, he invited the commander of the US 1st Army, the commander of the 5th Air Force, and the chief of the Far East Air Force Operations Division, who were on the battlefield at that time...... and other generals who participated in the war came to observe. even invited a vote of war correspondents to the scene.

Every observer was confidently presented with a well-made and delicate combat manual. As a matter of fact, this is also the first time that they have conducted a full-scale exercise in ground-air coordinated operations. Clark also referred to the exercise as the "Air-Ground Cooperative Operations Experiment."

The operation was scheduled to start on the 25th, but since it was believed in the deduction that the last failure was due to insufficient preparation. So this time, it is natural to need enough foreshadowing and adequate preparation in the early stage. From 20 July, for four consecutive days, the US Far East Air Force dispatched more than 40 sorties of fighter-bombers every day to drop and napalm bombs, and at the same time, nearly 100 guns of more than 105 mm guns from five artillery battalions also carried out non-stop sabotage fire.

On the 24th before the attack, the Air Force alone dropped 136,000 pounds and 14 boxes of napalm incendiary bombs on this small high ground! The entire T Heights were blown up in a mess. By 8 o'clock ~ 12 o'clock on the 25th, when the official offensive was launched, the Far East Air Force again dispatched F-84 sorties totaling 196 sorties, each batch of 8 planes, repeatedly bombarding the T-shaped mountain, and at the same time nearly 100 artillery pieces fired at once, bombarding for nearly 4 hours, under the cover of artillery fire, the US troops completed the assembly at the foot of the mountain.

At that time, the U.S. offensive force was Company E of the 31st Regiment. On the defensive side, it is still the 1st Company of the 201st Regiment of the 67th Division of the 23rd Army. It's just that the three rows have been replaced by one row. The result of the battle is the reason why the U.S. military paid special attention to trench tactics after the war:

The fighting began at 8 a.m. on the 25th and ended at 15:30 p.m. The commander of the 31st regiment, Elaud Moses, had to order the attacking troops to retreat. After nearly a day of fighting, the three platoons of the American army paid 77 casualties. The position was still not taken. Because, their opponent only suffered 11 casualties......

American historian John Tolan recorded that 224,000 pounds, 8 boxes of napalm were thrown, and 1,500,000 shells and bullets were fired from supporting artillery, tanks, heavy mortars, machine guns, and rifles. The U.S. military consumed 225,000 rounds of machine gun ammunition alone.

Then, they failed magnificently. The casualties were higher than those of his opponents, and James Alward Van Vliet, who was the first beach landing in Normandy and was awarded three bronze Crosses for valor in one day, and later a British medal, still failed.

This says a lot. This basin of cold water made the Americans begin to study their own opponents carefully. Particular attention was paid to their trench tactics.

Those studies made the later octopus suffer a big loss. You must know that the Americans are not only researching but are constantly testing and summing up combat experience on battlefields everywhere. After years of research, it has formed a system of its own. This system includes more about how to survive the shelling.

Of course, they studied more on how to break trench tactics. After all, more often than not, they are the attackers. And most of their opponents are likely to take trench warfare.