First, through some deductions and vague unofficial statements, each country hides its own masters of strategic analysis and only reveals some wild history on the surface to satisfy most people's curiosity about history.

If history can really be simple enough to change the outcome of a war by deciphering a code, then all strategists and famous generals can commit suicide with their guns.

It would be child's work to attribute the conclusions of strategic decision-makers, based on a database, to the deciphering of one document or several documents.

Countries are also willing to use some wild histories and stories to interpret that past history, weakening the strategic layout that affects the development trend of the world and the existence of sophisticated analysis masters.

The Normandy landings relied on the corpse of a non-existent colonel, and the documents on his body, to turn Hitler and Rommel around?

No, it's not that simple at all! In fact, Hitler's judgment of the Atlantic barrier was based on the use of existing military technology, and he believed that there must be a large port in the area where the Allied troops landed.

The Germans were convinced of this reasoning, because they had no idea that the Allies already had such a technological innovation as a floating dock!

The deployment of Rommel's armored forces in French depth was a tactical compromise and an underestimation of Allied air support.

Because of the limited number of troops and the fact that they could only be used in a centralized manner, Rommel could only deploy his armored forces on the second line.

Because for the first time in a large-scale maneuver, the army had to face the situation in which the enemy had air supremacy, so it was inevitable that there would be a miscalculation of the impact of the offensive distance on the attack!

This is the fundamental reason for the victory of the Allies, as for what fake Patton or Colonel's corpse documents are, they are just icing on the cake, and it is absolutely an exaggeration to think that they played a decisive role.

The same is true in the Pacific theater: what the US military deciphered Japan's intelligence is actually Japan's strategic choice, which has already come to an end before.

Prior to this, if Japan had left the Philippines and Malaya, or even Burma and Southeast Asia, and had directly attacked American territory in the Pacific, the United States would not have been able to guarantee that the Japanese army would attack Midway.

But after Japan attacked Malaya, the Philippines and Southeast Asia, there was only one option left for it: Midway!

At this time, the US intelligence department, which had deciphered the Japanese cables, could be sure that the information in their hands was accurate.

If the time had been a little earlier, even if they had obtained this information, they would have had to find a way to analyze whether it was a trap dug by Japan for the remnants of the US Navy at Midway!

Who can guarantee that the deciphered message was not deliberately sent by the Japanese? As long as Japan concentrates its superior forces and arranges a large encirclement near Midway, it will not be difficult to annihilate the American fleet.

So, what made the American fleet decide to concentrate on Midway and fight the Japanese fleet to the death?

It was their analysis, standing on the high ground, like a strategic analysis that could see through everything: the Japanese Navy was really going to attack Midway, not digging a trap against the U.S. Navy fleet.

Only when this is determined at the strategic level will the US Navy appear at a critical moment, in a critical place.

As for why the Japanese army had to seize Midway, it must start with the defensive counterattack strategy formulated by the Japanese army at the beginning.

From the beginning to the end, Japan never imagined that it would be able to defeat the powerful United States and become the world's number one hegemon by virtue of its weak national strength.

The Japanese top brass has never been blindly arrogant, they have positioned their country as assassins, and after a successful blow, they immediately fled thousands of miles.

Competing with a master like the leader of the martial arts alliance like the United States, it is really an act of looking for death. What Japan wants is to strike hard before the other side makes a move.

If you compare it to football, Japan's preparation from the beginning has been to take the route of defensive counterattacks.

Taking advantage of the international situation, the United States will realize that it is not worth the trouble of taking three years to solve Japan, and that the rest is a matter for politicians such as negotiation and bargaining.

Similarly, like football, to play defensive counterattacks, you must have capital. With the exception of Italy, which is a strong team that plays hard defensive counter-attacks, most teams prefer to take the lead before moving on the counter-attack.

And Japan's lead is to occupy Southeast Asia and Malaya and the Philippines, plus several important islands in the central Pacific Ocean.

Only after the islands are actually obtained, relying on these islands, and with fighters with a long range, can the Japanese Combined Fleet hold back the American enemy with superior forces.

Because of this, Japan must take Midway Island and fill the hole in its Pacific defense circle.

It is also because of this that the weakness of the Japanese Navy is not that it has made a bet on a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, and that it has to attack the Philippines and Southeast Asia to slow down the pace, but that it has a place to fight for that is known to the enemy.

Therefore, in the real World War II, the U.S. military will invest inferior forces to fight the Battle of Midway! The United States ceded the Philippines and Malaya, so why not Midway?

Originally, the US Navy did not have an advantage, and wouldn't it be easier to wait another six months or a year, after the US Navy has superior forces, to come back and find trouble at Midway?

The answer is no! After losing Midway, Japan could use it as a springboard to occupy the Hawaiian Islands.

According to the Japanese assumption, after capturing Midway, it would be easy to stock up on the island for landing materials and then attack the Hawaiian Islands.

After that, the United States had to find a way to find a decisive battle with Japan's combined fleet on the vast sea, and the initiative changed hands to Japan's side.

In fact, it's as simple as that: the United States itself knows that if the battle of Midway is not fought and continues to retreat, the battle that follows will be tenfold and a hundred times more difficult.

Just look at the map to see the importance of Midway. Having occupied this place, it would be possible to attack the Hawaiian Islands, and the American forces would have to fight fiercely with the Japanese in the nearby waters.

As long as the Japanese army hoarded forces at Midway, and then when they were ready, they used their superior forces to attack the Hawaiian Islands, and the American army could only be defeated.

Then the problem became even more serious: the Japanese army in control of Hawaii and the Japanese army near the Solomon Islands were in a distant position, forming a corner situation, and the Combined Fleet could dig a big hole for the United States by waiting behind.

The Combined Fleet has the advantage in troops, and there is no risk of attack, so it is only waiting for the United States itself to come to the door to deliver its heads.