At the same time, the supply and replenishment of German troops is also one of the many factors that need to be considered in logistics.

Due to the huge amount of activity of the soldiers in the field troops, the combat tasks of the troops are numerous, and the daily movement distance is long. Therefore, the soldiers of the German army were taking regular vitamin supplements. and oils and fats.

This requires fresh vegetables and fruits, as well as meat and other materials.

Coupled with the fact that the German soldiers had repeatedly performed on the front lines, they had to improve their food after each victory, which required other foods such as sausages, beef and rice.

In less than 6 weeks of the French campaign, the military trains of the entire Third Reich were running almost at full capacity on the German-French railway, which ensured that there was no tragedy of large-scale shortage of materials on the front line.

Don't underestimate the rail transportation resources occupied by these canned foods, vegetables, and fruits.

To take canned luncheon meat as an example, from the beginning to the end of the French campaign, Germany transported nearly 9 million cans of processed canned luncheon meat to the French front.

This is only the figure of nearly 2 million German troops in France, which has been reduced by reducing the supply of some second-line troops.

You must know that many second-line troops in the back did not enjoy the treatment of more than 3 cans of luncheon meat per capita from the beginning of the operation to the end of the war.

For example, the Trans-Siberian Railway, built by the Soviets themselves, has a length of 10,000 kilometers, and its maximum monthly capacity in 1945 was only 1.35 million tons, which can be said to be the limit of the railway capacity in the early stage of World War II.

Therefore, it is not easy for these 9 million cans to choose the gap between transporting arms during the war between Germany and France, and to transport them to the French mainland, where there are still wars from time to time.

Of course, this is another reflection of the capabilities of the German logistics department. If it had not been for the department's all-out efforts to ensure the supply of weapons, ammunition and supplies for the front-line troops, the Germans would not have taken France in such a short time.

Another pressure figure given by the young officer was reported in order to ensure the speed of the offensive of the Fist troops, that is, the German armored forces, which generated huge attrition.

The German transport troops were busy day and night, transporting 300,000 track parts, 50,000 engine wear parts, 400 complete engines, and 450 gearboxes to the French front, which ensured that more than 3,000 German tanks and armored vehicles in France could rush forward and not be stagnant due to breakdowns.

Due to Germany's own limited resources, self-sufficiency goes hand in hand with living space. In order to fight the war, Germany had to meet the basic needs of the war through occupation.

And to achieve this, Germany had to develop a war economy.

In 1936, Reinhardt explained in a memorandum the importance of the war economy: If we cannot make Germany a military power as soon as possible, Germany will have no place to stand.

One of the purposes of developing the war economy was to maintain the expanding German mechanized forces, and Reinhardt's own Leyin consortium has been frantically refining coal to gasoline in the past 10 years, and has not hesitated to convert coal to gasoline factories to expand to an annual output of 500,000 tons in one go.

In order to save coal mine usage and support coal-to-oil production, Germany has built 13 new hydroelectric power plants in various places, creating hundreds of thousands of jobs in disguise.

On the other hand, in order to succeed on the battlefield of the future, the motorization of the supply force is indeed very important, even indispensable.

Strategically, however, the benefits are questionable.

According to the technical conditions of 1939, the carrying capacity of 600 trucks was equivalent to that of a double-track railway, and in addition, in comparison with the actual load capacity, the consumption of automobiles in all respects was greater than that of the railway, so that when the transportation distance exceeded 200 miles, the railway still had a certain advantage.

That is to say, motorization is necessary from a campaign or tactical point of view, but it does not have a significant strategic impact.

And, no matter how hard efforts are made, it is unlikely that the car will change the status quo of trains as the main means of transport in Germany in the foreseeable future, let alone replace them.

However, Germany has made unremitting efforts to motorize troop transport.

Romania's oil field production capacity doubled from 1935 thanks to the efforts of German engineers and workers, and more than 90 percent of the oil produced in a year was sent to Germany, more than half of which was used for war supplies.

Germany's own North Sea oil fields were frantically overexploited by Reinhardt, replenishing the front-line military while preparing for the future expansion of more powerful army, air force, and navy.

During this time and space, the supply of oil was in place, which greatly supported the non-stop operation of German tanks and armored vehicles on the front line.

It was also these tanks and armored vehicles that allowed the British and French troops on the front line to be quickly dragged down, and their main forces were eliminated in time at Dunkirk.

It can be said that the level of German industry during the war is still shocking.

Mercedes-Benz, also affiliated with the Rheinland consortium, had 290,000 male and female workers in its automobile production plants two years ago.

BMW's engine production line also has 170,000 people working day and night under Speer's "three-shift system".

Reinhardt's brother-in-law, Krupp, also employs more than 200,000 people at the moment.

It is commendable that the number of workers in the Krupp factory and the weapons and equipment produced every day are still not enough to meet the needs of the German army.

As a result, the military factories of the Rhein consortium also divided the factories to assist the Krupp Group in the production of military production that they should have been responsible for.

Fortunately, Reinhardt and Krupp are close relatives, and the two consortia have been working closely together.

Otherwise, it is estimated that many arms businessmen would rather delay the country's arms orders than nod their hands and cooperate.

Of course, in order to support the German army in France, in addition to mobilizing 3,100 special trains to transport various strategic materials and ensure the invincibility of the German army in France, the Air Force also dispatched 5,000 sorties of JU52 transport planes to carry out major combat missions including paratroopers airborne to Belgium and Dunkirk, and arranged the material supply of paratroopers and part of the army.

Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to say that the German logistics department is fighting an invisible war for the German front-line troops.

These efforts, which are invisible on the front line, have also been highly praised by the front-line troops.

Field Marshal Brauchitsch, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, in his report to Reinhardt on the state of operations, said: "There can be no victory without logistical supplies." ”

Admiral Catherine also said in her report to Reinhardt: "If it were not for the most professional logistics force in the world, the Reich's air force, the air force that had been dispatched in the French campaign, it would have been delayed countless times." ”