John didn't take the initiative to get to know Smith, not only because the meeting had already begun, but also because he didn't want people to have unnecessary misunderstandings. Pen & Fun & Cabinet www.biquge.info assistant secretary to Chief of Staff Marshall, which is a rather special and sensitive position in the Army Staff.

In addition to helping Chief of Staff Marshall handle some day-to-day administrative matters, his most important job was to sit in the outer room of the Chief of Staff's office and act as a "driver." In other words, those who want to meet Marshall must first pass his level. It was up to him to decide if or when he could go in based on Marshall's schedule.

John didn't want to rush into getting closer, which could easily have led Smith and others into thinking that they wanted to get closer to Marshall. Ever since he heard Uncle Stimson talk about Marshall's previous "use arrangement" for him, John had been particularly careful about this issue.

At the end of the day, Uncle Stimson and Marshall were just allies. Although the two have maintained the same general direction and cooperated tacitly, their respective interests are still different. John, as Stimson's close junior, can maintain a positive and cooperative attitude at work, there is really no need to take the initiative to get to Marshall's side, and it is useless to get together.

John was well aware of his position in the staff and was honest about his business. The treatment he deserves will not be less, and those messy things will not involve him, but it is impossible to want additional preferential treatment.

Besides, he never thought about developing in the military circles for a long time, and any rank or position did not mean much to him. It's better to take the opportunity to learn something and make some contacts.

Soon, John focused his attention on the Army Air Corps' intelligence staff briefing on the air battle in the Gulf of Helgoland. The scale of the air battle was small, and the British bombers and German fighters that participated in the battle combined were just over a hundred units, and not all of them made contact.

The battle was not complicated, as 24 RAF Wellington bombers set off from home on a very clear day to attempt to attack German warships in northern German ports. As a result, over the Gulf of Helgoland, they were intercepted by German ground-based anti-aircraft artillery and air force fighter units, and 12 were knocked down. The Germans lost only 3 fighters, and not a single bomb managed to fall into the port area.

What is there to analyze and study such a simple battle? Not to mention, there's a lot to look into. Especially for the strategic bombers of the Army Air Force, such as "Hal", Hoyt, and Heywood, the experience brought by this terrible bombing operation was too valuable.

In recent years, the theory of strategic bombing has gradually been accepted by the air forces of various countries. The idea that "as long as you vigorously build up a bomber force responsible for the attack, you can rely on bombing to force the enemy country to surrender" has a market not only in the British Royal Air Force, but also in the US Army Air Force.

But theory is theory, even though many countries have begun to build and develop their own air forces around this line of thinking. But no one knows exactly how effective it will be. The air battle in the Gulf of Helgoland can be said to be a real combat test of the theory of strategic bombing.

Although the results were not good, they provided valuable experience for improving and perfecting the theory of strategic bombing. Historically, this small air battle completely changed the mode of strategic bombing operations in World War II, and was unanimously rated by official historians in Britain and Germany as "one of the most important battles of the entire war".

After the intelligence staff officer gave a briefing on the situation, a heated discussion ensued at the meeting. The controversy soon focused on the question of whether a dense bomber formation could break through enemy interception with speed and firepower alone.

Prior to this, there was a loophole in the strategic bombing theories of various countries, and the theoretical premise that "bombers can always break through the defense line" did not exist. But the air battle in the Gulf of Helgoland poured cold water on them.

During the day, it was difficult for bomber formations to break through the interception of opposing anti-aircraft fire without fighter escort. No matter how dense the bomber formation is, no matter how strong the armor and firepower are, it will not be able to achieve the ideal penetration effect.

So on the solution to this problem, the officers present were divided into two factions. One faction believed that daytime bombing should be abandoned in favor of nighttime bombing. This can effectively reduce the threat of the opponent's ground anti-aircraft fire and interceptor fighters, and avoid too large losses.

On the other hand, the accuracy of night bombing is not high, and that the fact that it is only dispatched at night greatly limits the power of strategic bombing, and that fighter formations should be dispatched to escort the bombers.

As far back as John can remember, Britain and the United States later made very different choices on this issue. Resource-constrained and short of fighter jets, the RAF converted its bomber force into a night bomber force, and almost all attacks were launched at night. In order to achieve a better low-altitude penetration effect at night, they also developed a pure wooden bomber such as the "Mosquito".

The US Army Air Force, on the other hand, has invested a lot of resources to greatly improve the armor and firepower of long-range bombers, and at the same time, it has developed long-range fighters to provide escort protection for strategic bomber units.

At the meeting, John unequivocally supported the proposal to form a fighter escort formation: "Although the bombing sight (Norton artifact) we currently use is very accurate, there is a premise for its use, that is, the bombing target must be within the crew's line of sight. It is difficult to ensure the accuracy of the bombing at night, and the efficiency is too low. ”

"However, the range of current fighter jets is too short to provide effective protection for long-range bombers." Objections were raised.

"In the past, the engine was not good, and the maneuverability could only be guaranteed by reducing the weight of the fighter. In the past year, aero engine technology has developed rapidly, and we are fully capable of developing a long-range fighter. "John, this is not bragging, isn't that what he worked so hard to get back the Merlin engine from Rolls-Royce.

Don't look at the Hughes aircraft's H-1 and H-2 are selling very well, but John knows that this is only an aircraft with a single high-altitude and high-speed performance, and the effect of being an interceptor is not bad, and the long-range escort depends on the P-51 under development. The P-51 Mustang can reach an astonishing 1,200 kilometers with auxiliary fuel tanks, enough to fly from the UK to Prague and back.

John's words successfully aroused the interest of Brigadier General "Howl" and others, and it can be regarded as an advertisement for the future fist products of Hughes Aircraft Company in advance.

In addition, the officers present were also very interested in the anti-aircraft early warning system of the Germans. Judging from the battle report, the British bomber formation first made a detour to the north of the Frisian Islands, and then made a big turn to the south, effectively avoiding most of the German anti-aircraft artillery positions.

However, they were discovered by the Freya Early Warning Radar facility of the German Navy. The detour route chosen by British Air Force Commander Lieutenant Colonel Chad Kellett gave the Luftwaffe fighters more time to react.

John previously only knew that during the air war in Britain, the British's radar warning system played an important role. Unexpectedly, the Germans also went ahead of the United States in this regard. At present, in the United States, radar is mainly used as a maritime detection tool at night and in foggy days, and is equipped on some naval surface ships. The Army did not realize its value in terms of air defense early warning.

At this combat power analysis meeting, the Germans' "innovative" use of radar systems finally attracted the attention of the officers present. John also took the opportunity to propose the idea of developing a small airborne radar, which was recognized by many people.