There are too many factors of change in the war, and any insignificant change has the potential to affect the overall situation.

For example, Army Group North, because the 56th Panzer Army, which played in the vanguard, was not commanded by the historical Erich von Manstein, but by von Wozandtet.

Although the two army commanders were both members of the Feng family, they had completely different command styles.

Historically, when Manstein commanded operations in the 56th Panzer Army, he broke into the Soviet Union 80 kilometers deep in the first few days, and then went 100 kilometers deep alone, far away from friendly forces, and attacked the heart of the Soviet Union for a fierce attack.

Manstein said to the officers and men of the 56th Army at the time: "If you do not reach Fort Dina within four days, it will be difficult to occupy the bridge over the Dvena River." ”

To this end, the 56th Panzer Corps under the command of Manstein, after capturing Fort Dina, did not follow Loeb's order to hold the ferry and wait for reinforcements, and continued to carry out a deep assault on its own.

Captain Wojoan Tate is different. Having waited too much for the Finnish army to achieve the objectives of the first phase of the battle and share the casualties and losses of the German army, it had already taken many days for him to lead the German army into Dina Fort.

Later, Wozhendtaite chose the "safe strategy" that Loeb had given him, that is, to wait for the arrival of the 41st Panzer Corps, which was at the Jacobs crossing.

That's the biggest difference between the two commanders.

Historically, the Manstein factor has been known for its ability to excel at "calculated adventures". Manstein's strategic talent and circumstances created him with a genius and sensitive sense of strategy, and the Germans were strategically unmatched.

And the name Wojoan Tate may be far less famous in comparison.

His fighting style is also very simple, that is, steady and steady. When the Germans had the upper hand, he could play quite beautifully and achieve perfect command without leakage. However, he is not at all comfortable with the Rapid Battle mode, preferring to gnaw at the obstacles step by step.

According to Manstein's conception, the appearance of an armored corps in the deep position of the Soviet army will inevitably cause great confusion in the Soviet army. Of course, the Soviets will also do their best to mobilize troops from all over the place, and give priority to driving this force back to the other side of the river.

At this time, the faster the 56th Panzer Army continued to assault in depth, the more difficult it was for the Soviet Army to have a chance to move forward and deploy superior forces to confront this army in time.

It goes without saying that the deeper a lone Panzer Corps is, the greater the risks it takes. It was precisely because of this that she was reluctant to continue the assault on her own, and chose to obey Marshal Loeb's standby orders.

But there is another aspect, which is the so-called "calculated adventure".

In itself, the 56th Panzer Army could be regarded as deep into the heart of the Soviet army. The safety of a fast armored corps deep behind enemy lines should mainly depend on its own movement. If it stands still, it will soon be besieged on all sides by enemy reserve forces.

Therefore, Manstein's risky tactics are actually feasible.

However, this time, Wojoan Tet, who commanded the 56th Panzer Corps, had ordered the whole army to garrison Fort Dina, temporarily expand the landing ground of Fort Dina, and hold the ferry to wait for reinforcements to arrive.

The disadvantage of this is that the 56th Army has no chance to reap more decisive results. But the benefits were also obvious, as Wozhendtet used Fort Dina as a stronghold to use the fortifications left by the Soviet army in defensive battles to massively eliminate Soviet counterattack forces.

Soviet General Froshilov hastily transferred his troops, which had been seriously depleted in the previous days and had not had time to replenish the whole force, to counterattack the German 56th Panzer Corps, which had broken into the rear of the Soviet 11th Army.

The combat effectiveness of these Soviet units was also not high, coupled with the serious lack of formation, and the German army had complete fortifications left by the Soviets themselves. The counterattack and recapture operation of the entire Soviet army can almost be said to be a complete defeat.

Wojoan Teate did not adopt Manstein's "calculative risk-taking" theoretical tactics, but while he insisted on attrition of the enemy, he moved closer to another tactical theory - the concentrated use of armored forces to exert overall effectiveness.

Wojoan Tet finally waited for the entire Fourth Panzer Army to come closer. In fact, he had only been waiting in Dina Fort for three and a half days.

In this way, the 4th Panzer Army gradually approached the biggest obstacle in the north - the "Stalin Line".

It was a fortified strip of the Soviet border, unevenly distributed, along the old Soviet border, from the southern shore of Lake Pepsie in the west of Preskaw to Shebezh, a small border fortress of the former Soviet Union.

In some places the Stalinist Line was a simple tunnel, while in others it was a huge complex of military defenses. In total, the Stalin Line consisted of 23 large fortified areas, including more than 4,000 permanent firing points.

However, fortunately, the Soviet high command did not correctly position itself as a defender, but was overconfident in thinking of itself as an attacker.

It was because of Stalin's excessive belief that the Soviet Union and Britain would defeat Germany from both sides that the construction of the later fortifications was extremely slow and even stagnant. By the time the German counterattack entered the territory of the USSR, the fortifications of many of the fortresses in this Stalin line had not yet been completed, many of the places where heavy fire weapons should have been placed were still empty, some of the units guarding the fortresses did not have heavy weapons, the air defense forces did not have anti-aircraft guns, the artillery units did not have artillery, and the garrisons of the defense line could only use light weapons to fight the Germans.

Moreover, because during the initial construction of the "Stalin Line", the idea of armored forces had not yet been carried forward, and the Soviet armored experts were still Pavlov's rice buckets, the Soviet high command did not know that the power of German tanks would be so great in the future, only a small number of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns were installed on the defensive line, and the very rare 76-mm guns were also temporarily removed from the turrets of old tanks, and the number was not enough to deal with the armored clusters of German tanks, and there were very few artillery support units.

At present, the 41st Panzer Corps continued to advance along the road towards Ostrov on the orders of the Panzer Cluster Command, while the 56th Panzer Corps of Wozhendetet turned east and advanced towards Shebezh-Odochka.

The intention was that the 56th Army, after breaking through the Stalin Line, would be able to join forces with the 41st Army to encircle a powerful tank cluster that the Soviets might be located near Presko.

And even if there is no such estimated Soviet army cluster, even if there is no beautiful encirclement and annihilation battle like Army Group Center and Army Group South, just breaking through the Stalin line is a major victory!

Genius one second to remember the address of this site:. Mobile version reading URL: m.