After nearly 20 days of fierce fighting, Semavo was almost in ruins, and the casualties on both sides were extremely heavy.

The government forces defending Semavo were almost completely wiped out, with fewer than 500 officers and soldiers fleeing to Nasiriyah and the remaining 5,000 or so killed.

According to the battle reports released by the government army, tens of thousands of rebels were killed in the battle.

However, the authorities in Baghdad claimed that only more than 2,000 officers and soldiers had been killed or wounded.

Obviously, neither side is honest enough.

The government forces must have counted the bombing into their own success, that is, the rebels who were killed, and the rebels only announced the casualties in the urban warfare.

What is certain is that the rebels suffered heavy losses.

After the capture of Semavo, the rebels did not immediately advance towards Nasiriyah, but arranged for a small reconnaissance force to move south to harass the Nasiriyah defenders.

With the deployment of the rebels, perhaps to make the government forces misjudge.

Clearly, the rebels miscalculated.

Because of the vast desert to the south and the absence of a road to Nasiriyah, there were only two options, one to advance east from Semavo and the other to the south from Amamara.

From Amara to the south, there is no need to go to Nasiriyah at all, and you can go directly to Basra.

It's just that it's more difficult.

Although the rebels have taken control of Amara, from Amara they have to pass through several towns already controlled by government forces, such as Aytag, Saleh Fort, 'Uzair and Huraibai, and then have to strengthen the Shatt al-Arab to reach Basra, and finally through the swamps north of Basra.

In addition, the traffic conditions of this route, that is, the roads, were terrible and unsuitable for large corps operations.

Conversely, there is a highway from Nasiriyah to Basra, which avoids the marshes north of Basra, and when it approaches Basra, it is possible to cut off the road to Kuwait and even control the mouth of the two rivers without even capturing Basra, thus encircling Basra.

It can be seen that the rebels have no better choice but to march into Nasiriyah.

As for the feints, they could not deceive the reconnaissance planes in the air.

As the saying goes, a soldier is fast.

As long as they are able, the rebels should advance towards Nasiriyah as soon as they capture Semavo, and even if they can't take it, they should encircle and blockade Nasiriyah.

After cutting off the highway from Nasiriyah to Basra, it was only a matter of time before Nasiriyah was laid.

Considering that the Arab League has already taken action and is massing ground troops in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, it should advance to the vicinity of Basra as soon as possible.

The problem is that the rebels did not immediately advance towards Nasiriyah.

This can only show that the rebels have reached their limit, several ace units have lost their combat effectiveness, and it will take time for these units to replenish the lost soldiers.

And, of course, armament.

At this time, the biggest problem for the rebels is not the soldiers, but the equipment.

Just outside Semavo, the rebels lost hundreds of tanks and fighting vehicles, as well as hundreds of heavy guns.

Without enough heavy equipment, even if they reached Nasiriyah, they would not be able to capture the strategic town, which was guarded by tens of thousands of government officers and soldiers.

In fact, the rebels still have enough heavy equipment.

It's just that all this heavy equipment is in the north.

Under the threat of bombing, the rebels could only maneuver at night, making it much less efficient to deliver heavy equipment to the front line, which required more time.

It's just that the situation with the government forces is not much better.

Strictly speaking, it's even worse.

Let's not forget that the rebels captured Semavo and won the final victory, even with huge losses and heavy casualties, they were able to boost morale, unite the morale of the army, and convince the officers and soldiers that if they continued to make persistent efforts to defeat Nasiriyah, they could achieve a final victory in Basra.

Victory was expected, and there were no problems with the morale of the rebels.

On the contrary, the biggest problem facing the government army is actually morale.

After more than half a month of bloody fighting, Semavo was finally lost, so that the government officers and soldiers had to believe that even if they fought desperately in Nasiriyah, the result would be the same.

If you are doomed to defeat, why keep fighting?

In order to prevent the spread of defeat, Nasiriyah's government forces took the remnants of the defeated army withdrawn from Semavo and imprisoned them in a military camp on the outskirts.

It's just that it doesn't make sense at all.

With the remnants arrived, about 50,000 civilians, all Sunnis.

Obviously, it is impossible for government forces to gag all the refugees.

Even when refugees were sent to resettlement camps, news of the defeat of government forces in Semavo spread quickly and had a devastating impact.

In just a few days, hundreds of government officers and soldiers fled without permission.

In order to stabilize the morale of the army, the commander of Nasiriyah's garrison personally ordered the execution of twelve leading deserters, including four officers.

The situation was brought under control, but the tide of thought of defeat spread like poison.

Not only in Nasiriyah, but also in Basra.

As a result of the devastation in Semawah, several senior government officials left Basra without warning, and several of them fled abroad.

Also on the run were the newly recruited recruits.

It's just that these recruits just escaped from the barracks and returned home.

They also do not have the ability to flee Iraq, which is the prerogative of key government officials.

As the saying goes, defeat is like a mountain.

That's probably what it means.

Obviously, this situation is beyond many people's expectations.

Strictly speaking, the performance of the government troops in Semavo was remarkable, they fought very actively, and the officers and men showed bravery, otherwise they would not have held out for so long.

From a strategic point of view, the government forces lost only a city and gained valuable time.

If he had not held out at Semavo, Nasiriyah would have been captured by the rebels.

In the long run, the rebels lost a lot of troops and wasted precious time in Semavo, so it was only a matter of time before the initiative changed hands.

What the government army has to do is to continue to hold on, accumulate strength, and wait for the opportunity to counterattack.

Judging from the situation on the battlefield, this opportunity will come at the time of the next decisive battle, that is, to resist the rebels in Nasiriyah and seize the initiative on the battlefield.

It must be admitted that Razak saw this a long time ago.

Perhaps, of course, the staff officers on his side.

However, Razak did one extremely wrong thing, that is, before that, he declared that he would fight the rebels to the death in Semavo.

He said this, perhaps, just to boost morale.

Obviously, he did not think at all that it was precisely because of these words that the government officers and soldiers thought that if they lost Semavo, they would lose the war.

Razak had a keen strategic vision, but he was far from being a good military commander.

If this continues, it is very likely that the government army will be defeated without a fight.

Razak first thought of Crown Prince Mohammed, and Crown Prince Mohammed thought of Wang Dong, who seemed to be the only one who could turn the tide.