The 1182 gap is revealed
It is a pity that the United States is willing to accept such losses, but the Japanese army has already seen its own defeat in the attrition of such losses.
The loss of 200 aircraft by the United States is nothing at all, and as the world's first industrial power, the United States at this time produced far more aircraft per month than that.
But the Japanese army is embarrassed, although its aircraft production is not small, but compared with the United States, it seems to be a little inadequate.
In addition, Japan's cheating pilot training reserve system is really unable to withstand such crazy consumption.
In the eyes of the Japanese army, one plane replaced ten American planes, and they did not necessarily make money. The problem now is that one Japanese aircraft can only be replaced by two American aircraft at most.
This is still a relatively good result achieved under the premise that Japan suddenly let the ME-109E fighter enter the war.
If you only rely on the KI-43 Hayabusa fighter, which is a domestic product made in Japan, it is estimated that the battle loss ratio will be about 1 to 1.5.
For Japan, such a battle result is absolutely unacceptable. Another headache is that the gap between the logistics and supply speed of the two sides is too large.
Japan is also an island nation, but the number of ships it has really can't compare with that of a traditional power like the British Empire.
The United States fought in New Guinea with Australia at its back, and the Japanese army fighting in New Guinea was followed by the Japanese defenders in Malaya, who were not very surplus themselves.
Therefore, the pressure on the Japanese side is very high, especially the pressure on transportation. This pressure forced the Japanese army to take the lead in making changes and adding an element of instability to the war situation.
There are many battles in history that were forced to seek change in advance because they could not withstand the pressure, for example, the most famous one is the Battle of Qin, Zhao and Changping.
That war made people slaughter in vain, and it also proved what kind of result it would be for a country that was not able to achieve comprehensive national strength to take the initiative to seek war on the battlefield.
The main force of the Japanese Combined Fleet, which was hiding in Malaya, was the First Air Fleet under Yamamoto Isoroku, and the First Fleet.
Jizaburo Ozawa now commands the fleet and is cruising the waters between Malaya and New Guinea, waiting for a decisive battle.
But this opportunity never appeared, which made Yamamoto and Ozawa very anxious. On the battleship Yamato, who had just returned to the anchorage to replenish fuel, the telegraph room received a secret telegram from the base camp.
After the translation, the officer on duty in the telegraph room sent the top-secret telegram to Yamamoto Isoroku.
He stood up and saluted, then handed over the telegram and reported: "Marshal Yamamoto! The order of the base camp is to do everything possible to find the American fleet, annihilate it, and regain sea supremacy near New Guinea! ”
"In that case, our fleet will have to take the initiative again, and we can only be the first to expose our own position......" Yamamoto fifty-six replied with a headache when he heard this order.
For this naval battle, Yamamoto's idea was for the American fleet to be the first to join the battle, and the Japanese fleet then launched strikes against the American fleet.
But now it seems that his plan cannot be completed: because the Japanese fleet will take the initiative to attack and take the lead in the battle.
He painstakingly arranged this naval battle, preserving the naval aviation that the Navy had just accumulated, and the purpose was to wait for the US Navy fleet to reveal its position first.
However, although Halsey, a famous American Navy admiral, has a style that resembles a mad dog, he plays like a fox. He did not let the aircraft carrier fleet into the Torres Strait, but only sent destroyers and cruisers that the United States consumed to keep probing.
Under such circumstances, the Japanese army could only let its destroyers and cruisers enter the Torres Strait to compete for sea supremacy in the strait and cut off the landing transportation of the United States.
But after several days of fighting, the U.S. Navy relied on numerical superiority and withstood the losses. On the contrary, the Japanese destroyer fleet and cruiser fleet were some unable to withstand it.
During the day, air supremacy in the strait was in the hands of the US Army Air Force, and if it were not for the fact that the US Army Air Force had no experience in attacking the sea, the Japanese Navy might have been crippled by now.
Yamamoto had to continue to endure and wait for the U.S. Navy to make a mistake first. In the eyes of the Japanese Army, his waiting was a sign of inaction.
After all, Yamashita on the island of New Guinea is now almost unsupportable: his army has been reduced from more than 40,000 before the war to less than 30,000.
If this continues, in less than ten days, the Japanese army will be consumed to about 20,000, and by that time, the mountain defense line will not be able to stop the pace of the American army's attack.
Just looking at the data on 11 October, the two armies of the US landing force all went ashore and received supplies and more than 60,000 tons of ammunition.
On the same day, Yamashita received only 500 reinforcements and more than 500 tons of supplies and ammunition......
The follow-up forces of the two sides that were not on the same level at all made Yamashita Fengfumi's counterattack plan all come to naught.
If it weren't for the fact that the United States was afraid of the Japanese Navy and did not dare to engage in naval follow-up operations, it might have collapsed and destroyed Yamashita Fengfumi's troops by now.
The tremendous pressure led Yamashita to send telegrams asking for reinforcements, and the navy's inaction became an excuse for him to shirk his responsibilities.
As a result, the base camp is now putting all the pressure on the Japanese Navy, which makes Yamamoto 56 very passive.
On the one hand, he wanted to ensure that the navy was invincible, and on the other hand, he had to attack first and defeat the American fleet......
What's worse is that he also has to separate the destroyer force to transport supplies to the army - to rush as many troops as possible to the island of New Guinea.
It was not impossible to rush troops to New Guinea, but the pre-war deployment of the Japanese army in New Guinea was so bad that the subsequent supplies became chaotic.
In order to prevent the U.S. military from raiding New Guinea, the Japanese sent a large number of troops to the island, but as the number of troops increased, the amount of logistical supplies began to increase.
Originally, there was not much food on the island, and before the war, it had to feed 40,000 people, and now it has to feed more than 30,000 troops.
Next is the problem of ammunition: the ammunition consumed by 40,000 soldiers is twice as much ammunition as the ammunition consumed by 20,000 soldiers, and the increased consumption rate also makes it very difficult for the Japanese army to replenish it.
In addition to these, including medical drugs, corresponding command equipment, and fuel consumption, all of which caused headaches for the Japanese high-level, who had hardly worried about logistics.
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