That evening, Musharraf flew with Saleh to Islamabad.

It was also on this evening that the Karim puppet regime announced that the "Mosul" brigade, the ace unit, had captured Najaf after two days of fierce fighting.

The more than 400 government officers and soldiers guarding Najaf were all killed.

In fact, nearly 200 government officers and soldiers were executed by the rebels after surrendering on charges of treason.

At the time of the capture of Najaf by the Mosul Brigade, the rebels deployed in Diwaniyah were the first to move south, and the forward force was an infantry battalion.

The rebels attacked Semavo next.

The city, located on the south bank of the Tigris River, was also the last fortress west of Nasiriyah.

To be precise, it is actually in the west of Nasiriyah, the only city guarded by government troops, and it is also the only way to march into Nasiriyah.

There is no danger between Semavo and Nasiriyah.

As for Nasiriyah, it is the western gate of Basra, and if the rebels are allowed to occupy Nasiriyah, the government forces will have to retreat to Basra as a last resort.

If the government forces are sufficient, two lines of defense can also be set up.

Unfortunately, the strength of the force is the biggest problem.

Razak had already ordered a dead hold on to Semavo and sent an infantry brigade there.

Only, will the government forces be able to hold Semavo?

The next day, under Wang Dong's arrangement, Xie Chuyue and Zhang Zilan took a large group of 200 operatives to get a Saudi transport plane to Kuwait City.

From there, they entered Iraq by land, heading for Basra.

Crown Prince Mohammed personally called Razak, claiming that he had hired a military instructor to help Razak train the newly formed army.

In addition, Saudi Arabia will send weapons and ammunition to Basra through Kuwait.

In the early stage, the main ones provided were light weapons such as firearms.

At this time, the only thing that Saudi Arabia can provide is light weapons.

In order to support the Iraqi government forces, Crown Prince Mohammed has asked Wang Dong to withhold the weapons planned to be sent to Syria and let the company be entrusted to transport them to Kuwait.

The first batch of weapons for assistance was not very large, only 10,000 rifles, barely able to arm the officers and soldiers of three brigades.

Compared to the powerful rebels, three infantry brigades are simply a drop in the bucket.

Only, it's better than nothing.

You know, before the coup d'état, the IDF's arsenals were all in the central and northern regions, and now all of them are in the hands of Karim.

The key is not Saudi Arabia, but how much support Musharraf and Saleh can muster in Islamabad.

It was at night, so it was already early in the morning when I arrived.

In the morning, Saleh went to meet with the Prime Minister of Pakistan as a special envoy.

Musharraf was not idle, and went to visit several generals with whom he had good relations.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan warmly welcomed Saleh, deplored the outbreak of civil war in Iraq and expressed support for Iraq's democratically elected government.

Clearly, the Pakistani Prime Minister is ambiguous about whether or not to provide assistance.

In contrast, the Pakistani military's position is clear: Karim is carrying out a coup d'état with the support of Iran, and if Iran succeeds in Iraq, it will inevitably pose a threat to Pakistan, such as instigating a Shiite rebellion in Pakistan, so it is necessary to support the democratically elected government of Iraq to get Iraq back on the right track in order to protect Pakistan's own interests.

However, the Pakistani military has also not made it clear what methods will be used to support Razak.

In fact, Pakistan's prime minister and military generals did not even mention Razak, but spoke of a "democratically elected government".

It can be seen that the Pakistani top brass has a lot of worries about Razak and does not believe that this guy, who has lived in Britain for decades, can become a climate.

And, of course, Razak's relationship with Britain and the West.

To put it bluntly, it is the relationship between Razak and the United States.

Although he was in exile in Britain as a child, he settled in Britain before returning to Iraq, holding a British passport and having dual British and Iraqi citizenship, but as an adult, Razak frequently traveled to the United States, and when he returned to Iraq, he was also supported by the United States.

Obviously, Pakistan does not want a pro-American regime in Iraq.

In addition, this can also see the influence of Huaxia.

In response to Pakistan's concerns, Saleh gave a clear answer, that is, the future Iraqi government will attach the most importance to relations with Saudi Arabia and other countries.

The implication is that Saudi Arabia will not prop up a regime that cannot be controlled.

After three days of consultations, the Pakistani authorities basically agreed to the Saudi request to sell the various weapons that the Saudis need.

However, the Prime Minister of Pakistan also clearly mentioned that the Pakistani army does not have much inventory equipment.

In other words, if Saudi Arabia urgently needs to acquire these weapons and equipment, it can only draw them from the current equipment of the Pakistani army, which will inevitably reduce the combat readiness rate of the Pakistani army.

This is no joke.

In Kashmir, there are sporadic firefights on an almost daily basis, while across the border, there are hundreds of thousands of Indian troops in combat readiness.

Pakistan's military strength is already inferior to India's, and if the combat readiness rate of the Pakistani army is reduced, India may make a misjudgment, such as thinking that it can defeat Pakistan in one fell swoop and seize Pakistan-administered Kashmir, even if it is only to seize a few important strategic passes.

In addition, India's relationship with the United States is extraordinary.

If the United States believes that Pakistan's arms sales to Saudi Arabia and indirect assistance to Razak pose a threat to Pakistan, it may incite India to intervene against Pakistan.

All in all, Pakistan is taking a lot of military and political risks by selling its active equipment to Saudi Arabia.

Of course, the solution is not impossible, that is, to use the money from Saudi Arabia to buy replacement equipment, and it is directly imported.

It's just that this is unacceptable to the Saudis.

Quite simply, Pakistan offers second-hand equipment, but it is new at the price.

No matter how rich Saudi Arabia is, it can't be the big one.

What's more, the new equipment directly imported by Pakistan is certainly more advanced than the existing equipment, and the price is certainly much more expensive than that purchased domestically.

Take the main battle tank as an example, the main force of the Pakistan Army is MBT2000 "Khalid", and this tank is actually from Huaxia, and the VT-1 model promoted by Huaxia in the international market belongs to the same generation of products, and VT-1 has long been discontinued, and Huaxia is now marketing the VT-99 of the same generation as ZTZ-4.

In other words, the Pakistan Army is going to use the money from the sale of MBT2000 to purchase VT-4.

Is it possible?

You know, the unit price of the VT-4 is more than twice that of the VT-1, and even if Pakistan has an extraordinary relationship with Huaxia, the purchase price will not be less than $5 million per vehicle.

How much is MBT2000 worth?

At the time, the Pakistan Army's purchase price was just over $2 million per vehicle.

Obviously, Saudi Arabia is certainly not stupid enough to spend $5 million to buy $2 million in equipment.

Fortunately, it is not non-negotiable.