Chapter 243: The Bloody Battle of Songshan

The artillery was in position, and the Japanese army held Matsuyama alone.

At 3:15 a.m. on July 5, Matsuyama received its first shell in days.

The 8th Army launched its first offensive against Matsuyama, and the artillery first fired suppressive fire on the attacking targets.

At 5 o'clock in the morning, the main force of the 3rd Regiment of the 1st Rong Division attacked from the high ground north of Yinshan Mountain to the peak of Songshan Mountain (sub-high ground) and the high ground on its north side.

By 5:40 a.m., the enemy position was occupied. However, the troops who reached the summit of Songshan were subjected to intense fire from the defending enemy, suffering heavy casualties, although repeated reinforcements.

Still unable to gain a foothold, they had to retreat to the top of the mountain about 100 meters below to build fortifications as a foothold for another attack.

The reason for the failure of this attack was that it was suppressed by the fire of the enemy's anti-slope positions and the flank defensive positions in the dense forest valley.

These positions were very secretive, and they were a dead end for artillery fire, making it difficult for infantry to detect and approach. Artillery could not be destroyed either.

Summing up the lessons learned, the attacking troops decided to first break through Huangshipo and Rolling Dragon Slope on both flanks of Songshan and cut off their fire support, and then assault their main positions from the front

After terrain reconnaissance, there are fewer trees on Rolling Dragon Slope. The moon mark was significant, and the Hetaoqing Heights on its south side had a comprehensive view of the Rolling Dragon Slope, so it was decided to attack the Rolling Slope with the newly arrived 246th Regiment of the 82nd Division, and the Rong 3rd Regiment on the side of the Songshan Slope and the Rong 2nd Regiment on the Yin Mountainside attacked the sub-high ground at the same time to contain the enemy's forces.

On the afternoon of 7 July, the artillery on the east bank of the Nu River and Zhuzipo concentrated their fire on the enemy positions in Rolling Longpo.

At 7 o'clock in the evening, the main force of the 246th Regiment attacked Rolling Dragon Slope from the direction of Hetaoqing and Hongbushu, and successively occupied Heights C and B.

However, the enemy fortress could not be besieged, and the artillery fire was too close for the infantry to support. The enemy troops in each base fired at the attacking troops exposed on the high ground with crossfire nets, and blocked the advance path of the reserve with firepower, while more than 200 people were dispatched to counterattack.

The 246th Regiment held out until dawn, and finally retreated because it could not gain a foothold, and the main force of the Rong 3rd Regiment, which broke through to the top of the sub-highland, was seriously killed and wounded by the enemy's crossfire network.

Only five of the first battalion of the regiment had withdrawn by midnight with five wounded, the rest were all killed, and the second siege of the 8th Army was again defeated.

The 8th Army decided to launch a third offensive on the 12th and transferred the 103rd Division to increase its strength.

In view of the lessons learned from the failure of the first two attacks, it was decided to use the main force of the 307th Regiment of the 103rd Division, which had just been transported to Songshan by Xiangyun car, as the left flank, with artillery and flamethrowers, to attack Rolling Longpo B and C. Dingsan Highlands; The 246th Regiment was the Central Team. Attack the Jiagao and Da Yakou on the east side of Rolling Dragon Slope; The 3rd Regiment of Rong was the right flank and attacked the heights of Matsuyamayo.

With the 245th Battalion of the 3rd Regiment as the right detachment, it moved back to the north of Malutang to attack to attract the enemy.

The 307th Battalion of the 1st Regiment was in reserve. At 3 p.m. at 12H, the Songshanzi Heights and the Rolling Longpo B, C, and D Heights were first bombarded with artillery fire.

After two hours of fire preparation, the infantry took advantage of the extended range of the artillery to launch a charge. When the main force of the 307th Regiment rushed to about 50 meters of the enemy's position on the C and D heights, it was met with intensive fire from the enemy's anti-slope flank positions and B heights.

The enemy organized three counterattacks, and the attacking troops ran out of ammunition and suffered great sacrifices.

The 246th Regiment's attack on the Da Ya Pass and the Rolling Dragon Pojia Heights was also frustrated and retreated to its original position. When the main force of the 3rd Sakae Regiment approached the sub-high ground, it was fired at by crossfire from enemy positions on the northwest and south sides of Matsuyama. The enemy's position was hidden in the dense forest, and it was difficult for the supporting artillery to hit accurately.

The third siege was also lost, and the 8th Army launched three attacks, although the infantry was brave and the artillery fire was fierce, but the enemy's fortifications were concealed and strong, and the artillery fire covered a large area and it was difficult to destroy it.

The 8th Army learned a lesson, changed its tactics, advanced its artillery to the area of Yinshan Mountain and Rolling Dragon Slope, and fired precision at the enemy's forts and anti-slope fortifications on various heights one by one.

Each company of the first-line infantry dug at least two skirmish trenches parallel to the enemy position as the starting point for the charge, so as to reduce the damage of enemy fire.

After rushing into the enemy line. Enemy forts that have not been destroyed by artillery fire are destroyed by sapper blasting or flamethrowers.

During this period, Wei Lihuang, commander of the expeditionary force, Song Xilian, commander of the 11th Group Army, and Brigadier General Shi Eren, commander of the US military advisory group, all went to the Songshan front to inspect and decide, and studied with He Shaozhou to form a sharp corps, with the division commander as the regiment commander and the regiment commander as the battalion commander.

After the order to attack was issued on the 18th, it was rainy for several days, and the dense fog was pervasive, which made it difficult for the infantry artillery to be idle, so the attack date had to be postponed.

After 10 a.m. on July 23, the weather cleared, and the units of the 8th Army, supported by artillery fire, began the fourth siege. The 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Rong Regiment of the Right Wing attacked the Jigao Heights, but because they were controlled by the fire from the Songshanzi Heights, the all-day attack was ineffective.

The main force of the 246th Regiment broke through to the Geng Heights. Repelled the enemy's counterattack, used its position to hold it, and advanced to the side of the road about 200 meters to the side of the pass.

That night, the enemy counterattacked four times from Da Ya Pass and Ji Heights, but they were all repulsed. The 307th Regiment of the Left Wing Brigade quickly occupied most of the two heights of Rolling Tuopo C and D, and continued to advance to the B and Shu heights. When approaching the top of the mountain. He was killed by machine gun fire from his fortress and the valley on the left. under

After 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy troops took advantage of the heavy rain and dense fog to continuously counterattack from the three heights of A, B, and Shu to the two heights of C and D.

The enemy and us repeatedly engaged in hand-to-hand combat, and at dusk Ding Heights was lost for a time, and the 3rd Battalion of the 308th Regiment rushed in time to surrender to the battle. At 7 p.m., the Ding Heights were recaptured.

In the fierce battle, Chen Yikuang (formerly known as Chen Wei), deputy commander of the 307th Regiment, and Liu Jiaji, commander of the 1st Battalion, led officers and soldiers to fight the enemy and were wounded. The fourth siege made some progress. On the 24th and 25th, it was rainy and foggy, and it was difficult for infantry and artillery to coordinate and fail to expand the results of the battle, mainly to repel the enemy's counterattack and consolidate the positions that had been gained.

The 8th Army attacked the troops in Songshan, and by this time more than half of the casualties had been lost, and the combat effectiveness was greatly weakened.

The 308th Regiment of the 103rd Division and the 245th Regiment of the 82nd Division were ordered to join the battle and strengthen the left flank and center offensive forces.

At the same time, summing up the experience of artillery in destroying enemy positions, it was decided to advance the artillery to the closest distance, destroy the enemy's large multi-layered shelter with heavy artillery fire, block the defending enemy, and use engineering blasting or infantry to destroy it with rocket launchers and flamethrowers.

The fifth attack was scheduled to be launched on the 29th, but from the 27th to the 31st, heavy rain continued for several days, and the attack was repeatedly postponed.

The units took advantage of the past few days to carry out earthwork work in the rain and gradually approached the enemy positions in the communication trenches.

By the night of 1 August, the communication trench of the Central Brigade had advanced to a distance of more than 60 meters from the enemy's position on its own heights.

On August 2, the weather cleared, and the left, center, and right attack units of the 8th Army were planned according to the plan. Assaults were made at their respective designated targets from 2 p.m. onwards.

The 246th Regiment of the Central Team and the 308th Regiment of the Left Wing Team, under the command of artillery fire, used engineer blasters and flamethrowers to wipe out all the enemy in the strongholds of Rolling Dragon Slope.

Before the infantry dispatched, the artillery fire first concentrated on bombarding the A and B heights, and then transferred the artillery fire between the A and B heights, and the infantry took advantage of the situation to charge.

Such tactics were already the peak of the Japanese army's play, but the offensive was solid, and the Japanese army's cold fort would always be exposed at a critical moment when the position was not occupied, resulting in the failure of the attacking troops.