In the first two days of fighting, the Indian Air Force exposed a lot of problems, even low-level mistakes, most of which were directly related to the pilots.

The battle near Karachi, which was most prominently manifested.

In the two raids, the F-16E/F fighters on strike missions immediately discarded the ground strike munitions they were carrying after receiving the threat, and then turned to escape, without trying to intercept the incoming enemy aircraft with the AIM-120A, let alone making appropriate tactical adjustments.

You know, these F-16E/F actually carry 2 AIM-120A and 2 AIM-9X.

In other words, even if it is intercepted, it has the power to fight.

What's more, it was the JF-17 that went to intercept these F-16E/F, and the SD-10A carried by the first batch of JF-17 was not the SD-10C with a longer range.

Obviously, in the event of an interception, these F-16E/F could have used the AIM-120A to expel the JF-17.

Even if that doesn't happen, the JF-17 can be used to combat it with the AIM-9X by discarding the ground attack munitions it is carrying while it is approaching.

In terms of maneuverability, the JF-17 is definitely no match for the F-16E / F.

In addition, tactically, it is also possible to have a small number of F-16E/Fs divert the JF-17 to ensure that a portion of the F-16E/F can continue to carry out strike missions.

It can be said that no matter how you look at it, these F-16E/F should not immediately turn to escape after being intercepted.

In the battle for the sneak attack on the ZDK-05, the elite pilots of the Indian army flying the F-35AI also made mistakes, and they should not have been.

What's wrong?

Although there is a set of HQ-9B air defense systems nearby, it is completely unnecessary for the F-35AI to launch missiles in advance until they are detected by radar.

In fact, even if it is detected by radar, the F-35AI is not much of a threat.

Why?

The HQ-9B needs to use a fire control radar to illuminate the target, and the fire control radar has a significantly shorter detection range for stealth fighters like the F-35AI.

That is, as long as it is not locked by the fire control radar, the F-35AI is not threatened.

With the stealth performance of the F-35AI, it is too late to turn to evade after being locked by the fire control radar, and there is every chance to avoid the incoming anti-aircraft missile.

At that time, if the two F-35AIs did not evacuate in a hurry, but calmly completed the guidance work, the ZDK-05 of the Pakistan Air Force may not be able to return to the airport.

Quite simply, the two F-35AIs launched 8 AIM-120Ds, and they were all self-guided throughout the process.

To put it simply, the missile is first allowed to fly under the control of the inertial guidance system, and after reaching the predetermined area, it will use the missile radar to search for the target and complete the attack on its own.

The AIM-120D has strong self-guidance capabilities, and can theoretically be left alone after launch.

The problem is that it takes a lot of time for the missile to fly almost a hundred kilometers, and during this time, the target of the attack is also in motion, and even turns to evade.

In fact, in the event of a missile attack, any aircraft will immediately change course.

It is precisely in this way that during combat, the pilot will generally use the fire control radar to irradiate the target again when the missile is approaching the target, to be precise, when it is about to reach the self-guidance stage, obtain the detailed parameters of the target, and provide the last ballistic correction for the missile through the data link, so that the missile can fly in the right direction.

If the target turns midway, the pilot also makes timely corrections to the missile's trajectory.

The U.S. military has extremely strict requirements for this.

That is, if the attack range is more than 40 km, then the carrier aircraft must provide relay guidance for the AIM-120D, and only if the range is less than 40 km, preferably less than 30 km, the carrier aircraft pilot is allowed to choose the launch and forget the attack mode.

Obviously, the Indian F-35 AI pilots did not follow this set of operational principles.

As a result, 4 of the 8 AIM-120Ds missed directly, and they did not lock on to the target at all, to be precise, they were too far away.

Only 4 AIM-120Ds locked onto the target, 2 of which were deflected away by jamming projectiles thrown by ZDK-05.

If the pilot of the F-35AI continued to approach the ZDK-05 at that time, constantly providing relay guidance for the missiles, all 8 missiles could approach the ZDK-05.

Obviously, as long as one more missile hits, that ZDK-05 will be finished.

In addition, in terms of attack tactics, the Indian Air Force is also extremely rigid.

Still taking the battle on the Karachi side as an example, the Indian Air Force has barely made adjustments in three consecutive waves of attacks, and they all let the aircraft group take turns.

What's worse is that India's fighters are entering from one direction.

If the tactics can be properly adjusted and more effective assault methods can be adopted, even if it is just a few more attack directions, it can create great problems for the Pakistan Air Force.

Let's not forget that in this direction, the Pakistani Air Force has only 20 JF-20s in total.

The Indian Air Force seems to believe that it will be able to crush the Pakistani Air Force with a much larger number of fighters.

The question is, in modern air combat, is it really the main factor that determines victory or defeat?

The answer is clearly no.

You must know that the JF-20 can theoretically carry up to 10 SD-10Cs and 2 PL-10s, and the fire control radar can track 20 targets at the same time, and can guide up to 8 SD-10Cs to attack 8 of the most threatening targets, and has extremely strong air defense interception capabilities.

In fact, from the very beginning, the J-10A was used as a light interceptor.

When designing this fighter, the Huaxia Air Force clearly requested that it replace the previous interceptor plane and have the ability to carry out interception missions on the mainland.

Of course, in real combat, the JF-20 generally carries 4 SD-10Cs, and at most 8.

In any case, this is a medium fighter with a range that will not be too large, so when performing air defense missions, especially when the purpose of the mission is not clear, it is common to carry several auxiliary fuel tanks, at least on the central hardpoint in the belly.

Even so, the JF-20 has an extremely good volley capability.

In the face of such a JF-20, does the quantity still work?

Obviously, even with 2 SD-10Cs against one target, one JF-8 with 10 SD-20Cs will be able to intercept four enemy aircraft.

That is, the Indian Air Force must have at least 4 times the numerical superiority in order to crush the Pakistani Air Force.

Have it?

In addition, the Pakistan Air Force is operating on the inside line, the airport is not far from the rear, and the JF-20 can control the sortie cycle within 2 hours, while the Indian Air Force is fighting on the outside line, the airport is still hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away, and the fighter jet sortie cycle is more than 3 hours.

This means that the sortie efficiency of Indian fighters is only about half that of Pakistani fighters.

Counting this, the Indian Air Force would have at least 8 times the size of the Pakistan Air Force in order to have any hope of crushing the Pakistan Air Force with numerical superiority.

Obviously, this is absolutely impossible.

Why?

Not to mention the Indian Air Force, the fighters of the Chinese and US Air Forces, which are unlikely to be eight times as large as Pakistan.

It can be seen that the defeat of the Indian Air Force in Karachi, and even in all directions, or rather heavy losses, is more due to its own problems, at least the main reason is its own, not that the Pakistani Air Force has reached a world-class level.