Rommel did guess that the Allies would land from Normandy. Pen @ fun @ pavilion wWw. ｂｉｑUｇE。 ｉｎｆｏ

Rommel would have judged this way, not because he knew the intelligence of the Allies, nor because he had drawn conclusions from his analysis of the terrain, let alone because he had foretold the prophets......

In fact, Calais was the most suitable landing site if analyzed only from the topography, so much so that Hitler was convinced of this and repeatedly emphasized Calais as the focus of defense. Even Hitler ordered that no one could transfer troops from Calais without his own approval.

Rommel was able to guess because he knew the Allies and knew that the Allies would not attack in a position where the enemy was prepared and the fortifications were very strong...... The Germans garrisoned nineteen divisions in Calais, compared to only ten in Normandy.

Naturally, Rommel set his sights on Normandy, a barren land that no one else cared about.

However, although Rommel was aware of the danger in Normandy, he was somewhat powerless, mainly because the military power was not entirely in his hands, he only had the right to command...... This should be considered Hitler's mistake, and the German army in Normandy actually had two commanders, one was Rommel and the other was the more senior aristocratic general Rundstedt.

As usual, the civilian generals and aristocratic generals from the grassroots all looked down on each other, so there was no communication and coordination at all, and even demolished each other.

To make matters worse, the two have completely opposite opinions on the use of armored forces.

Rundstedt is regarded as an expert in armoured troops, a staunch supporter of Blitzkrieg, and one of the founding emissaries...... Bypassing the Maginot Line and forcing France to surrender was his masterpiece.

Originally, there was no problem with this, because Rommel himself was an expert in armored forces and was also good at attacking the enemy with blitzkrieg.

The problem was that Rundstedt was an aristocrat who had never been on a tank, who couldn't stand the dirt, grease and noise, and who never went deep into the lower echelons of the troops, inspected the troops, and inspected the weapons and equipment...... This makes his theories somewhat detached and inflexible.

So he took it for granted that the tank is a kind of mobile equipment, and without mobile equipment it is equivalent to a coffin, not to mention that the allies also have sea and air supremacy, and if the tank is placed on the coastline, it will become an excellent target for enemy fighters and warships.

Therefore, Rundstedt suggested that the armored units be deployed a hundred kilometers behind the defensive line, so that they could be protected from bombardment by enemy fighters and naval guns, and then use the mobility advantage of tanks to rush to the front line for reinforcements.

This theory sounds completely correct, and it has been proven again and again in the war, so no one can contradict him.

But the battlefield is never static, and Rundstedt's theory, which may have been true elsewhere, proved completely wrong in this particular battlefield of Normandy.

Rommel believed that in the absence of air supremacy, armored units would be targeted by the enemy wherever they were deployed, and in this respect it was advantageous to deploy them on the coastline rather than in the rear.

The reason is simple, because it also takes a maneuver to deploy in the rear, during which the armored forces are exposed to the enemy's air power and are completely annihilated, and they may not even have a chance to fire a shot at the enemy.

On the contrary, it is not a problem when deployed on the front line, as long as the tanks are built with suitable bunkers and camouflage, it is difficult for the enemy's warships and fighters to find these hidden tanks.

More importantly, Rommel believed that the biggest feature of this battle was the extreme disparity in strength and equipment between the enemy and us: the German army had only 40 divisions in northern France with a total strength of less than 500,000 troops, while the enemy had more than a million men (Rommel did not know the exact strength of the Allies at this time) and also had sea and air supremacy, in addition to the Allied forces had sufficient supplies and more advanced equipment.

In this case, the only possibility for the Germans to win was to keep the Allies at sea.

Therefore, the first day of the battle was very important, if it was decisive, if the Germans lost the first day of the war, then the Allies would open a breach in the coastline, and then millions of well-equipped troops would pour into France like a flood of bursting banks...... The Germans had no chance of turning defeat into victory.

If the first day of victory is achieved, that is, the Germans succeed in blocking the Allied forces at sea, then the location of the Allied offensive will be completely exposed, and the German army can calmly strengthen the defense.

At this time, the superiority of the Allies in strength and equipment could not be reflected, because they could only attack the German troops hiding in the fortifications from the sea one after another.

Therefore, Rommel repeatedly emphasized: "The 24 hours after the start of the battle are crucial, and this day will be the longest day for both the Allies and us!" On this day, we have to put all the energy of all the troops on the beach, even the orderly soldiers have to go to the battlefield with rifles! ”

It is for this reason that Rommel considered it absolutely wrong to deploy armored forces a hundred kilometers away, and that it would not play any positive role on the battlefield.

But Rundstedt did not agree with Rommel's idea, and he even persuaded Guderian that two armored experts met with Hitler several times, saying that the armored forces must not be handed over to Rommel and used as planned, otherwise it would be a disaster for the armored forces!

Unable to determine who was right and who was wrong, because the theories of both sides sounded plausible, Hitler made a mediocre decision to divide the seven Panzer Divisions in northern France into two, three to Rommel and the other four to Rundstedt.

Rommel could do nothing about this, so he could only do his best to deploy the three armored divisions handed over to him, and these three armored divisions even included two heavy losses, and the 21st and 116th armored divisions were not fully reorganized, and of course did not regain their combat effectiveness.

Fortunately, Rommel was constrained in all respects, otherwise the Allies would probably not have been able to survive the "longest day".

Eisenhower and others, of course, were not aware of these inside information, and they could only guess the intentions of the German army on the basis of the existing situation.

Unlike Eisenhower, Zhang Chi was very sure that the landing from Normandy would work, so he would not suffer from gains and losses at the slightest time like Eisenhower and others.

"So!" Zhang Chi concluded: "What we have to do is to proceed according to the original plan, on the one hand, we will continue to train and prepare, and on the other hand, we will continue to confuse the enemy!" ”