Chapter 628: A Watershed

The Battle of Bertancourt can be said to be a watershed moment in this war.

Prior to this, the Pakistani army had seized the initiative on the battlefield, almost overwhelming the Indian army, and seized the entire Kashmir region in one fell swoop.

On the surface, the advantages of the Pakistani army are extremely obvious.

It's just that after the Battle of Bertankod, the problems of the Pakistani army also manifested themselves.

What's the problem?

Follow-up weakness.

Of course, in essence, this is limited by Pakistan's national power.

Although the battle was won, Pakistan was still too small compared to the behemoth of India, and the strength of the Pakistani army was not sufficient.

Fight a war of annihilation?

Apparently overthinking.

Even if Pakistan exerts all its national strength, it is unlikely that India will be destroyed.

Of course, this also fundamentally limits the strategic objective of the Pakistani authorities, which is to achieve a limited victory and then sit down with India to negotiate.

Since we have to talk about it, we have to accept it when we see it.

The point is that there is no reason for Pakistan to mobilize for war on a nationwide scale when it has the initiative on the battlefield and has the upper hand.

In fact, Pakistan has not mobilized for war.

If the situation is not so favorable, Pakistan will definitely carry out a full-scale war mobilization, and there will be no shortage of troops.

However, this will also reduce the combat capability of the Pakistani army.

Why?

It is not difficult to mobilize troops, but the key is to arm the mobilized troops with what?

You must know that Pakistan's own industrial strength is very limited, and only a few weapons can be produced on its own, and most of the main battle weapons need to be imported.

What is the point of mobilization if it is not possible to arm mobilized servicemen?

Forming infantry units?

The crushing defeat suffered by the Indian army has proven that pure infantry units are of little use on the battlefield other than to increase their own casualties.

In addition, it is necessary to consider the negative effects of all-out war mobilization.

All in all, given the limited strategic objectives and the initiative in the war, there is no reason for the Pakistani authorities to expand the scope of mobilization.

There is also a crucial reason.

What?

Battlefield environment.

Although the Northwest Territories are the core of India, the road traffic is extremely poor, and even the national highways have poor capacity.

Obviously, this determines the combat efficiency of the Pakistani army.

The most affected is actually logistics.

In Bertankot, it was because the logistics could not keep up that the Pakistani army had to give up the idea of going south and honestly retreated.

If the logistics can keep up, it will definitely be different.

The combat effectiveness of the Israeli and Palestinian armies, as well as the troops invested, can completely avoid Amritsar and directly march to Jalandar to carry out strategic encirclement of the Indian army.

If this were the case, the Indian authorities would probably immediately sit down and negotiate.

Of course, if the road conditions were good, the Indian army would not have been so badly defeated, at least in the vicinity of Bertankot, more troops could be committed.

It can be seen that the poor traffic environment is a big trouble for both sides.

You must know that the requirements for logistics support of armored forces are much higher than those of infantry, so in many cases, what determines the combat effectiveness of an armored force is actually whether logistics support can keep up with it, and how strong the logistics support is, not how many troops can be invested.

In fact, the Pakistani army has not invested enough troops.

Why?

It's just that the logistics can't keep up.

Due to this constraint, it is unlikely that the Pakistani army will achieve much success in India.

In fact, if you really want to compare, the transportation conditions in India are not as good as Pakistan.

With so many restrictions, how can you fight?

This brings up a very obvious problem.

That is, as long as India is unwilling to negotiate, the war can drag on forever.

After the end of the Battle of Bertanokot, the Pakistani authorities have recognized the problem.

In fact, the Pakistani authorities were alarmed before that.

If nothing else is taken into account, the Indian authorities can drag on the war forever, while Pakistan obviously can't drag it out forever.

Why?

This is not the war that Pakistan wants.

If Pakistan had been in charge, this war would not have broken out at all.

So, what's next?

The Pakistani authorities have not figured it out, or have not yet found a feasible solution.

At that time, the only thing the Pakistani authorities could do was to sweep Indian-administered Kashmir as soon as possible and accomplish the set strategic goals.

To this end, during the Battle of Bertankod, the Pakistani army has been focusing on Kashmir in the north.

Even after the end of the Battle of Bertankod, the Pakistani army was strengthening the defense deployment in the border area, using enough troops and supplies.

To put it bluntly, Pakistan is strengthening its control over Kashmir for the long term.

Why?

If India refuses to negotiate an armistice, Pakistan's occupation of Kashmir will become a fait accompli, leaving India without any talks.

At that time, even if it drags on for a few years, it will not have much impact on Pakistan.

Don't forget, except for the plains near Jammu, the whole of Kashmir is mountainous and difficult to defend.

As long as the Pakistani army has a firm foothold, it will be impossible for the Indian army to regain the lost territory, at least not through small-scale military operations.

Launching a large-scale offensive?

Obviously, first of all, we have to ask whether the Indian army has that strength.

If not, then we have to accept a fait accompli.

However, the key is still to get India to sit down and negotiate.

So, how can we get India to sit down and negotiate?

Obviously, to this extent, it is very difficult to negotiate an armistice.

The point is that the Indian authorities are not willing to admit defeat and still believe that there is hope for turning the tide of the war, and even still feel that they can turn the tide of the war into victory.

Otherwise, the Indian authorities would not have been dragging their feet on armistice talks with Pakistan.

From this point of view, the only way to get India to sit down and negotiate is to dash the hopes of the Indian authorities, or even bring them down.

So, how to fight?

In fact, this is the key to Yunlong's suggestion that the Pakistani army launch an offensive in the Amritsar direction.

The Indian authorities are still insisting that there are only two conditions.

The first is to have enough troops, and the main forces in the north-western direction still exist, that is, hundreds of thousands of troops deployed near Amritsar.

Second, they have illusions about the United States and Japan, believing that as long as they persist, they will be able to receive assistance.

Whether or not the United States and Japan come to India's aid is actually determined by the performance of the Indian military.

If India is doomed to defeat, why should the United States and Japan come to India's aid?

Then, it has become the best choice to defeat the main force of the Indian army and let India lose its last hope.