On July 12, 1947, a second meeting on the U.S. aid program was held in Paris.

With the exception of Spain, Andorra, San Marino and Liechtenstein, almost all European countries, including the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, were invited.

However, before receiving the invitation, negotiations between the Soviet Union and Britain, the United States and France on related issues had broken down, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had already indicated that it would reject the American aid plan. Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Norway, Greece, and other member states of the Eastern European bloc also echoed the position of the "big brother of the Soviet Union" and resolutely refused to send representatives to attend the meeting.

However, the "Big Bobo (Poland)," which had always been fond of fighting the Soviet Union to the death, risked being criticized by the boss and sent representatives to Paris to attend the Western-led conference.

In Stalin's view, any Eastern European country accepting the US aid plan would seriously threaten the Soviet Union's control over Eastern Europe, because it was very likely that the Western countries would take advantage of this aid opportunity to break these Eastern European socialist countries away from the influence and control of the region that the Soviet Union had just established in the name of "economic integration" and to collapse the socialist economic foundation.

As a matter of fact, the United States has also seen this, so not only is it not opposed to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe receiving aid, but they are also actively inviting Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, and other socialist countries to participate in this meeting. As long as these countries accept U.S. aid, the Soviet Union's influence on Central and Eastern Europe will inevitably be greatly reduced, and the influence of the United States on Europe will also increase.

Stalin, of course, did not want this to happen, so he prevented the Polish delegation from traveling to Paris for the conference, and other Eastern European countries wittily refused American aid.

In Manturov's view, in order to maintain close ties between the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the "big brother of the Soviet Union," it is necessary to develop an aid program led by the Soviet Union, similar to the Marshall Plan, so that the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe can receive the resources they need for post-war reconstruction and economic development from the aid program.

However, the financial resources of the USSR were not as abundant as those of the United States, and it was not feasible to provide significant financial assistance. Although the industrial level of the Soviet Union has ranked second in the world, leaving behind the traditional industrial powers such as Britain, France and Germany, it has not been able to compare with the United States, which has a stronger industrial base, and cannot provide too many industrial products as assistance.

Under such circumstances, in order to save the financial resources of the Soviet Union and at the same time achieve the purpose of "aiding" the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union could only "aid" in the form of the export of raw materials (such as steel and oil) and production machinery (such as agricultural machinery such as tractors and harvesters, as well as industrial production equipment such as machine tools), and of course, financial support was also indispensable.

Of course, this aid program was not absolutely gratuitous, and while the Soviet Union provided aid, the former Axis powers such as Germany and Northern Italy also needed to provide the Soviet Union with raw materials or industrial goods (mainly industrial production equipment such as machine tools, as well as transportation vehicles such as automobiles and airplanes, and Romania provided raw materials such as oil) as "war compensation".

A significant portion of the war reparations received by the Soviet Union would also be used to support the economic (mainly industrial) development of countries that had been invaded by the Axis powers, such as Greece, Denmark and Norway.

Manturov's proposal was endorsed by Vyacheslav Molotov, then a member of the Soviet Politburo and deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Ministers (equivalent to the deputy premier of the State Council), but was vehemently opposed by Nikolai Voznesensky, chairman of the State Council for Planning and Economy.

Voznesensky believed that the aid package proposed by Manturov and Molotov would cost a lot of resources without any return and was not in the national interest of the Soviet Union.

But in reality, the Soviet Union did not need to pay much in its aid program, and after the development of the Soviet Union's four five-year plans, its economic strength and financial situation were no longer what they used to be, and there was not much problem in coming up with hundreds of millions or billions of rubles.

What's more, the Soviet Union did not need to come up with much money this time, it only needed to provide the "socialist brothers" with some raw materials (such as oil and metals) that the Soviet Union already had, and some overproduced machinery (such as tractors, harvesters, and industrial production equipment), which would not put too much pressure on the finances.

Moreover, in this aid plan, the Soviet Union's "aid" to Germany, Northern Italy, and other defeated countries was also only profitable, and the "war aid" of these former Axis powers was completely able to offset the Soviet Union's raw materials and financial subsidies to them.

A considerable part of the Soviet aid to the victorious countries was also received from the former Axis powers, and although the aid provided by the Soviet Union itself accounted for the lion's share, it was not much for the Soviet Union's increasingly abundant treasury.

In general, the Soviet aid program was actually a "mutual economic aid (material deal)" between the Soviet Union and the former Axis powers such as Germany, Italy, and Romania, and the Soviet Union's aid to the victorious powers such as Greece, Norway, Denmark, Poland, and Czechoslovakia was actually not very much for a superpower like the Soviet Union, and it was all within the range of affordability.

After the development of the various "socialist brothers", they will also be able to produce more raw materials and industrial and agricultural products, which will be able to provide more material supplies for the Soviet Union in disguise, and their economic capacity and purchasing power will also increase, and they will be able to develop into an export market for Soviet industrial and agricultural products and raw materials, which will be beneficial to the economic development of the Soviet Union.

However, this plan in favor of the Soviet Union was opposed by the State Committee for Planning and Economy, and in order to strengthen the opposition, Voznesensky even invited some so-called "economic authorities" to write a joint letter opposing it.

In the Soviet Union, the State Committee for Planning and Economy was the government agency that led the economic development of the Soviet Union, and Voznesensky, as the chairman of this committee, was a professor of economics, and he had a great say in the economic field of the Soviet Union, and he had to make decisions on almost all economic policies and issues.

Fortunately, the supreme decision-making power of the Soviet Union's economic policy has not yet fallen into the hands of Voznesensky, and above the State Planning Commission, there is also a power organ called the "Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU."

As long as the Politburo and the top leader have the support, no matter how much Voznesensky tries to do so, he will not be able to stop the aid plan.