Kulakov, the first secretary of the party committee of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, looked at the young man who was sitting in the chair and said: "But this method, the secretary of the party committee of one of the metal processing plants of the Krasnoyask Territory also gave a similar opinion to the party committee of our Krai. Pen, fun, pavilion www. biquge。 info

After discussions with the state committee, we decided to use all the propaganda resources at our disposal to instill in the workers the concepts you just mentioned.

However, there have been some difficulties in the implementation of this propaganda strategy, and the results have not been very good. The main reason is that we have no practical examples to prove that their labor is directly related to the war situation, nor can we convincingly prove the negative impact of sabotage on the war.

In addition to the lack of examples, this may be due to a problem with our advocacy policy, but in my view, propaganda and indoctrination are not enough, and there is also a need for good monitoring.

However, in terms of supervision, the standards for sabotage are not uniform, and the production standards of large factories are difficult to quantify at the individual level.

At present, most of the factories are able to complete the production targets set within the specified time and meet the quantitative requirements, which provides some leading cadres with a reason to relax the supervision standards, and also provides a reason for some lazy workers to slack off. ”

Manturov smiled appreciatively, this secretary of the Krasnoyayarsk Krai Party Committee is also a bit of a level, after all, in Stalin's time, it was not ordinary people who could get into these positions.

In fact, this Kulakov is not an ordinary person at all.

Like Manturov, in 1938, at the age of twenty, he became the first head of the local party committee, becoming the first secretary of the party committee of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, the youngest first secretary of the district committee of the Krai in the whole Soviet Union.

Originally, according to historical development, Kulakov would have been the second youngest member of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (the youngest was the second secretary of the Party Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Stolyzhev, 27 years old).

But in this space-time, with the addition of Manturov and Chernenko, Kulakov fell to fourth in the ranking. If Katia is included as an alternate member, it will fall to sixth.

It is precisely because of the appearance of Manturov that the central authorities pay too much attention to the vigorous development and outstanding political achievements of the Novosibirsk side, and focus on sending people to observe the young and promising cadres on the Novosibirsk side, while ignoring the inspection of the Krasnoyarsk Krai next door.

As a result, Kulakov was not elected by the Central Committee as a director of the People's Commissariat of Supervision, but promoted the second secretary of the Novosibirsk Regional Party Committee, which not only promoted a local cadre from Novosibirsk to the Central Committee, but also preserved Kulakov's status as a prince.

"Comrade Kulakov, I think we should report more in the media and propaganda on the heroic deeds of front-line fighters, and it is better to indicate which equipment these fighters used, or which tanks or which planes they flew, and spread these things in the factories that produce the relevant equipment, so that the workers know what the value of these products is.

At the same time, it is also necessary to report on the fact that some troops have been repulsed or even eliminated because of the lack of equipment and ammunition, so that the workers know the consequences of insufficient equipment and ammunition, and urge them to actively produce, otherwise it will lead to more troops being wiped out because of insufficient equipment or ammunition. ”

Manturov said it lightly, but that raised another problem.

Actually, Kulakov had already thought about this: "Comrade Manturov, what you said was also mentioned by our comrades of the Party Committee of the Krasnoyask Territory, but we lacked relevant materials, so in the end they were not implemented. ”

"Rest assured, Comrade Kulakov. We, the General Political Department of the Red Army, will try to provide you with sufficient relevant materials. Of course, these materials cannot involve military secrets, including the deployment of our army, so most of the materials that can be provided are not up to date, and the stories transferred in them are not the most recent ones, I hope you can understand. ”

Kulakov then remembered that Manturov was also the head of the General Political Department of the Red Army, and if the Red Army was willing to help provide materials, the work of propaganda and indoctrination would be much easier, but how to solve the problem of supervision? "Thanks to the help provided to us by the General Political Department of the Red Army, how should we deal with the problems that exist in supervision?"

"Comrade Kulakov, as you said just now, one of the reasons for the lack of supervision is that the standards of supervision and punishment are not uniform, so we need to formulate a unified standard to unify the supervision mechanism and the punishment mechanism.

However, if the standards are unified, and the supervision and punishment mechanisms are unified, does that mean that the problem can be solved? In my opinion, this is a no.

Because the root cause of ineffective supervision actually lies in the leaders in charge of supervision. As you just said, some leaders are worried about the loss of talent and the impact on the relationship between leaders and workers, so they have adopted more lenient standards.

If the standards are unified, the leaders will have a basis for punishment, and according to the established standards, the workers who are found to be sabotaging will be punished, and there will be no problem of loose standards.

But what if the root cause of the problems in some factories is that the leaders are lazy, unwilling to supervise, or even deliberately shield some sabotage workers? Even if the standards are in place, will these leaders deliberately shield some people and deliberately fail to see the existence of sabotage? Will you deliberately not deal with it after seeing it? ”

"It's a possibility, but in any case, we have to believe in our comrades."

"That's right, we have to believe in our comrades. However, there are some people who carry the identity of Communist Party members and hold some power, but they do not want to do things for the people, and they do not have the party in their hearts at all. Can these people be considered our own comrades?

We have to punish these people severely, and if we can be 100% sure that all factory leaders are not such people, of course it would be the best, but if there are such people, then what then?

Therefore, we should send people to the factory from time to time to conduct inspections, and these people should also enter the factory in another capacity to ensure that the inspections are sudden and secretive. However, the effectiveness of this method has yet to be verified. ”