At nine o'clock in the morning of the same day, Zhang Cheng and Li Yunlong gathered more than 5,000 people from the 1st Brigade and a reconnaissance unit to go to Daoxian County as the vanguard of the Young Communist Division. Pen & Fun & Pavilion www.biquge.info

Just when the Young Communist Division was advancing towards Daoxian with all its strength at an unprecedented marching speed, on November 18, the vanguard of the Central Red Army engaged the Gui army at Baimang Camp and Gongcheng Longhu Pass in Hexian County, Gui Province. On the 20th, the Red Ninth Army approached Jianghua, and on the 21st, captured the county seat of Jianghua and sent two regiments to attack Longhu Pass.

After that, the troops of the Red Fifth Army, the Red Eighth Army and the Red Ninth Army all entered Jianghua and Yongming successively, threatening Fuchuan, Hexian and Gongcheng in Gui Province. Bai Chongxi (Li Zongren was stationed in Guangdong Province for a long time, and the actual commander of the Gui Army at that time was Bai Chongxi) was worried that the Central Red Army would be brought into the hinterland of Gui Province from Fuchuan and Hexian, and he received a secret telegram from Wang Jianping from the magic capital, saying that Chang Kaishen had adopted the poisonous strategy of Yang Yongtai, the head of the Department of Political Science and Science, to "eliminate the three evils in one fell swoop" and planned to oppress the Red Army from the areas on both sides of the Longhu Pass to the south and eliminate the "three evils" of the Red Army, the Guangdong Army, and the Gui Army in one fell swoop.

On the evening of November 21, Bai Chongxi telegraphed Chang Kaishen in the name of Li Zongren, requesting that the main force of Xia Wei's troops be withdrawn south, and the gap left by the Hunan army should be filled. At 17 o'clock on the afternoon of the 22nd, Chang Kaishen issued a telegram permitting the Gui army to retreat south, and sent a telegram to He Jian, asking He Jian to send the Hunan army south to Quanzhou to take over the defense.

After Bai Chongxi received the reply, he did not wait for the Hunan army to take over the defense, and immediately ordered the main force of Xia Wei's headquarters, which was deployed in Quanzhou, Xing'an, and Guanyang, to withdraw to Gongcheng (more than 100 kilometers south of Guanyang) overnight, leaving only two battalions of the 72nd Regiment of the 24th Division of the 7th Army in Quanzhou, one regiment (belonging to the 43rd Division) in Xing'an, and one regiment (130th Regiment of the 44th Division) in Guanyang.

However, after receiving Chang Kaishen's order to take over the defense, the Hunan army did not immediately go south to take over the defense, but repeatedly delayed. On November 23, the General Staff of the Red Army intercepted the operational order issued by the commander-in-chief, He Jian.

In response to He Jian's battle plan, on the day the Military Commission column arrived in Dao County, Mr. Zhu issued the "Deployment of the Field Army to the West to Crossing Xiaoshui before the morning of the 25th":

The 1st Army Corps: On the 23rd, it "moved to the Daozhou area" and controlled the east bank of the river with the strength of one division, "preparing to surprise and pursue our enemy to the west." On the evening of the 24th, the main force of the corps began to "move in the direction of Yong'an Pass, and the rear guard division was transferred to the Daozhou area in the east of the river, and the pontoon bridge was destroyed."

Third Corps: Where possible, "a division should be crossed west of the river with the vanguard." The other division was to "prepare for a surprise attack on the enemy tomorrow morning." On the evening of the 24th, the main forces of the corps "should have all crossed westward, and the rearguard should destroy the bridge."

The Fifth Army Corps: "Prepare to surprise the enemy who will be chasing us from the east tomorrow" to prevent the enemy from outflanking. On the evening of the 24th, he quickly broke away from the enemy and crossed the river, "and destroyed the pontoon bridge."

Eighth Army Corps: The main force of the corps "can cross the river west before dawn on the 24th". If this is not possible, it should be changed to "cross the river in its entirety" at dusk on the 24th, and "cross it in three hours".

Ninth Legion: "The mission of attacking Jianghua remains unchanged. ”

International Division of the Young Communist Party: "The task of serving as the general guard of the Red Army remains unchanged. ”

The final requirements of the deployment: "The crossing of the river on the night of 23 and 24 should be rapid, and the time should be absolutely guaranteed, and it is strictly forbidden to cross the river during the day." Each corps should send a competent man to supervise the troops to contain the backward troops, and by dawn on the 25th, they should complete all the crossings, destroy the pontoon bridges, and concentrate all ships on the west bank. ”

From this detailed operational order, the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution has completely clarified the intention and deployment of the Kuomintang army to prepare for a decisive battle with the Red Army between the Xiangjiang River and Xiaoshui, and has exposed Chang Kaishen's conspiracy to annihilate our Central Red Army.

Therefore, the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution decided to do its best to speed up the westward advance of the Central Red Army, hoping to cross the Xiangjiang River before the KMT army completed its troop deployment and transfer. However, the column of the Central Military Commission carried those "pots and jars" on their backs like a big move, and the troops could get up quickly? The units of the Red Army were doomed to pay the price of blood for the "sluggishness" of the columns of the Military Commission.

Zhang Cheng led the vanguard of the Young Communist Division to march at a speed of more than 50 kilometers a day for four consecutive days, and finally arrived in Daoxian on the morning of the 24th.

At this time, the Central Military Commission was still staying in Daoxian and had not crossed the Xiaoshui, so Zhang Cheng handed over the troops to Li Yunlong and hurried to the Red Army headquarters to hand over the task.

When he returned to the camp, Zhang Cheng stopped by to visit the commander-in-chief, and the correct suggestion put forward by the commander a few days ago: "Take advantage of the fact that the enemy forces from all walks of life are being mobilized and the Xue and Zhou divisions have not yet come closer, kill one of them, concentrate the main force of the Red Army, and seek and destroy the enemy all the way or one of them, so as to turn the tide of the battle, break the enemy's "pursuit and suppression" plan, and open up a new situation." "Again rejected by the leaders of the Soviet faction, which made the commander-in-chief feel a little depressed.

If the Central Military Commission of the Central Revolution can adopt the commander-in-chief's suggestion, it is very likely that the Red Army will shift from retreat to counteroffensive, and the situation of the war will undergo major changes, and it will be possible to establish a new Soviet zone in southern or central Hunan and cooperate with the army and people who persist in the struggle in the central Soviet zone to break the enemy's "encirclement and suppression." Even if it is not possible to establish a new Soviet zone and win a victory, it will be very beneficial for the Red Army, which continues to carry out the strategic shift.

However, the "dogmatism" of the Soviet leaders was extremely deep-rooted, and in their view, retreat was retreat, and retreat could not be "killed", and thus retreat turned into flight. They subjectively imagined that they would go to Xiangxi to drop off their luggage before making plans, so that they lost a good opportunity to annihilate the enemy in southern Hunan and change the situation of the war.

Zhang Cheng naturally knew this, but he didn't plan to take the initiative to change anything for this. In Zhang Cheng's view, without the bloody lessons of the Xiangjiang Campaign, the Central Red Army would still be under the command of the Soviet leaders, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Party headed by the commander-in-chief would certainly not be able to rise to the core leadership of the Central Committee, and the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Party would always have to become a regional organization under the leadership of the "Comintern."

Zhang Cheng knew that the later Battle of Xiangjiang would end in a crushing defeat for the Red Army. Of the 86,000 Red Army officers and soldiers, more than 30,000 were killed or missing, and about 6,000 were captured. The Red Eighth Legion behind His Royal Highness ceased to exist. On the east bank of the Xiangjiang River, the 18th Regiment of the 6th Division of the 3rd Red Army Corps and the 34th Division of the 5th Red Army Corps were all wiped out. The rest of the departments were only less than half of the troops in the Battle of Xiangjiang, and there were many officers and few soldiers.

This was a serious consequence of the Soviet leaders' practice of escapism. The reason why the main force of the Red Army was able to cross the Xiang River in this battle was that the commanders and fighters of the Red Army had a high degree of political enthusiasm and heroic dedication in the battle, and they stopped the enemy's attack. The main reason why the Soviet leaders suffered such heavy losses in this battle was that the Soviet leaders did not give full play to the strong points of the Red Army, and the troops still had to march with "pots and jars" on their backs during their operations, and their actions were slow, and there were even more serious mistakes in their strategic and tactical guidance.

But strategically, the Red Army was victorious. In the Battle of the Xiangjiang River, the Central Red Army broke through the fourth blockade line of the Kuomintang Army after heroic fighting, and thwarted Chang Kaishen's plan to annihilate the Red Army east of the Xiangjiang River. Most importantly, the defeat in the Battle of Xiangjiang also accelerated the return of the commander-in-chief, found a suitable helmsman for the great ship of the Chinese revolution, and laid the foundation for the great victory that followed.

If there had not been a bloody battle on the Xiangjiang River, how could the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Party profoundly review the mistakes of the Soviet leaders in their "left-leaning" orientation, and the commander-in-chief, under the suppression of the Soviet leaders, would not know when he would have come out.