Spruance's sense of despair did not affect others, at least not the workers who toiled on American soil, far from the battlefield. The country itself is a huge machine, a violent machine, and war is a part of violence, the United States, the machine that creates war and violence, is still running continuously, quickly, and in an orderly manner, and the weapons and equipment needed by the army, ammunition and materials are also being sent to the front line in a steady stream.

For the Navy, the most important thing is the ability to build ships, especially for the US Navy at this time, more, better, more powerful warships are the most needed fresh blood for the US Navy. And the part of the huge American war machine that is used to build warships is not inefficient, and it is constantly improving.

Like the Tang Empire, the American ship engineers are quite good, and in any shipyard in the world, the construction of a battleship is a huge, complex system engineering, it can be said that any battleship is a huge system, and the battleship itself is not only a single weapon, but also a complex weapon system composed of multiple components.

Before the outbreak of war, American engineers could design and build a warship for years. In the case of the Iowa-class battleship, American engineers spent five years designing the battleship and made a large number of modifications to the original design in an effort to achieve the best performance of the battleship. Subsequently, American shipyards spent nearly three years building the warship, striving to ensure that every part was installed in the most correct position, and that every part could play the maximum role, so that the combat effectiveness of the battleship could reach the best level. In fact, this is also a major feature of peacetime, where the designers, technicians, engineers, and workers who build the battleships have to support their families. If you have to live, you have to have something to do, so in peacetime, almost all countries strive for perfection, not quantity, and strive for every warship launched into service to be the most advanced. Originally, the British Navy would have even designed a separate battleship, rather than building the same. More warships to strive for perfection.

During the war, the shipbuilding industry in the United States developed quite rapidly, and its ability to build warships almost reached the level of the Don Empire. If it weren't for the fact that the submarines of Germany and the Tang Empire sank hundreds of merchant ships on the ocean, forcing the United States to build more merchant ships to make up for the loss of transportation routes and the loss of transportation capacity, I am afraid that as early as 26 years, the United States would have surpassed the Tang Empire in its ability to build warships. And one of the major characteristics of the construction of warships during the war is: large-scale, large-scale construction. Like small and medium-sized warships such as destroyers, there are several types of warships of one class. Or even dozens of variants. The number of ships built is hundreds, if not hundreds. For example, the Navy of the Tang Empire built more than 300 large destroyers of the "City" class during the war. As well as almost 1000 small frigates (this was later called, at that time it was called escort destroyers). In terms of large warships, they are also built in batches as much as possible, each batch can be several to dozens earlier, and each type of warship can be built in several batches, or even a dozen batches, to meet the needs of the war and make up for the losses in the war. For example, the US Navy's "Essex" class aircraft carriers are planned to be divided into eleven batches, with a total of more than 40 ships!

Just as the United States never underestimated the Tang Empire. The Tang Empire also did not underestimate the United States, especially the industrial power of the United States. For the Tang Imperial Navy, the most important thing that should be paid attention to is the shipbuilding capabilities of the United States. Since the United States entered the war in 24 years, almost every year, the United States has seen a huge increase in shipbuilding capacity, of which the total tonnage of warships built by the United States in 24 years is 2.8 times that of 23 years, an increase of 140%. 25 years is 1.7 times higher than 24 years, an increase of 70%, and 26 years is 1.2 times that of 25 years. That's a 20% improvement. Every year there is a huge increase, but the growth rate is significantly slower. According to the estimates of the intelligence department of the Tang Empire at that time, the total tonnage of warships built by the United States in 27 years was the same as that in 26 years, an increase of about 10% at most. If the new submarines of the German Navy and the Tang Imperial Navy can achieve better results, perhaps the total tonnage of warships built by the United States in 27 will be lower than in 26 years, mainly because the United States must ensure the total number of its transport ships.

Another important factor influencing the ability to build warships is effective planning and management. Since 25 years, the U.S. Navy has adjusted its warship construction plan, adopting a similar approach to the Tang Imperial Navy, that is, large warships are concentrated in the middle of each year, and at the end of each year, or at the beginning of the following year. This is actually determined by the construction cycle of the battleship, as well as the construction efficiency itself. At that time, the shipyards of the Tang Empire were able to complete the construction of an aircraft carrier in ten months, and it took only one year to count the testing and acceptance. The shipbuilding efficiency of the United States is also about the same, and it takes almost a year for an "Essex" aircraft carrier to be put into service from the laying of the keel to the final commissioning. The construction of large warships is generally divided into two stages, one is slipway construction, and the other is perching. Therefore, the shipyard will make full use of the slipway, and when one aircraft carrier is launched and begins to perch, another aircraft carrier begins to lay the keel. In this way, half of the interval between the service of the two aircraft carriers is about half a year, maybe a little longer, maybe a little shorter, but basically it can guarantee the delivery of a batch of aircraft carriers every six months. The construction of other large warships, such as battleships and cruisers, is also relatively similar, only destroyers, submarines and other small and medium-sized warships can be built continuously, or directly on the slipway to complete all the construction, after launching can be put into service, at most it only takes a small amount of time for perching, and the main work is concentrated on the slipway.

At the end of 26, the U.S. Navy received a new batch of warships, which is probably the largest number of warships acquired by the U.S. Navy since the outbreak of the war.

This batch of warships includes six "Essex" class aircraft carriers, according to the order of service, they are CV-29 "Lake Chamberlain", CV-37 "Princeton", CV-40 "Tarawa", CV-33 "Chishaji", CV-32 "Wright", and CV-47 "Philippine Sea". Because the U.S. aircraft carrier's board number was determined at the beginning of construction, and the raw materials and efficiency obtained by each shipyard were not exactly the same, it led to the situation that some aircraft carriers built later entered service first, and the aircraft carriers that started construction first entered service. As a matter of fact. This also proves that the industrial power of the United States has been stretched to the limit, otherwise there would be no uneven distribution of resources, resulting in inconsistent construction efficiency among shipyards.

In addition, four second batch of Iowa class battleships were served, in the order of service: BB-65 "Illinois", BB-66 "Kentucky", and BB-67 "Nebraska". BB-68 "Iowa". The first two were decided to be built before the outbreak of the war, while the last two were added 25 years later. At that time, the U.S. Navy was deciding whether to continue with the construction of the third batch of Iowa-class battleships or to build the more powerful Montana-class battleships instead, which had largely completed design work.

In addition to these two main warships, the most important thing is to complete the preliminary design at the end of 25, complete the design revision work at the beginning of 26, and start construction of 12 "Detroit" class large air defense cruisers at the same time. And the basis for its design is actually the short-lived "Alaska" class. Before the outbreak of war, the US Navy did not recognize the importance of large air defense cruisers and did not expect that their fast battleships would be lost so quickly. And the losses of the "Baltimore"-class heavy cruisers, the only commendable air defense capabilities, in the war were also quite significant. Its air defense capabilities are also not enough to support the air defense network of the fleet. At that time, the best air defense warships were large cruisers of the "Alaska" class, but their cost was simply too high to afford. Therefore. In 25 years, the US Navy proposed the need for a special air defense cruiser with air defense capabilities comparable to the "Alaska" class, and only need to reach the level of the "Baltimore" class in sea combat capabilities, and at the same time do not need to have any other redundant functions, and the price can be reduced to the level of mass procurement. This is where the large air defense cruisers of the "Detroit" class came from.

The design basis for the "Detroit" level is the "Alaska" class, or the "Alaska" class, a reduced and simplified version. Its displacement was reduced to 18,500 tons / 22,450 tons (fully loaded), the main gun was replaced with three triple 203 mm turrets, the secondary guns were all 127 mm high-level guns, and for the first time 12 76 mm anti-aircraft guns were used, and 40 mm was also arranged as much as possible. Gun emplacements for 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. In addition to reducing the displacement and the caliber of the main guns, the "Detroit" class completely abolished the fleet command system that did not play any role on the "Alaska" class, and the only place that remained was the radar, which was also the most important equipment of air defense warships. In addition, for the first time, the Detroit class is equipped with an integrated radar command system, which has the ability to guide anti-aircraft artillery operations by radar, which is much better than those improved warships with this capability. In addition, the seaplane was retained on the battleship, and the position for the installation of the second radar was also reserved behind the chimney No. 2.

Thoughtfully designed. By reducing a large number of unnecessary equipment, and even reducing the defense capability that was not important for air defense cruisers, the cost of the "Detroit" class was effectively controlled, which was also the most important "performance" of the US Navy at that time. The unit price of the first batch of 12 ships was only about half of that of the "Alaska" class, and from the second batch onwards, the cost could be reduced by a lot due to the reduced design costs and the savings from large-scale procurement.

Comparatively speaking, the combat efficiency of the air defense of the "Detroit" class was somewhat better than that of the initial model of the "Li Jing" class, after all, the original design goal of the "Li Jing" class was not air defense, but against Japanese heavy cruisers. The "Detroit" class is probably able to reach the air defense capability of the improved "Li Jing" class, and there is still a clear gap between the "Detroit" class and the "Rui Beast" class, especially in terms of radar and radar-guided large-caliber antiaircraft gun operations, and the "Detroit" class is still far behind.

For the U.S. Navy at that time, the appearance of the "Detroit" class was undoubtedly a relief in disguise, and it was certainly the most powerful air defense warship of the U.S. Navy at that time, except for 4 battleships. The most important thing is that the "Detroit" class is a battleship that can be "lost", and its procurement cost is not much higher than that of the "Baltimore" class, and much lower than that of battleships. According to the exchange rate at the time, the purchase cost of the "Detroit" class was comparable to that of the "Li Jing" class, but it was slightly more expensive than the "Rui Beast" class purchased by the Imperial Navy in 27, mainly because the Imperial Navy successfully allowed the shipyard to reduce the price.

In addition to these three types of warships, which were vital to the U.S. Navy, 12 Baltimore-class heavy cruisers were in service during the same period, and the first batch of Miami-class heavy cruisers to replace the Baltimore-class was also part of the U.S. Navy's combat sequence at that time.

The "Miami" class was designed together with the "Detroit" class, which was mainly aimed at the "River" class heavy cruisers of the Tang Empire, and in the design comprehensively improved air defense capabilities, in fact, this is the reinforced version of the "Baltimore" class. At the beginning, the US Navy also demanded a larger gun than 203 mm, but the problem was that if a larger caliber gun was used, it would be better to increase the number of "Alaska" classes. It was not until the Tang Imperial Navy replaced the twin 240 guns of the "River" class with a triple 200 mm guns that the US Navy gave up its excessive requirements. Thus, the "Miami" class is actually a strengthened version of the "Baltimore" class, which has increased its displacement, strengthened its defenses, and from the very beginning of its design, which has taken into account the capabilities of air defense, and is positioned very similarly to the "River" class.

In addition, a number of "Fletcher"-class destroyers, a large number of submarines, and rapid supply ships to support the fleet's operations were in service at the same time. These warships can not only form two complete aircraft carrier task forces with six aircraft carriers, but can also supplement the escort force of the existing three aircraft carrier battle groups of the Fifth Fleet to form another aircraft carrier battle group.

It can be said that these battleships are like a shot in the arm, giving the US Navy, a dying patient, a glimmer of hope, and indeed, when these battleships entered Pearl Harbor, many people saw hope. But Spruance didn't see the slightest hope, he knew that the booster was just a booster, which could only bring the dying patient back to light, but could not ultimately save the patient, just let him live a little longer. At that time, it was not the warships that could save the US Navy, not even the excellent officers and men, but some factors that were not determined by the United States, very slim factors.