In Wang Hanzhang's situation, Yamashita Fengwen also sent someone to investigate, but nothing was found. It stands to reason that after the expeditionary force wiped out more than 100,000 Japanese troops in Burma, the Japanese army in Burma was already less than a division, and the squadron should have made every effort to seize Burma, but the squadron did not do that, so Yamashita was very worried that the squadron had a conspiracy waiting for them. But then I checked and checked, and after thinking about it, I didn't find anything. However, doubts are still hovering overhead, and the conspiracy Wang Hanzhang's plan is too bold, just like the hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops at the beginning, didn't they see that the squadron was going to flood them, otherwise who would attack Mandalay, at least not along the river.

In the end, the situation of the Battle of Kuah Island was not optimistic, a large amount of materials were needed, as well as the materials of millions of troops on the Chinese battlefield, so that Yamashita Fengwen did not dare to attack in a big way, he was worried that halfway through the battle, his troops would run out of ammunition, so that the opposite squadron would kill them like pigs, if the other squadrons were not worried, but who called the expeditionary force is really the elite of China's elite.

In the end, Yamashita Fengwen could only prepare slowly with peace of mind, and wait for the battle of Kuah Island to be fought, and then mobilize forces to completely take Burma, Yamashita Fengwen thought that no one in East Asia could confront the Japanese army, but the navy and the US Navy, thinking of the huge industrial power of the United States, they were terrified. And Soviet Russia and Japan are non-aggression against each other, and Soviet Russia was beaten like a dead dog by Germany in Europe, where there is kung fu to fight Japan.

Therefore, Yamashita believes that at least to hold Burma, ensure that Burma is not lost, and block the Allied forces in India, then Japan can mobilize enough capital to fight with the United States, as it is now, every place may be counterattacked by the enemy, and Japan's industrial strength and population are so much, where can it fight with China and Britain and the United States.

Yamashita sent his thoughts about the defeat of Kuah Island and his thoughts about the entire war situation to the Japanese base camp, as an imperial official, he had to do this, and no one wanted to see the defeat of the goal he was fighting for.

Regarding the defeat in the Battle of Kuah, he summarized six points, which are:

First, strategically, the Japanese army's operational attempts greatly exceeded its own combat capabilities. Japan has always had expansionist ambitions, and its basic national policy is aggression and expansion, and its military performance is to gain an inch and be insatiable; whenever it occupies a place, in order to hold on to the occupied area, it has to further occupy other important places in the vicinity, and even if it is counterattacked, it is unwilling to take the initiative to give up, which violates the law that "the offensive force will gradually weaken" that Clausewitz said in his "On War". There are more and more occupied areas and vital rear lines of communication that need to be defended, and more and more troops are used, and the troops used for the first line are gradually decreasing, on the contrary, the defending side gradually concentrates its forces with the shortening of the battle line, so that there are more and more troops on the first line, so with the relative change of the frontline forces of the two sides, the defender can launch a counterattack once the strength is greater than the attacking side, so that the tide of the war changes. In other words, if the attacker's attack exceeds the limits of its own strength, it will suffer defeat.

In the early stage of the war, the first stage of the strategic offensive, the Japanese occupied Rabaul and the northeastern part of New Guinea, trying to establish the first line of defense in the Bismarck Islands, this area was already the limit of the offensive power for the Japanese army, but the unexpectedly huge victory in the early stage of the war made the Japanese army dizzy and forgetful, and decided to continue to advance the front in the direction of the southeast Pacific, so the airfield was built on Kuah Island. Originally, Kuah Island was regarded as an insignificant island by the Japanese army, and when the U.S. military landed on Kuah Island on August 7, 1942, if the Japanese army simply withdrew from Kuah Island, there would not be a decisive battle against it, but the Japanese army believed that if Kuah Island was not recaptured, the U.S. military would use the Kuah Island airfield to form a huge threat to the entire Solomon Islands, then, the Japanese army's important sea and air base in the South Pacific, Rabaul, would lose its barrier, and then threaten the Bismarck Islands, so it was determined to recapture Kuah Island with all its might.

Before the war, the total industrial output value of the United States was equivalent to nine times that of Japan, and in 1940, the United States produced 60.765 million tons of steel, while Japan was only 6.856 million tons, equivalent to only 11% of the United States; If the industrial output index in 1940 was 100, by 1942 the United States had reached 136, while Japan was only 102, and the gap was further widened. At the end of 1942, the U.S. military industry was equal to that of Germany, Italy, and Japan combined. During the period of the battle for Kuah Island, the United States had 3.7 times the shipbuilding capacity and six times the aircraft production of Japan, and this was the fundamental reason why the US military was constantly repaired and supplemented by new ships and planes in the later stage of the Kuah Island Campaign, and its military strength continued to increase, but the ships and planes lost by Japan in the operation could not be replenished in time, and the military strength was constantly weakened.

The number of U.S. transport ships not only made up for the total losses in the war but also increased by 30 percent due to the addition of a large number of new ships, while the total number of Japanese ships in the war decreased because the number of new ships could not make up for the total losses in the war. Kuah Island is an island, which needs a large number of transport ships to transport troops, equipment and supplies, and the shortage of Japanese ground forces and heavy equipment and the extreme lack of supplies are closely related to the insufficient number of Japanese transport ships. Therefore, in the later stage of the campaign, the Japanese military strongly demanded that the government increase the number of civilian ships to be requisitioned, but this was a major issue that had a bearing on the national strength of Japan, an island nation, and the overall situation of the war, and the Japanese Government's Planning Institute held that the number of civilian ships was limited, and if the military expanded the number of requisitioned ships, it would inevitably affect the transportation of raw materials for production in Japan, and then affect the production of military industry, and it would certainly have an adverse impact on the development of the entire war situation. On this issue, sharp contradictions arose between the military and the government, and even Major General Sato Kenryu, director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of the Army, who was in charge of the requisition and transfer of civilian ships, and Lieutenant General Shinichi Tanaka, chief of operations of the General Staff Headquarters of the military representatives' base camp, fought hard over this, but in the end they were still unable to meet the needs of the military.

Kuah Island is 3,000 nautical miles from the Japanese mainland, and Japan is beyond the power of both the combat capabilities of the naval and aviation forces, as well as the ships required for logistics and transportation. After the defeat in the Battle of Midway, the Japanese army did not shrink its front in time, turned to strategic defense, and continued to launch an attack on the Solomon Islands.

Ideology

Second, in terms of ideological preparation, the Japanese army was arrogant and lacked the necessary ideological preparations for the US military's strategic counteroffensive, and therefore subjectively and arbitrarily made an erroneous judgment, and the Japanese high command has always had a deep-rooted idea that the US counteroffensive was after 1943, and it was precisely on this basis that the Japanese army tried to push the front forward as much as possible before the US counteroffensive, and was unwilling to turn to strategic defense too early. The Japanese army believed that since the US strategic counteroffensive was not yet ready, it would encounter no obstacles if it continued to advance to the Solomon Islands, so it dared to cross hundreds of nautical miles in one fell swoop and build an airfield on Kuah Island. In this way, they were completely unaware of the threat they were facing, and there was no forward base that could be deployed in the middle of the hundreds of nautical miles from Rabaul to Kuah Island, and they were only concerned with building an airfield by surprise on Kuah Island, ignoring the necessary defensive preparations, so that the Japanese troops on the island were completely unprepared for a sudden attack by the US troops, both mentally and materially, and were about to collapse under the US attack.

On the other hand, as early as March 1942, the U.S. military began to prepare for this campaign, mobilizing troops and weapons to the South Pacific, building ships and aircraft, stockpiling equipment and supplies, and building naval and air bases in New Caledonia and New Hebrides. Therefore, the landing on Kuah Island on 7 August was a well-planned strategic counteroffensive by the US military. It was not until the end of October, after the failure of the general offensive of the 2nd Division, that they gradually realized that this was a counteroffensive by the US army and that it could develop into a strategic decisive battle between the two sides, but it was too late, and the Japanese army was forced to engage in an extremely unfavorable decisive battle with the US army on Kuah Island.

When the U.S. military learned that the Japanese troops were stationed on Kuah Island, some people pointed out that this was not a good thing, because, geographically speaking, Kuah Island was far away from the Japanese mainland, and close to Australia and other places of the Allied Powers, which was extremely unfavorable to Japan geographically. Expect the enemy to win, calculate the danger easily, far and near, and the way of the general. Those who know this and use war will win, and those who do not know this and use war will lose. "Since the terrain is unfavorable, a decisive battle in an unfavorable situation should be avoided. However, the Japanese high command, which was carried away by the victory in the early stage of the war, failed to see the emerging crisis from the success, still less could it foresee a possible reversal in the tide of the war, so it failed to turn to the defense in time, and when it was counterattacked by the US army, it failed to withdraw decisively, and it was not until the later stage of the campaign that the decision to withdraw from Kuah Island was made under an extremely unfavorable situation.

Operational command

Third, in terms of operational command, from 1893 onwards, Japan's Army General Staff Headquarters and the Navy Command Department were two completely independent and equal commanding organs, commanding the army and navy respectively. Although a base camp was later set up as the supreme commanding organ, it was still difficult to exercise unified command because of the deep-rooted contradictions between the army and navy. The supreme commander is nominally the emperor, but in fact the emperor has not many opportunities to directly command, and it is difficult to play the role of unified command, and others simply cannot command the army and navy at the same time, and when the army and navy are at loggerheads over a certain issue, the base camp has no choice but to coordinate the two sides to compromise and adopt a compromise plan, and even this plan does not really work, and in the course of the campaign, the army and navy often go their own way. In order to avoid unnecessary friction between the army and navy, the base camp designated the army or navy in some areas to be responsible for each other, and each performed its own responsibility, but the disadvantage of this made the army and navy unable to communicate with each other. For example, in Kuah Island, it was assigned to the Navy, and there was no Army in the first place, and the Army was completely unaware of the Navy's construction of an airfield on Kuah Island. Later, in order to coordinate the actions of the army and navy, the headquarters drew up the "Army and Navy Central Agreement" on operations in the Solomon Islands on 13 August, but it was only a dead letter and did not work.

Therefore, in the battle for Kuah Island, both the army and navy have serious self-centeredness, each doing its own thing, and there is no coordination in the slightest. the general offensive of the army on the island, which failed to coordinate its actions with the navy; However, the sortie of the naval fleet does not coordinate with the attack of the army, and the power of the army and navy in coordinated operations cannot be brought into play. In particular, in the general offensive in late October, the ground forces of the army and the US army were almost twice as superior, and if the army and navy worked closely together, it was not impossible to recapture the airfield, but in fact, the army launched a second general offensive on the island, and the navy organized the naval battle of Santa Cruz at sea, and as a result, due to the dispersion of forces, neither the airfield could be recaptured on land, nor the American fleet was destroyed at sea. In the course of the entire Kuah Island Campaign, there were numerous such cases, and the contradictions between the army and navy were never well resolved, so it is said that the Japanese army did not have a unified command, which was one of the important reasons for the failure of the Kuah Island Campaign.