(445) Soldiers in the Maginot Line
"Specifically, when the German assault force, the 43 divisions of Army Group B, reached Belgium, it would run headlong into 20 divisions of Belgian troops, and if the Netherlands was also included in the battle plan, 10 divisions of Dutch troops would be added. These troops were inferior to the Germans in terms of quality, but because of the strong fortresses (Manstein said, pointing to the sides of Liège and the Alpet Canal) and natural obstacles (in Belgian territory there was the Albet Canal, which flowed into the Antwerp Fortress; and the fortified line of the Maas River, with La Mur as its hub; There are countless on the territory of the Netherlands
waterways), so it is very conducive to defense. And within a few days, these forces would be able to receive reinforcements from the Anglo-French forces - including all their tank and motorized divisions, which had already been massed on the border between France and Belgium to prevent the German attack. Therefore, it is impossible for the German right flank to use a large-scale roundabout movement to obtain a strategic surprise attack, as it did in 1914. By the time the Anglo-French forces arrived, the Germans would have to fight an opponent of equal strength, and more or less a frontal attack. Therefore, the success of this first blow must be sought by tactical means, because there is no chance of strategic use of the offensive. β
Hearing this, Ruprecht already understood what Manstein meant, but he did not interrupt Manstein's narration, but continued to listen to him.
"If the enemy had considerable skill in command, it was possible for them to evade complete defeat in Belgian territory. Even if they could not hold the line of Antwerp, LiΓ¨ge, Maas or Simos, they could still maintain a fairly good order and retreat to the rear of the Lower Somme. Once there, they can draw up their strong reserves and build a new front. By this time, the German offensive was losing momentum. Army Group A, on the other hand, was powerless to prevent the enemy from establishing a new line of defense from the end of the Maginot Line east of Sedan to the lower reaches of the Somme. In this way, the situation of the German army would be quite similar to that after the end of the autumn battle of 1914. Its only gain was the capture of a wide coastal base along the strait. Therefore, we could neither destroy the enemy forces in Belgium nor create a favorable strategic situation for the future of the war. The operations planned by the Army Headquarters could only achieve a partial victory at most. β
"There is another thing that is not contemplated in the plans of the Army Headquarters, and that is the range of capabilities that a decisive enemy commander can have. No one should assume that the opposing commander lacked the ability to lead, and that a bold enemy commander would be able to prevent the expected German advance through Belgium on the one hand, and launch a massive counteroffensive on the southern flank of the German flank on the other hand. Even if the forces designated to support the Dutch and Belgian forces had already been committed to Belgium, it would have been easy to draw 50 to 60 divisions from the Maginot Line to launch such a counteroffensive. The farther Army Group B advanced in the direction of the English Channel and the mouth of the Somme, the more advantageous it would be for a counteroffensive on this flank of the enemy. Army Group A had only 42 divisions in total, and it seemed uncertain whether it would be able to hold off the assault. Whatever the outcome, the development along this line will be strategically difficult to achieve a general solution in the Western Theater. β
"I see." After listening to Manstein's account, a hint of admiration flashed in Ruprecht's eyes.
"So, let's talk about your plan." The German emperor said.
"These objections came to mind when I studied the operational orders of the Army Headquarters, and they formed the basis for my and everyone's proposals. So we came up with a series of memoranda to convince the Army headquarters to accept our views. "First, I think the goal of the offensive on the Western Front should be to seek a decisive battle on land. The pursuit of only the limited objectives set out in the Army Headquarters plan would seem unreasonable in terms of political adventure and military bets. The offensive capability of the German Army was one of our trump cards on the European continent, and it would be a pity to allow such a formidable force to be consumed in such incomplete measures. ββ¦,
"Second, the focus of our attack should be on Army Group A, not on Army Group B. The task to be carried out by Army Group B, as drawn up in the existing plan, was to launch a frontal attack on an enemy force that was ready to do so; Even if it is initially quite successful, it is likely that the Somme will become the end of the crossbow. The real opportunity was on the side of Army Group A, which was mainly to launch a surprise attack through the Ardennes Mountains. Because of the treacherous terrain, the enemy would never have imagined that we would use any armor here. In this way, it would be possible to rush to the lower reaches of the Somme in one fell swoop, cutting off the lines of communication between the enemy forces already thrown into Belgian territory and the ferries. Only by this means could the entire right flank of the enemy in Belgium be completely annihilated and preparations for the final victory in France. β
"Had our enemies acted reasonably, they might have avoided an unfavourable duel with us in Belgian territory and retreated to the back of the Somme. At the same time he would concentrate all the forces at his disposal for a major counteroffensive on our southern flank, which would aim at encircling the main German forces in Belgian territory or in front of the Lower Rhine. While we can assume that the High Command lacked such a bold approach, and that the French allies might oppose such a bold decision, this possibility cannot be ignored. β
"If our offensive is halted at the Lower Somme, the enemy will at least be able to use all his reserves to establish a new continuous line of defense. This line of defense may have been east of Sedang and the northwestern end of the Maginot Line, using the natural barrier of the Esny and Somme rivers to the strait. In order to prevent this from happening, it is necessary to immediately crush any concentration of enemy forces on our southern flank. Whether on either side of the Maas, between the Maas and the Osay, they should not be given the opportunity to concentrate. The integrity of the enemy's front in this area must be destroyed first, with a view to the flank that can then be detoured to the Maginot Line. β
"In other words, Army Group A is already scheduled to become the main force in the operation, and it should be given the strength of three army groups, not just two army groups." Pointing to the map, Ruprecht I said, "Perhaps in the initial stage, for reasons of space, it may be necessary to temporarily accommodate a larger number of divisions in the area of Army Group B." β
"That's right, Your Majesty." "An army group should attack beyond southern Belgium and cross the Maas, but then it should go straight to the lower reaches of the Somme and attack the enemy facing Army Group B from the rear," Manstein said. The other army group was to move in a south-western direction, with the task of crushing any enemy forces concentrated in the area west of the Maas River that attempted to launch a counteroffensive on the southern flank of our army. The Third Army Group remained in accordance with the original plan, covering the entire flank of the operation from the north of the Maginot Line, which was sandwiched between Silke and Moz. In this way, since the focus of the operation has shifted from Army Group B to Army Group A, it is necessary to increase the strength of Army Group by one army accordingly. Even if it is necessary to wait until after the offensive has been launched to join the army group, such an army group must be designated in advance. β
"Although what I have just said is very brief, it represents the main ideological trend in the memorandum that has been repeatedly submitted by the headquarters of our army group to the army headquarters." Manstein, who had finished his statement, said to Ruprecht I.
"I have a hunch right now that victory will be ours." Ruprecht I took a deep breath, straightened up from the map, and said.
"The goddess of victory favors only those who are prepared, Your Majesty." Manstein said. β¦,
"Your plan is very good." Pointing to the location of the Maginot Line on the map, Ruprecht I said, "However, I would like to make some small additions to this already perfect plan." β
"What is Your Majesty's mind?" Manstein asked cautiously.
"The offensive on the Maginot Line was primarily intended to attract the attention of the French and provide cover for the offensive of Army Group A and Army Group B." Ruprecht I smiled and said, "In order to achieve this strategic goal, we should probably make this show more realistic." β
"If that's the case, we'll need more troops." "And there are likely to be more casualties." β
"We have enough troops, and we have weapons." Ruprecht I smiled and patted Manstein on the shoulder, "This time, I want the French hiding in the Maginot Line to see the wisdom of German scientists." β
Seeing that the Emperor's will could no longer be changed, Manstein did not say anything more, because the Emperor fully approved of his plan, and the Emperor's increase in forces to attack the Maginot Line was also an effective supplement to his plan, so he did not object.
With the end of the dialogue between the two people, the curtain of the "Battle of France" that shocked the world began.
France, Alsace, Maginot Line "Shenan" fortress.
"What do you see?" A French patrol officer pays a speech to Roger Roger, an observer who is making observations with a periscope in an underground observation room? Bruge asked.
"It's business as usual." Roger replied, but his eyes did not leave the camera.
"I don't think you'll see anything either." The French patrol officer smiled and said, "Every inch of land here has coordinates, and if the Germans come, we can wipe them all out with a single shell from one coordinate to another." β
"That's right." Another officer said, "Our engineers, who take pleasure in designing modern fortresses, have taken all the circumstances into account. β
"Yes! Even my toothache came to my mind. Another observer laughed, "In two hours my appointment is up, and I have to go to the dentist." β
"You've eaten too much cake." The patrol officer looked at the metal dinner plate placed not far away, and said half-jokingly, "Drink some gin, maybe it will be good for your condition." β
"Thank you, sir, I think I'll try." The observer laughed.
The patrol officer looked at the rather spacious underground observation room again, nodded, and left with the other officers.
As the bell rang, Roger looked at the hands of the clock and rubbed his somewhat sour eyes.
"Hey! Roger, it's time, I'll do it for you. The observer, who had just said he was going to the dentist, said, "Take a break, go get me a bottle of gin and a piece of cake." β
"Why did you let him go? He's going to get lost. One of his comrades-in-arms listened to him and laughed, "You forget, he was born road blind and gets lost at home." β
"Who said that? Ever since he entered the Maginot Line, he has never lost his way. The observer smiled and looked at Roger, "Isn't it, dear Roger." β
"Yes! I never get lost here. Roger smiled and stood up, "Then I'll go now." β
"Thank you, brother."
"You're welcome."
Roger said, leaving the observation room, he opened the iron door and went out, and came to the underground fortification passage, he looked at the neatly arranged electric lights by the wall, and sighed.
"Yes! Once here, I never got lost again. His gaze fell on the tomb-like corridors not far away, and he said with some self-deprecation. β¦,
He took his nerve and walked forward.
It has been said that the French nation has not produced a military wizard since Napoleon, which is biased but also illustrates a fact. France has been in a relatively turbulent social state since the collapse of the Napoleonic dynasty, and the disastrous defeat in the Franco-Prussian War gave the French an opportunity to reorganize their military theory and thinking. At the beginning of the First World War, the French not only ignored the fire cover of the artillery of visual warfare, but also pedanticly regarded the infantry running forward under the blows of German machine guns and artillery as an insult to the glory of the soldiers. At the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives, the French finally became pragmatic and abandoned those ridiculous ideas. In the end, with the help of his allies, he defeated his old enemy, Germany, with difficulty.
Due to the heavy losses brought about by the French in the early days of the First World War, and the great successes in several defensive battles that followed, most French people believed that the future form of warfare would not deviate from the type of World War I, so the experience gained in the First World War was completely preserved by the French - "uninterrupted linear defense strengthened by fortresses under the cover of field artillery", which was later improved and carried forward by the French using modern technology, and finally this "complete defense" The First World War made the French military thinking jump from one extreme to the other -- from "complete offensive" to "completely defensive". The Maginot Line is a best practice for this kind of military thinking.
This kind of military thinking of the French army mainly comes from the "Battle of Verdun", which is a symbol of the national spirit of the French people who bravely sacrificed and persevered to the end in the face of a strong enemy, and was the greatest pride of the French in World War I. The experience gained from this battle of "blazing firepower combined with strong defense" was repeatedly practiced in later battles, and from it came a "new offensive method of opening the way with artillery and infantry occupation", so it was later regarded as a dogma by the French army, and is now carried out mechanically to the end. After "uninterrupted linear defense under the cover of field artillery, reinforced by fortresses" became the latest military thinking and code of conduct of the French army, everything revolved around it. The French paid special attention to fixed defense under the cover of firepower, and the mobility of troops under field conditions was neglected, and the combat doctrine and training program did not encourage troops to carry out adventurous attacks, and as far as possible on the battlefield, they "avoided encounters with the enemy" on the battlefield, and it became the operational principle of the French army to strike at the invading enemy with "vigorous" firepower on the predetermined defensive positions.
While French politicians were preparing to impose a punitive peace treaty on Germany to prevent it from threatening France again, the French began to consider what military measures to take to defend France in the event of a possible future invasion. At that time, the top of the army was divided into two factions. One faction was represented by Marshal Foch, the Supreme Allied Commander at the end of World War I, who believed that the best defense was an offensive: as soon as Germany threatened France again, France should immediately launch an offensive across the Rhine. The other faction claimed that the experience of the last war, especially the Battle of Verdun, had proved the superiority of strong permanent fortifications and fortresses, which, under the cover of powerful artillery fire, could inflict heavy losses on the attacking troops. They believed that it would be better for France to have a strategic line of defense against invasion consisting of a series of fortresses until the Allies could come to the aid of a joint blockade to strangle Germany. After a fierce debate, the short-sighted French top brass actually chose the latter.
The short-sightedness of the French leadership is also reflected in the use of new weapons. Some French generals stubbornly believed that the role of the aircraft was to indicate the target to the artillery, and the range of movement of the tank must be within the effective range of their own artillery fire, and the attack could only be launched by the infantry after the artillery completely destroyed the enemy's defenses, and the tanks had to cover the attacking infantry. Marshal Petain, the hero of Verdun, openly stated more than once that "tanks and airplanes cannot change the shape and course of war, and that the security of France rests mainly on the continuous fortifications on the border". These concepts were deeply engraved in the minds of French officers and soldiers.
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