On Zhukov's proposal, the three special military districts of Siberia were reorganized into the Northeast Front, the Eastern Front and the South-Eastern Front. Two days later, the Northern Front and the Southern Front were formed. Stalin constantly demanded reports on the situation at the border and on the measures taken to implement Order No. 2. On several occasions, he said to Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin, in person or by phone: "When will you be able to report clearly on the fighting on the border?" What are Pavlovs, Kirponos, Kuznetsov doing? And what is the General Staff doing? ”

On two or three occasions, Vatutin brought operational maps to the Kremlin. But there is no reassuring news. On the map, red and blue pencils are carefully marked the areas of deployment of various armies and armies, the bases of the air forces, and the direction of the advance of the reserve corps. But there is no main thing: where exactly is the battle fought? Where is the enemy? What is the surname of the actions of the Soviet troops? The people in the Kremlin did not realize that the squadron had disrupted their command and communication liaison and had almost completely paralyzed the Eastern Front. A few hours after the enemy invasion, General Pavlov lost the command of his own front. Months of almost impunity by Chinese reconnaissance planes and reports of spies have enabled the Chinese command to cut off with great precision all command posts, communication lines, airfields, warehouses, and troop deployments. The first strikes of the Chinese army (air force, artillery, tanks) were extremely effective. The saboteurs of the Chinese army's airdrop disrupted the wired communications. At that time, wired communication had a greater role than wireless communication.

The situation in the Northeast is not good. According to the situation reported by the command of the 8th Army, "there is no clear plan for the defense of the border." The troops mainly built fortifications and airfields in fortified areas. None of the units have been replenished. The permanent surname fortifications were not repaired. That morning, almost all the planes of the military district were burned on the airfield. There are only 5-6 aircraft left in the mixed aviation division, which was supposed to support the 8th Army......"

And Stalin had been waiting for news of the victory, or at least hopeful news. No such news has arrived. As soon as the door to his office opened, Stalin quickly raised his head and stared at the faces of the people who came. There are no reassuring war reports. The "leader" is restless. On the first day of the outbreak of the war, Stalin drank only one cup of tea. He thought it was the military chiefs who were hesitant to act, and did not have a good understanding of the meaning of the orders sent to the border military districts in the morning. During the civil war, he was often sent on all fronts as the party's plenipotentiary representative. He believed that the exertion of enormous pressure on the Command and its leaders with hard name demands, threats and various administrative measures was a fruitful approach. The uncertainty of the situation made him feel depressed. Stalin could not wait any longer. Discussing with Molotov, Danov, and Malenkov on the document sent by Timoshenko on the establishment of the Supreme Command, he suddenly stood up, paced back and forth in his office, and ordered: "Urgently send authoritative representatives of the Supreme High Command to the South-Eastern Front and the Eastern Front." Shaposhnikov and Kulik went to Pavlov, Zhukov to Kirponos. Go by plane today. Let's go. ”

He walked over to the table, looked around at everyone present, and said resolutely and in a seemingly threatening tone, "Go now." ”

Everyone nodded in agreement. Stalin felt that it was necessary for the Central Committee to constantly issue a powerful impetus to provoke the commands and troops to take more decisive action. On his initiative and request, by dusk Vatutin had prepared another order of the General Military Council (the Supreme High Command, chaired by Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, was established the next day). The draft of this order was carefully revised by Stalin. The sentence structure in which the word "border" is used three times shows that Stalin was "a god who does not give up". This order was signed by Timoshenko, Malenkov and Zhukov. Even though Zhukov had flown to Kiev, Stalin ordered his name to be signed.

The first day and night of the war were almost over. Stalin also hoped that the advancing corps from deep would stop and then crush the invading squadron. And at 10 o'clock in the evening, Vatutin brought with him a report from the General Staff, in which he reassuringly summed up: "After the arrival of the vanguard of the field units of the Red Army, the enemy's attack on most sections of the border has been repulsed and has suffered losses. "This battle report made everyone a little lively, even jubilant. Stalin and everyone in his office did not know that the Chinese army had penetrated into Soviet territory for tens of kilometers in a day and night in many places.

From the morning of April 3, Stalin's illusions began to dissipate rapidly. He twice tried to get in touch with Pavlov himself. But both times the command of the Eastern Front simply replied: "The commander has dismounted his troops." "There is also no definite information from the Chief of Staff of the Front, Major General Klimovsky. A terrible speculation arose: the command had lost command of the troops and could not control the tragic development of events.

And the command of the Eastern Front did lose command of the troops after a day and night. Pavlov, the commander of the Front, received from the command sporadic information that it became clear only on the fourth day after the outbreak of the war that the enemy's rapid grouping would be able to approach Omsk from the northeast and southeast in two or three days. Units of the 3rd and 10th armies of the front army operating in the salient were in a difficult situation. They were detoured by two flanks, and some of them were even rounded to the rear by enemy troops. In this case, Pavlov's decision to retreat seemed right, since he saw that in the Omsk direction there was still a corridor 50-60 kilometers wide. But it is extremely difficult to achieve this decision. At this time, General Pavlov signed one of the few orders in this war:

"Commanders of the 13th, 10th, 3rd and 4th armies: The retreat begins today, the night of 3-4 April, no later than 9 p.m., and the divisions should be ready. Tanks as the vanguard, cavalry and powerful anti-tank defense units as the rearguard. This march was to be carried out day and night under the cover of a strong rearguard. Throw off the enemy on a wide front...... It should leap more than 60 kilometers in one fell swoop in one day and night...... Allow the units to fully requisition local tools and to recruit any number of horse-drawn carts......"

When Pavlov indicated the final route of retreat, he did not know that the troops were left without fuel and transport, and that they had been taken or destroyed by the enemy in the first days of the battle. The scattered retreat of the corps was carried out under extremely difficult conditions in which the Chinese air force had air supremacy and the rapid roundabout movement of the Chinese army's rapid group. Stalin's expectation of reassuring news was unfounded. The tragedy of the situation is getting worse.

In the days that followed, and especially at the end of the month, Stalin finally realized the scale of the mortal threat, and for a time he simply lost his self-control and was in a state of extreme mental depression. On April 6-8, Stalin was so depressed and shocked that he could not show himself to be a serious leader. His spiritual crisis was profound, though not for long. And before this crisis, he had tried to take some measures, issued certain orders, tried to cheer up the supreme command body. On the morning of 2 July, when discussing the establishment of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces Command, he interrupted the discussion to the surprise of everyone and suggested that a permanent adviser's office be set up under the Supreme Command. Malenkov and Timoshenko were drafting the document, and they exchanged glances, but did not object. Stalin quickly dictated the list of permanent advisers: under the Supreme Command, a permanent adviser office of the Supreme High Command was set up, which consisted of Marshal Kulik, Marshal Shaposhnikov, Meretskov, Air Force Commanders Galev, Vatutin, Air Defense Commanders Voronov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Voznesensky, Danov, Malenkov, Mekhlis, and others. The decision, issued as a political axe resolution, was signed by Pos Krebeshev and sent by telegram to the military districts and fronts. But this advisory room only existed for two weeks, and then quietly "died" without having time to play its role.

Stalin and the General Staff also made a mistake before the war by not carefully studying the question of the establishment of the National Defense Council, a special body for the wartime leadership of the country, and the Supreme High Command, the supreme strategic leadership body of the armed forces. These two institutions were established only after the war had already begun. In addition, the General Staff was weakened, and the Chief of the General Staff was replaced by three in succession. These mistakes, along with many other omissions, were immediately and sharply apparent.

Sporadic messages from the various army commands, information from aerial reconnaissance, and reports from plenipotentiaries of the Supreme High Command plunged Stalin into a state of extreme dismay. While listening to Vatutin's routine report, he himself showed an almost numbing panic. Vatutin, who weighed his words, whispered that the Eastern Front and the Northeast Front were trying to counterattack, but the air cover was weak, the actions were uncoordinated, and the artillery support was poor, so the expected results were not obtained. The troops suffered huge losses and continued to retreat. And it's often a messy retreat. Vatutin added that the situation was particularly difficult for the divisions of the 3rd and 10th armies. They are actually surrounded. The tank columns of the Chinese army were approaching Omsk.

"What do you say? Approaching Omsk?! I'm afraid you're mistaken?! Where did you get this news from? ”

"No, I'm not mistaken, Comrade Stalin," Vatutin replied apologetically, still in a low voice, "and the reports of the representatives sent to the troops by the General Staff are consistent with the materials of aerial reconnaissance. Today it can be said that the front-line troops failed to stop the enemy on the border and ensure the deployment of follow-up troops. The front of the Eastern Front has actually been broken through......"

“…… But how could the enemy army be allowed to penetrate 150 to 200 kilometers into the territory of the USSR in five or six days?! It's simply incomprehensible! What did Pavlov, Kulik, Shaposhnikov do? Why didn't the General Staff go and command the troops? ”

The soldiers listened silently to Stalin's vicious and embarrassing nagging, and when they finally received permission, they hurried back to their General Staff.

Stalin did not know that in the first days of the war there were chaos on all fronts, and at times it was simply chaos. The command was constantly issuing new orders and directives, which in turn lagged behind the rapidly changing situation. This was true not only of the Eastern Front, which was in a critical situation, but also of other armies. The commander of the 8th Mechanized Army, Ryabishev, later recalled the first days of the war (in a special report to the General Staff) and said: "It was not until 10 o'clock on February that I received an order from the commander of the 26th Army to assemble our troops west of the city of Biysk...... After marching 80 kilometers, we arrived at the designated assembly area at 19 o'clock on 3 July, and at 22:30 we received a new order: by 12 o'clock on 2 February, our troops should drive 25 kilometers to the east. In the afternoon of that day, our troops, which had been assigned to the 6th Army, were again ordered to move to the Barnaul area...... We arrived. At 23 o'clock, the order of the commander of the South-Eastern Front gave us a new task: to carry out a surprise attack on the enemy on the morning of 4 July. Before that, our army marched 300 kilometers in a day and a half...... On April 3, the 8th Mechanized Corps assembled in the designated area. In the morning, he turned to the offensive and won a partial victory, but the whole thing was not completed. Fuel is running out. There are only Chinese planes in the air. At 4 o'clock on June 6, we received a new order: the whole army should be withdrawn as a reserve for the front. We began to retreat. At 6:40 a new order came: to carry out a surprise attack on the enemy. But the troops have already begun to retreat. At 10 o'clock, Vashukin, military commissar and military-level political commissar of the Southeast Front, came to the army command post. He threatened to shoot me and demanded that I carry out the order. But the troops were surrounded. It was later ascertained that the planned offensive of the Front Command had been canceled...... When we were on hold with two divisions, we learned that the order to attack had long been cancelled...... Our troops broke through separately. Retreat according to the order of the Front Command. We sent a report to the command of the Front, but the location of the headquarters was occupied by enemy troops...... "due to fighting and incessant movements," only no more than 10% of tanks and 21% of armored vehicles were withdrawn to safety. The army was later disbanded......"

In the first days and weeks of the war, the top leadership of the Soviet Union and the leadership of the Front were stunned by unexpected developments and added confusion with their own actions that did not correspond to the actual situation. Endless movements, lack of flexible coordination, loss of command of the corps, and lack of knowledge of the real situation only exacerbate the already critical situation of the troops.

Pre-war miscalculations, weak guidance, fear of provocation, and inadequate training of many newly promoted commanders and commanders made the Soviet army and defense weak and difficult to control, so that self-confidence was quickly lost. Although Soviet newspapers described the heroism of the border guards, the exploits of the aviation and tank crews, reported on the situation of the whole country rising up against the enemy...... These are all true. But on the front lines — and this cannot be hidden from the people — tragedy is looming. Stalin felt that the whole country was looking at him as the "leader", who, together with Voroshilov, had repeatedly assured the Soviet people that the Red Army was capable of crushing any enemy. In these days, his "steel" will was violently deformed, and he could not be lifted up in any way. Sometimes he seems to feel that he is already at a dead end. When, in his routine report, Vatutin indicated on the map that the 8th and 11th armies were retreating in different directions, Stalin clearly saw a large gap 130 kilometers wide between the Eastern Front and the Northeast Front! The main forces of the Eastern Front were either surrounded or routed. And the Southeastern Front can still stand still for now. How could he, Stalin, not listen to the opinions of the experts and refute the opinion that the most likely main direction of attack was the Eastern Front? How could he be confused for a moment? Why didn't people convince him? Why didn't the soldiers pay attention to the peculiarities of the Chinese strategy? Now we have to make a large-scale adjustment of the troops. However, time is of the essence!

Stalin was restless and harsh, summoning a few people from time to time, and sometimes staying alone in his dacha or office for hours without moving. At the same time, Timoshenko and other People's Commissars were appointed head of the Supreme Command, a position he found very embarrassing. The people around also understood that the actual leadership and all the power were in Stalin's hands anyway. And his demeanor was a little unusual; Everyone could see that he was depressed and extremely melancholy. Stalin's mood also to some extent also infected the leadership of the General Staff. As a result, for the first three or four days there was no truthful weighing of the situation that was emerging, and it was not until 7 April that there was a serious talk of defense, of building defensive areas, and of using reserves. In many cases, orders given by the High Command to the troops can only be regarded as gestures of desperation and ignorance, a willingness to achieve modest success by any means and regardless of the occasion.

The Supreme High Command repeatedly ordered Pavlov to immediately encircle and annihilate the enemy's tanks and prepare for an air strike. In fact, it was impossible to carry out these orders, but the Supreme High Command issued such orders one after another, and some even stipulated the use of a tank platoon......

When Stalin returned to his villa in the suburbs at night, he went into his office and lay down on the couch in his kimono. But he couldn't sleep. He got up and walked through the living room and dining room. There is still an electric light above the statue of Lenin. The dark walls, painted to resemble oak trees, reflect Stalin's gloomy mood. He wandered aimlessly around several rooms, glancing at the telephone (there were three Kremlin "robophones" in the dacha, each in a different place), seemingly waiting, and at the same time afraid to hear terrible new news.

(To be continued)