Chapter 292: A Terrifying Collapse
In the air, the Luftwaffe still concentrated on airfields and transport hubs, and the main forces on the Netherlands. In the Ardennes direction, it is quiet so as not to reveal intentions. German aircraft also played a significant role in helping the German armored forces on the march, as they were able to quickly detect traffic jams. The French Air Force still did not launch any attacks, and the only attack on the Germans in the Ardennes direction was launched by the British Air Force, which shot down 7 of the 8 with heavy anti-aircraft fire.
Fifteen Belgian bombers tried to destroy the bridge over the Albert Canal, which had been seized by German glider forces, and 10 were shot down without the bridge being damaged at all. At 4:30 p.m., Gammelin instructed to concentrate the air force in the direction of Belgium, apparently still confused by the feint of the Germans.
The Allied forces advancing into Belgium were in the northernmost part of the battle line and the farthest distance, and the French 7th Army, which was rushing towards Breda, was moving smoothly and doubtfully. Dozens of kilometers away, the Luftwaffe was bombing the Dutch, why let them go. The French march also went smoothly and was not disturbed by the Luftwaffe. (apparently the Luftwaffe did not want to prevent them from falling into the trap), the morale of the ordinary British soldiers was high, and that night the French troops had almost arrived at the designated line along the Belgian border and began to set up defenses.
The French 1st Army did not go so well, and along the way they encountered a tidal wave of Belgian refugees, a pessimistic picture. The cavalry corps of General Prios, who was in the vanguard of the Belgians, had reached their appointed position, and they were shocked to find that the fortifications that the Belgians had promised to repair in advance did not exist. Immediately afterwards, the news came that the German team had broken through the defense line of the Albert Canal in Belgium, and the fortress of Emar had also been lost.
General Prios estimated that the Germans would soon attack his cavalry corps, and he would not have time to prepare his positions. Therefore, he suggested to the commander of the 1st Army Group, General Bierot, that the cavalry corps be withdrawn to the line of the Suerde, which was in fact tantamount to abandoning the Breda plan of Ganmalin and returning to the original plan of the Suld. Greatly alarmed, Bill Ott hurried to General Prios, telling him that the Breda plan was now impossible to reverse. He was to speed up the timetable for the march of the 1st Army, and at the same time, to ask the cavalry corps to hold on until 14 June.
In the Netherlands, resistance was crumbling at a frightening pace, and the German 9th Panzer Division passed through the Maas River on Belgian territory from the bridge captured by the Brandenburg troops. The Dutch had to shrink their lines to cover the Dutch hinterland and Rotterdam. Thus, by the time the French 7th Army arrived in Breda in an attempt to make contact with the Dutch, the Dutch troops had already withdrawn. At noon, the 7th Army and the German 9th Panzer Division met near Tilburg. This time, the Luftwaffe really began to bomb indiscriminately, and the 7th Army was caught off guard by the air raids and sudden encounters of enemy aircraft, and retreated in the direction of Antwerp. By now, it can be said that the Breda plan for Gammelin has largely failed.
News of the New York newspaper of the same day: Germany claimed to have captured an important fortress, and even if this is true, this fortress is not important, because only one captain was awarded a medal.
The Allied newspapers of the day gave the impression that the German offensive had been blocked by the Netherlands and Belgium. This is the cornerstone of the Gamma Forest Project. In reality, however, the situation in the Netherlands was almost hopeless. In the north and center of the Netherlands, the German ** team, with the help of paratroopers (who had already taken Arnhem on the first day), had broken through the Dutch defenses and already threatened the heart of the Netherlands. In the south of the Netherlands, the 9th Panzer Division killed Murdijk, where paratroopers were still holding the bridge over the Maas River. By this evening, Muldike had fallen into German hands, and all hope of a convergence of the French 7th Army and the Dutch army was completely lost.
By this time, the Dutch army could only retreat to the sea and cover Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague in the interior of the Netherlands. There is only one aircraft left in the Dutch Air Force. And the situation of the French 7th Army was also extremely bad. They were constantly under fire from the Luftwaffe, and most of the tanks were still being transported forward on the railroad. Its right flank was seriously threatened by the 9th Panzer Division. Under these conditions, General Thilaud decided to retreat to cover Antwerp.
In front of the French 1st Army, Belgian troops were in a general retreat and attempting to occupy the Antwerp-Mesililine-Rubén line. (i.e. between the French 7th Army and the British Expeditionary Force). In this way, the cavalry corps of General Prios, the vanguard of the 1st French Army, lost its barrier. The commander of the 1st Army Group, General Bill Ott, had realized this yesterday and ordered the rest of the 1st Army to arrive at their intended positions two or four hours earlier. To do this, the French had to march during the day and leave most of their artillery behind. The Luftwaffe bombarded the French marching columns all the way.
General Prios' cavalry corps had already engaged the advance of General Hopner's German 14th Panzer Corps. The cavalry corps performed valiantly and basically held the defensive line. Although the battle could be said to be unwon, it showed that under the same conditions, the French armoured forces were comparable to the German armoured forces.
However, this was probably the first and last time that the French armoured forces had fought on equal terms in this campaign. By evening, only a part of the infantry of the 1st French Army reached the Dale line, and tomorrow General Prios's cavalry corps would have to deal with the main forces of General Hopner's two armored divisions alone.
The Allied chain of command also began to be disorganized, and although Gammelin was still not satisfied, the situation forced him to agree to General George's arrangement to be coordinated by General Bieraut in coordination with the Belgian army. This made the work of General Biraut very heavy, and he commanded five armies plus the Belgian army. His busy schedule left him without giving any instructions to the British Expeditionary Force for several days.
In the air, the main forces of the Allies remained focused on dealing with the feint attack of Bauk. The Allies were still unaware of the presence of a large armored force beneath the forests of the Ardennes. A few days ago, many French air force units moved their bases forward, and the elite I/54 ground attack group did not receive the necessary equipment until noon on the 12th. Therefore, most of the attack missions on the 12th were carried out by the British Royal Air Force. Mainly for bridges over the Maas River in the Netherlands. Seven of the nine Breham bombers that attacked the Dutch bridge over the Maas River were shot down.
At noon on the 12th, the I/54 group was finally ready, and 8 of the 18 aircraft were shot down in a low-altitude attack on targets in the Netherlands. The losses of the other sorties are about the same proportion. THE LARGE NUMBERS OF 20MM AND 37MM ACCOMPANYING THE GERMAN ARMORED FORCES AND INFANTRY PROVED TO BE EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE AGAINST LOW-ALTITUDE AIRCRAFT. It must be stated that the waste of forces of the Allied Air Force in this direction will seriously affect the critical phase of the campaign.
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The French Air Force's reconnaissance report that day showed that a strong German column was crossing the Ardennes Forest and found that the German troops were carrying a large number of bridge-building tools. 1152