After the German conquest of Poland in 1939, Adolf? Hitler proposed peace, but Britain and France rejected it, so Hitler was determined to use his strength to force Britain and France to sue for peace. On 9 October, in a directive to the German army generals, he set out his reasons for his conviction that an attack on Western Europe was the only way forward for Germany. He feared that a treaty with the Soviet Union would neutralize the Soviet Union only if it served its purposes.

Therefore, once Britain and France attacked Germany, the Soviet Union was likely to deliver a fatal blow from behind. So he was going to attack France well before the USSR was ready. He also believed that if France failed, Britain would follow suit. However, the German army generals, led by the commander-in-chief of the army, Brauchitsch, firmly opposed it, on the grounds that the German army was not strong enough to defeat the Western European armies, and if the war began, Germany would surely die. Hitler severely rebuked Brauchitsch and others for their cowardice, and ordered them to follow his ideas unconditionally.

Since the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, when Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, it and the Allies were at war on the European continent for a considerable period of time, known as a fake war. Adolph? Hitler had hoped that France and Britain would acquiesce in the German conquest of Poland and an immediate truce. This is because Germany's stock of raw materials (which need to be imported from abroad) is very insufficient.

At present, Germany's war machine relied mainly on raw materials from the Soviet Union, and Hitler was uneasy about the situation because of the ideological differences between the two countries. Thus, on 6 October he made a peace proposal to Britain and France, and without waiting for a reply from both countries, on 9 October Hitler also formulated a military operation in response to the possibility of the Allies vetoing his proposal: Führer's Decree No. 6.

At Hitler's repeated urging, the German Army General Staff Headquarters drew up an operational plan for the Western Front, codenamed the "Yellow Plan." This plan was similar to the Schlieffen plan for the German invasion of France in World War I, that is, to put the main German army on the right flank and attack France through Belgium. But the Chief of Staff of Army Group A, Erich? Feng? Manstein, on the other hand, hated the idea and thought it was just a rehash of the same old tune. Hitler himself did not like this plan either. Manstein put forward his strategic concept: the main spearhead of the German offensive should be placed in the center, not on the right flank.

With powerful armored forces, the main assault was carried out on the strategically decisive breakthrough --- the Ardennes Forest belt. This was a shortcut to attack France by surprise and victory, which could cut off the connection between the North and the South Allied forces, divide and encircle the British and French Allied forces, and quickly destroy France. But the commander-in-chief of the German Army, Walter? Feng? Brauchitsch refused to forward Manstein's plan to Hitler.

On January 10, 1940, a Luftwaffe officer carrying the "Yellow Plan" made a forced landing in Belgium due to a plane lost, and because he could not burn all this important document, part of it fell into the hands of Britain and France. So Manstein again presented his ideas to the army headquarters, which disgusted Brauchitsch so much that he was transferred to the post of commander of the 38th Infantry Corps. But Manstein took advantage of Hitler's meeting with the new army commanders and presented his views directly to Hitler.

Hitler's statement about Manstein was "understood very quickly like a fairy" and stated that he personally agreed with Manstein's opinion. The next day, Hitler summoned Army Commander-in-Chief Brauchitsch and Army Chief of Staff Halder and ordered them to draw up a new battle plan at once on the basis of Manstein's proposals.

Although Brauchitsch and Halder strongly opposed Manstein's suggestion, arguing that his so-called secret passage was a wild hypothesis that would expose the elite of German panzer forces to a flank attack by the French and possibly lead to the annihilation of the entire army. But under pressure from Hitler, the two army chiefs succumbed. As a result, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Halder, was ordered to reformulate the battle plan on the basis of Manstein's proposal.

On February 22, 1940, Hitler approved a new battle plan that was broadly identical to that envisioned by Manstein. The German General Staff replaced this plan with Operation Scythe. According to Heinz Brown, then commander of the 19th Panzer Corps? William? With the exception of Hitler, Manstein, and himself, almost no one else had confidence in the plan, Guderian said.

On 10 January 1940, a German Messerschmitt Bf108 was forced to land in Masmechelen, north of Maastricht, Belgium (the so-called "Mechelen Incident"). The passenger on the plane was Helmao, a key member of the Luftwaffe? Reinberger, who carries an up-to-date copy of the "Yellow Plan No. 2". Reinberger was unable to destroy the document, which soon fell into the hands of Belgian intelligence agencies.

It is often argued that this event was the reason for the major revisions planned by the German army, but this is not true; In fact, on 30 January, the military operation was re-designated as "Yellow Plan No. 3", which is largely in line with the previous version. On 27 January, Manstein was relieved of his post as Chief of the General Staff of Army Group A and transferred to the rank of corps commander in Prussia, where he began his command at Stettin on 9 February.

This move was made by Halder in order to eliminate Manstein's influence. Manstein's enraged subordinates presented his plan to Hitler's attention, which he obtained on 2 February. Manstein was invited to explain his proposal to the Führer personally in Berlin on 17 February. Hitler was impressed by the plan. The next day, he ordered to follow the von ? Manstein's conception changes the plan. These ideas appealed to Hitler primarily because they offered some hope of a real cheap victory.

Hitler ordered Franz? Halder changed plans again, von? Manstein did not intervene further. Halder agreed to transfer the main forces, the so-called "tactical breakthrough forces", to the south. Feng? Manstein's plan did not have much support (from a defensive point of view), because the Ardennes region was densely forested and had only a poor road system, which were unreliable as invasion roads. But there must therefore be an element of surprise that would be crucial to the Allies' response to the plan originally envisioned, in which the main elite forces of France and Britain would advance north to defend Belgium.

To help ensure that in this case, German Army Group B was to attack Belgium and the Netherlands, giving the impression that they were the main force of the German army, in order to lure the Allies east into the intended encirclement and pin them down. To do this, 3 of the existing 10 armored divisions were still assigned to Army Group B.

However, Halder had no intention of deviating from the established principle and allowing the seven Panzer Divisions of Army Group A to make an independent strategic interlude. To Guderian's chagrin, this was initially completely removed from the new plan. The "Yellow Plan No. 4" was issued on 24 February, and the crossing of the Meuse at Sedan was supposed to be captured by infantry divisions on the eighth day of the invasion.

It was not until after much debate that the motorized rifle regiment of the Panzer Division was given the option to establish a bridgehead here on the fourth day after the invasion. Even now, the breakthrough and advance towards the English Channel can begin only on the 9th day, and the stay in the middle 5 days is intended so that a sufficient number of infantry divisions can catch up and create a continuous front with armored forces.

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