Elizabeth, Roosevelt, Churchill and others knew very well that this must not be allowed to happen. At present, Britain and the United States have assembled 2.88 million troops in Britain, including more than 1 million British troops, 800,000 American troops, and hundreds of thousands of other allies.

Elizabeth was not participating in the secret discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill, who invited Roosevelt to his chancellor's office, alone in a secret room, and gathered several key military chiefs, who would discuss with the American generals who had come to Britain with Roosevelt.

On the British side, Alexander and Montgomery, and on the American side, Marshall and Eisenhower, the four men openly discussed, and then Roosevelt and Churchill made the final decision on which strategy and tactics to choose.

This meeting is not something that can be concluded in a day or two, and once it is decided, it will affect the future national destiny of Britain and the United States, and it must be cautious. Whether Britain and the United States chose to sit on the mountain and watch the tiger fight, or wait for the Battle of Kursk to reach a stalemate, and immediately launch a landing operation in France. No one knows about the decision of the British and Americans.

……

In April 1943, Limer drew up his initial battle plan, and for this assault Limer expected to point to the base of the wide salient in the Kursk region, which was chosen because it was located between Belgorod and Orel, just within the German lines.

Therefore, for the German army, the military deployment of the Soviet army in the Kursk salient would threaten the coordinated operation of the German Army Group Center and Army Group South. and then developed to use it as a breakthrough to invade Ukraine. To eliminate this huge salient, the Germans were to resort to pincer warfare:

The 4th Tank Army in Limer's Army Group South (formerly Army Group Don) constituted the encircled Right Wing Group, and the 9th Army in Kruger's Army Group Center became the Left Wing Group. Finally, the forces of the two major armies were relied upon to eliminate the Soviet salient at Kursk, which stretched seventy-five miles into the German positions, and restore the 1942 front. Therefore, if this offensive was successful, it would be possible to annihilate a large number of Soviet divisions and greatly weaken the offensive power of the Soviet army, thus putting the German army in an advantageous position on the Eastern Front.

Li Mo's original intention has evolved from relying on assault forces to strike at and deplete the Soviet forces in the Kursk region to trying to annihilate the Voronezh Front and the Central Front of the Soviet Army in Kursk at once by means of encirclement tactics. If possible, it could also evolve into a joint encirclement of the steppes and the Bryan Front. Completely destroy the main forces of the Soviet army. The consequence of this was that a blitzkrieg with a limited purpose was designed to be a decisive offensive.

On May 4, 1943, an offensive plan codenamed "Bastion" was officially introduced, but in reality it was not much different from the battle plan drawn up in April. Judging from the military disposition of the German army, the two pincer arms of this pincer offensive were the 9th Army of General Moder, which attacked from the north. And Admiral Holt's 4th Tank Army was to be tasked with attacking from the south. In the first echelon. Hult has 8 armored divisions. Moder had 7 armored divisions.

In addition, a considerable number of infantry divisions were to be drawn to participate in the offensive. But from a strategic point of view, the battle of "Bastion" was purely an irresponsible gamble for the sake of this offensive. The Germans had to use almost all of their campaign reserves. Therefore, if the campaign is lost, the consequences will be unimaginable.

Prior to this, Li Mo had repeatedly insisted that if an offensive plan was to be adopted, it would have to be launched in early May, that is, when the spring mud had just dried and the Soviets had not had time to adjust their troop deployments. The commander of the 9th Army, Moder, advocated a moratorium on the operation and waited for the arrival of a large number of tank reinforcements. Taking Moder's advice, Limer postponed the launch of the attack to May, but in the end it was delayed until 4 May, with 12 armoured divisions in the north and south.

This is almost 70 percent of the German armored division on the Eastern Front, Li Mo is not afraid of big gambles, Germany has 3,800 tanks of various types, while the Soviet army is 5,000 to 7,000 tanks, but Li Mo is confident. The battle plan formulated by Li Mo in the early stage was just a smoke bomb, and the real battle plan was already in Li Mo's mind, and hundreds of excellent combat staff officers had been secretly transported to the "Eagle's Nest", and they were mainly to improve the general battle plan designed by Li Mo.

As for Limer's suggestion to launch an offensive in early May, many people have also questioned whether the German offensive in May would have been effective. Some people suggested that Hitler immediately gather forces and delay the attack, but Limer immediately explained the situation to Hitler:

The original concept of the entire "fortress" battle plan was to take advantage of the enemy's attack before the reorganization was completed. It was also inevitable that the longer the German offensive was delayed, the greater the threat to Army Group South's forces in the Donets-Mius salient area, since all their armoured forces had been withdrawn, as was also the case in the area of the Arnell salient where Army Group Center's 9th Army jumped out of its base. Therefore, the longer the delay becomes, the greater the threat to these areas from the Soviet army.

The situation on the southern front in April-May was still more favorable for the Germans. The German army on the southern front did not suffer serious losses in the Kharkov counterattack, and many first-line German divisions maintained strong combat effectiveness. Within 10 days of the end of the Battle of Kharkov, the industry had regained most of its strength. The Soviets, on the other hand, did not have these conditions, and although they outnumbered the Germans in reserves, the difference between the two sides in the number of technical weapons was small.

By April 10, the Germans had deployed a very large military force around Kursk, including about 1.7 million men, 16,000 artillery pieces and mortars, 3,800 tanks and assault guns, and 3,500 combat aircraft.

Although the delay in the offensive allowed the German Panzer Division to acquire more new tanks to increase its strength, the Soviet forces in the Kursk region were growing even faster. At the beginning of April, the Soviet reinforcements were not yet fully in place, and the most important thing was that the Soviet fortifications near Kursk were far from complete and could not withstand a fierce attack. But if the Germans delay the offensive for a month or two, the chances of completing the mission are much smaller.

At this point, both in terms of time and space, further delaying the offensive would only turn the tide of the battle more unfavorable for the Germans, who had already found that the Soviets were growing faster as they were growing stronger. As a result, the Germans delayed the offensive for several months, which meant that it would be much more difficult to complete the task. (To be continued......)