Originally the training program in Alchena was developed by Semen? Colonel M. Krivoshin was in charge. Although initially it was planned to limit the use of Soviet personnel for coaching, at the end of October the situation in the republican [***] near Madrid was so bad that the Soviet military attaché, Colonel Golev, approved the formation of some temporary battle formations from the personnel of Alchena to go forward to reinforce the Madrid front. At least three small battle groups were sent to the front, one under the command of Captain Novak and including 6 "BA-3" armored vehicles and 7 "T-26" tanks, a Spanish tank platoon under the command of Major Villacanth, and one by Paul? Reinforced company-sized formations under the command of Major Arman. The first two formations were put into battle on the evening of October 27, 1936, but their role was limited.

Arman's morale-boosting words did not do much of a difference among the Spanish Republican Army soldiers, and Arman knew that nothing he said would be useful in a victory.

As a result of the onslaught of Franco's nationalist army, Madrid's fronts were already in a dangerous situation. In the continuous tug-of-war, the casualties of the republican [***] became larger and larger.

This morning, the first effective battle of the tank forces of the Republic [***] will be fought by the 1st Tank Battalion of the Partly Formed Army in Arman.

An active Latvian, Arman served in the ranks of the Bolsheviks from the Russian Civil War onwards before joining the Latvian Army as a spy until his return to the Soviet Red Army in 1926. After completing the officer course in the Red Army, Arman came to Spain, where he previously served as a company commander in a regiment of "BT" fast tanks. Arman was selected to be the head of the first training group because, unlike most of the Red Army officers, he spoke several Western European languages. Arman picked the best Soviet crew, mixed with some new Spanish crews, for a total of 34 Soviets and 11 Spaniards.

On the morning of 29 October 1936, Arman's company was sent to support the infantry attack of the Italian and Spanish nationalist forces in the village of Sesana, launched by the Liszt and Bruno brigades, on a major communication road south of Madrid.

After another mobilization, the high-spirited Arman set out with his team.

The assault on the village of Sesana was indeed defeated "without much effort", as Arman had predicted, but the battle also revealed the problems and potential of the tactical use of tanks in Spanish conditions. The Spanish infantry was not trained to work with tanks, and Arman did not have the patience to wait for the infantry. Therefore, he ordered the tanks to advance without infantry accompaniment. Three of his 15 tanks were immediately damaged by mines on their way into the village, a completely new experience because anti-tank mines were rarely used in the First World War. After evading the positions of the field artillery batteries of the nationalist army on the western outskirts of the village, Arman approached to attack the main position of the nationalist army in the village. During the street battle, one of his tanks was destroyed by an incendiary bottle filled with gasoline, which was the first time that the "Molotov cocktail bottle" was used in combat in Spain. After firing at the nationalist army in the village, Arman led his company to the east and rushed out of the village, trying to attack from behind. After crossing the position of a field artillery battery, the "T-26" tank was met by three "CV3/35" ultralight tanks of the Nationalist army tank company, small armored vehicles armed only with machine guns, and their counterattack against Arman was therefore hopeless. One "CV3/35" was destroyed by a tank gun at close range, and the other was pushed into a ditch by a much larger "T-26" tank and turned over. By noon, Arman's tank group had passed through the village of Isquievas, headed south to Poacos, made a circle, and finally stopped in a grove on the southeastern outskirts of the village of Sessana. After resting, the tank group again attacked the nationalist army in the village, this time from behind the enemy's front, and rushed out of the village from the southwest to make peace with the republican [***]. During the attack, three of his tanks were destroyed by "Molotov cocktail bottles" and artillery fire, three more were damaged, and in terms of personnel, 4 Soviets and 4 Spaniards were killed and 6 were wounded. But Arman's tank group destroyed two enemy infantry battalions and two cavalry squadrons, as well as 10 75-mm field guns, 2 ultralight tanks, 20-30 trucks and 5-8 vehicles, as well as a number of tank transporters and captured two field guns. Although Arman's assault was a psychological boost to the distressed Republic[***], the general counterattack (of which the tank group was a part) failed due to the failure of the infantry to storm the village without planned tank support. Unbeknownst to Arman at this time, the lack of coordination between infantry and tanks in the village of Sesana was typical of the Spanish war.

After several days of fighting around the village of Sessana, the scattered republican [***] tank formations were unified into a tank battle group under the command of Colonel Krivoshin, which consisted of 48 tanks and 9 armored vehicles. However, Krivoshin did not concentrate on the use of armored forces, and Arman's company was again sent to support the Liszt brigade, while Krivoshin's other forces covered the retreat of the main republican [***] forces to Madrid. The Republican [***] was powerless to stop the attack of the nationalist army, although the performance of Krivoshin's scattered armored forces was universally praised. The Krivoshin tank group took part in the battles of Trejón and Valdemoro in Velasco on November 4-5, 1936, a counterattack on the outskirts of Englis on November 13, 1936, and continuous fighting in Madrid in mid-December.

The pre-war Spanish Army had two tank regiments, the 1st Tank Regiment in Madrid and the 2nd Tank Regiment in Zaragoza. Most of the soldiers of the 1st Tank Regiment sided with the Republic, and they consolidated their old World War I French Renault "FT" tanks into a company, commanded by D. Pergodin, to support Krivoshin's tank forces in the battle of Madrid.

The Soviet advisory group in Madrid sent the following assessment to Moscow: "Arman's tank group has created a real miracle. It is quite certain that if there were no fighter groups and Arman's tanks in the first stage of the defense of Madrid, the defense of the city would have been a catastrophic situation. It is impossible to depict exactly and completely the heroism of the tank crews, they prevented the rout of the infantry, they were always at the front, they fought alone with enemy artillery batteries, they disrupted the enemy's battle plans. They maximized the advantages of tank technology and were exemplary, they never refused or questioned the assigned tasks. The tanks fought all day, returned to the support base in the evening to repair the vehicles, and returned to the battlefield the next morning. The best examples of heroism and the resourcefulness of our people were clearly demonstrated by the performance of all the personnel of Arman's tank group. ”

By the time Madrid was besieged in mid-December 1936, Krivoshin's small armored force was largely depleted, not only from combat casualties, but also from the mechanical wear and tear of the tanks themselves. The tanks of the thirties were not as strong and robust as one might think. The T-26 light tank needs to be overhauled at the regional repair station after 150 motorcycle hours, and at the factory for overhaul every 600 motorcycle hours. Inferior gasoline at the time often led to engine scorching, spark plug fouling, or other problems that immobilized the tank. The tracks and track pins were worn out after 500 miles; The side clutch wear is severe, and the drivetrain is gradually shaken out of place during hard off-road driving. In the desperate battle to defend Madrid, Arman's company accumulated more than 800 combat hours by December [***], far more than the order, which rendered many tanks unusable. Other units of Krivoshin were not much better either, the inexperienced Spanish crews could not carry out battlefield repairs, and their unfamiliarity with tank driving led to the failure of the clutch and transmission system, which often had the surname. There are no ready-made repair facilities in the Madrid area, and spare parts are almost non-existent. Krivoshin's tank unit was successful in its mission to directly support the Republican [***] defending Madrid, but it was no longer possible to use this force in later battles.

The immediate lessons of tank battles in the autumn of 1936 were primarily about the technical aspects of how to keep the troops in combat condition. The Soviet Red Army had not yet conducted tank operations for an extended period of time without peacetime training bases, so the Spanish combat experience was an eye-opener for tank crews who had been plagued by technical problems since the First World War. In fact, until 1932-1933, the Red Army had only a small number of tanks and trucks, and the expansion of its tank strength and its reliance on poorly prepared conscripts outstripped its ability to maintain a cadre of high-quality technical specialists. And from the first battles it was shown that tank units could not be used uninterrupted, like infantry, night and night, and care had to be taken to save only the most important tasks.

The condition of the crews of the new Spanish tanks was depressing, and as was customary in the Red Army, less experienced crews were generally assigned to drivers, so inexperienced Spaniards became drivers, which led to an unusually high failure rate and forced Krivoshin's troops to rearrange the division of labor among the crews, with the commander often acting as the driver to get the tank running. But this seriously affected the combat effectiveness of the tank, since experienced Soviet tankmen in separate cockpits could not direct the tank and gunners to fire. In order to extend the life of the tank, when the troops had to move more than several kilometers, the Soviet tank units began to use trains or heavy trucks to transport tanks. This is a technique learned from the Spanish Army, which used the French Renault "FT" tank and adopted this French practice, which is clearly different from the Soviet custom.

In the early battles, there was very little experience with tactics. The Soviet tanks and the infantry they used to support were very poorly coordinated. Before the operation, they did not conduct any training in the tactics of cooperation of tanks and infantry. Tank companies also rarely stayed with the same infantry unit for more than a few days, so there was no way to gain experience. At that time, due to the urgency of the war situation and the poor technical condition of the equipment, this was not considered an urgent problem. Since the Republican [***] were unable to take tank units out of battle for coordinated training, Crivoshin's headquarters was reluctant to devote their precious motorcycle hours to training with the Spanish infantry. In January 1937, Krivoshin was recalled to Moscow to recuperate and report to senior leaders of the Red Army.

Due to the fact that Italy and Germany were sending more troops and weapons to Franco's army in clear violation of the policy of non-intervention, Stalin decided to strengthen his detachments in Spain. While the battle for the defense of Madrid continued, a second group of about 200 Soviet tankmen and tank specialists arrived on a steamer on November 26, 1936. This is the backbone of the 4th Reading (Light) Tank Brigade of the Belorussian Military District in Staro-Dologa, commanded by Colonel D.G. Pavlov. The top of the Red Army prepared to form the 1st Armored Brigade with these at the Achena training camp. But the larger size of the units of the armored brigade did not indicate that the Soviet advisory group in Spain planned to direct a large-scale operation with the concentrated use of tank forces. The light tank brigades of the Red Army were used only to provide support to composite arms units or infantry units, and their formation allowed for the deployment of separate tank battalions to infantry divisions in battle. However, the structure of the brigade contained a more complex and complete logistics system than Krivoshin's troops, which would help solve the serious problems of vehicle maintenance that plagued the first Soviet tank units in Spain. Pavlov's brigade in Spain was only about a third the size of a light tank brigade of the Red Army standard, nominally 96 tanks, but rarely more than 60 in battles throughout the winter and spring. In the case of the Krivoshin Division, only Spanish personnel could be used due to the fact that there were not enough Soviet crews. This usually means: Soviet drivers, company platoon commanders, and Spanish turret personnel. In total, there were 351 Soviet tankmen in the Spanish War, and Pavlov's brigade absorbed the remaining units of Krivoshin, who formed the 1st Tank Battalion.

Pavlov's partially built brigade was rushed into battle in early January 1937, when he had only 47 tanks at hand. The best equipped was the newly formed 2nd Tank Battalion, commanded by Bertov. The operational intent was to support the 12th and 14th "International Brigades", which had attacked from Las Rozas to Magadaanda on 11 January 1937 on the western front of Madrid. The attack began without planned artillery or air support. In contrast to the previous synergy with the Spanish army, the cooperation with the infantry of the International Brigade was somehow more successful. Tanks were effective in breaking through the defensive line based on reinforced stone houses. However, after the initial line of defense was broken through by tanks and infantry, the infantry could not keep up with the tanks and separated from each other. Tank units could penetrate deeper into the positions of the nationalist army, but, as Arman's previous battles had shown, penetrating without accompanying infantry was ineffective. During the three days of fighting, the division lost 5 tanks, mainly destroyed by enemy anti-tank guns. While Soviet aid to the Republican Axe increased, Germany and Italy also increased their support for the Nationalist Army. The natural enemy of the Republican [***] tank was the German 37mm "PAK36" anti-tank gun, while the Italian 47mm infantry gun was sometimes successful.

The Magadahanda offensive soon ended, and the Nationalist Army shifted the focus of their assault on Madrid to the southeastern front along the Harama River. Pavlov's tanks passed through the city, were transported to new fronts and reinforced into the republican [***] fronts by small detachments of company size. As the French discovered during World War I, the presence of tanks had a strong psychological reinforcement of the demoralized infantry, and the entire Madrid Line strongly demanded tank support. Despite the losses suffered in the fighting in recent weeks, the strength of the tank brigade increased to 80 tanks as the tank crew increased and more battle-damaged tanks were repaired. With the support of Pavlov's tank forces, scattered to the ministries, the republican [***] even switched to a counteroffensive.

The report of the Soviet advisory group to Moscow did not affirm the combat operations on the Harama River. During the offensive, the coordination of infantry and tanks was very poor. The nationalist army had more 37-mm anti-tank guns on the battlefield, as a result of which the republican [***] tanks suffered heavy losses, sometimes approaching 35-40%. But the Soviets did not learn nothing, although the terrain there was not conducive to the formation of large tank battles, and there were few battles on the scale of 10 tanks in the company class. But the Soviets still had a lot of success. On February 14, 1937, the Pavlov Brigade began to use its forces more intensively, and in a counterattack launched with the 24th Infantry Brigade, it overwhelmed the main force of a nationalist army, killing and wounding about 4,500 people. At the end of February, the Pavlov Brigade again concentrated its forces to support the International Brigade in its offensive. On February 27 alone, the tank brigade launched five attacks on the positions of the nationalist army, but was hit by anti-tank guns and suffered heavy losses. The Nationalist Army artillery destroyed eight tanks in one sitting, so much so that the Soviet artillery expert Kulik commented, not without irony, that "their anti-tank guns can sweep our tanks across the battlefield like they sweep down infantry with machine guns." ”

By March, the front line moved again, this time north of Madrid, where the Italians began an offensive in Guadalajara. The Pavlov brigade was again called to "put out the fire" and transported to a new battlefield. At the initial stage of the campaign, the Pavlov brigade was used for defense against the onslaught of the Italian army.

On March 13, 1937, one of the battles between the few tanks took place, when the Republican [***] "T-26" tanks were firing on an Italian "CV3/35" tank company, destroying five of them and severely damaging the other. There were also many skirmishes with the Italian army, and the Italian tank crews soon did not dare to come into contact with the republican [***] rearguard units supported by "T-26" tanks. When the offensive of the Italian "volunteers" exhausted, the republican [***] switched to a counteroffensive led by Pavlov's tanks.

(To be continued)