Napoleon III had a great affection for Prussia, and he believed that "Prussia was the model of the Reformation, commercial progress, and liberal constitutionalism among the German nation, and the greatest representative of the orthodox German kingdom, with its freedom of opinion and popular suffrage far superior to that of other German nations." Pen, fun, pavilion www. biquge。 Regardless of whether this judgment is true or false, the problem is that the evaluation of a country's internal affairs cannot be the basis for its foreign policy. Regardless of the form of government and ideology that Prussia pursues, France can only formulate its foreign policy towards Prussia on the basis of the balance of power, the stakes, and the position in the power structure between the two countries. Politicians are not intellectuals, and they should understand the "gushing talk" about doctrines, beliefs, national and national feelings...... No more valuable than the moonlit fantasies of a sentimental teenager. "Not only that, but Napoleon III also carried on the tradition of the Bonaparte family to oppose Austria and break the blockade and containment of France by the Vienna system. In fact, both of these points were misjudged. Austria was a conservative country, the German Union was more of a defensive system, and as long as Austria maintained a leading position within the German League, the security of France's eastern frontier could be guaranteed. Due to the loose nature of the German Union, France could also maintain its influence over the other small and medium-sized states within the Union. Austria has traditionally enjoyed a superior political position, and the Habsburgs have held the crown of the "Holy Roman Empire of the German nation" since ancient times, and enjoy great prestige among the small and medium-sized German states. Together with the middle states represented by Bavaria, Saxony and Hanover, it was a real resistance to Prussian expansion.

The fragmentation of the Kingdom of Prussia was a formidable obstacle to Prussia's dominance of German unity, and Prussia made it its basic policy to defend the fragmented territories it had gained over its long expansion. If Prussia had been reassured by the framework of the German Union, the reunification of Germany would have been far away, even stillborn. Therefore, the master diplomat Bismarck was bent on destroying this framework, but Napoleon III unconsciously helped Bismarck and promoted the unification of Germany.

The reunification of Germany has a popular and economic basis, and it is also the trend of the times, and it is not wise for France to stop this historical trend alone, and it is beyond the national strength of France, and Napoleon III is not without reason. But the crux of the matter was that France was not without allies in its opposition to German unification, and that in the end it ended up being a lone duel with Prussia to stop this trend. If Napoleon III had been able to perceive the trend of history, he could have planned his calculations, leveraged his strength, arranged France's national strategy according to the situation, and used Prussia's initiative to maximize his own interests.

In the modern history of Europe, the "unification of Germany" and "the acquisition of a natural frontier by France" were the sources of diplomatic contradictions. France's acquisition of a natural frontier or control of the rest of francophone Europe and the unification of Germany were equally historically and realistically justified, and there was no distinction between moral superiority and inferiority. National unity is certainly "just," but the security of the country and the balance of Europe are also "just." Although nationalism is a popular trend in this century, it is far from the consensus of those in power in the major powers, who at that time generally believed that "those who have power have rights, and the weak can only reluctantly conform to the views of the strong" and that "small and weak countries must exercise self-restraint for the sake of political balance [in Europe]. It was in this spirit that the Congress of Vienna re-established the political landscape of Europe, and the demarcation of national borders was concerned only with the maintenance of the balance of power among the major powers of the European continent, without any regard for the principles of national self-determination and national unity. Therefore, for France, the superior position on the European continent need not be confined to the destruction of such and such a treaty at the Congress of Vienna, any treaty is only a piece of waste paper in the face of force, the only thing that is worth noting is in whose hands the force is in whose hands and whether it has the will to use force. Nor is it impossible to annex the French-speaking regions of Europe, for Britain, although it has always opposed the domination of the Low Countries by any military power, it cannot organize its own action against France without other continental European countries acting as British thugs. Napoleon III repeatedly hoped to obtain the approval of the Great Powers for his annexation attempts in the form of a European conference, but he did not know that the so-called diplomatic conferences or international organizations had always only recognized fait accompli, and could never produce strong action. Words make sounds, but actions make louder sounds. Is a region that is extremely important to France's national interests and national security waiting for an adversary to come to its door? If France itself is capable of seizing and holding these areas, why should it need recognition from its adversaries? Napoleon III was obsessed with the Left Bank of the Rhine, Belgium, Luxembourg and other French-speaking regions, and was therefore repeatedly tempted by his opponents in the historical process of German unification, repeatedly misjudged and missed opportunities, and failed to succeed in seeking reciprocal national interests for France.

Of course, it cannot be said that Napoleon III did everything to the detriment of French interests, but that he was devoting himself to the glory of France, to the extension of French interests, and to the preservation of his own rule. Someone once summed up the political personality of Napoleon III - "The ideas in his head multiply as quickly as a nest of rabbits." The problem was that there was no higher and stronger central idea to rely on his creative ideas. In contrast to Bismarck in Prussia, Napoleon III lacked not strength or even intelligence, but the ability to prioritize national interests and perseverance to achieve a goal, and the ability to perceive the interests of countries and the structure of diplomatic power. This is partly related to Napoleon III's personal cultivation and family feuds, and partly it is also the result of the complex entanglement of French geographical environment and historical grievances. However, no matter how complicated France's geographical environment and historical grievances are, it is not as complex as Prussia's geographical environment and historical grievances, and compared with Bismarck's wisdom and calmness, Napoleon III himself cannot escape the blame.

After Napoleon III came to power, his primary purpose was to break the shackles of the Vienna system on France, restore France's status as a great power, and compete for hegemony in Europe and the world. Diplomacy has been brilliant at times, but it has been multifaceted and inconsistent, and has failed to see the foundations of its own success. As a result, his victory quickly became a heavy strategic burden, and he overestimated his own power, creating diplomatic disputes in the false belief that France could profit from it, while underestimating the destructive power unleashed by his own European nationalist movement. And it was this force that made the historical trend of Prussia's unification of Germany irreversible.

The failure of the Franco-Russian alliance with France and Austria was the most crucial external factor in Prussia's ability to unify Germany, and the Franco-Russian rivalry between France and Austria was caused by Napoleon III. Napoleon III was anti-Austrian and anti-Russian, except for historical grievances - Napoleon's First Empire was defeated by Austria and Russia. Moreover, because after Napoleon III became emperor, the Russian tsar refused to recognize this "usurper", and was only willing to call him "my friend", rather than using the title of "my brother" according to the hereditary monarchs of Europe, which added a layer of personal grudge to the historical grievances, so Napoleon III would be desperate to repeatedly offend Russia's interests on the Crimea and Poland issues.

Under the pretext of competing with Russia for the title of protector of Christians in Ottoman Turkey and the keys to the "Holy Sepulchre" in Jerusalem, France and Britain launched the Crimean War. And apart from avenging the First Reich, it is not clear that France has any long-term strategic interests in this war. He had never been as wise as Bismarck's - "to despise the sixty million Russian people...... and to ignore that they would become important allies of the future enemy, would have been a terrible mistake. ”

The post-war Paris Peace Treaty of Crimea contained a clause on the neutralization of the Black Sea, which forbade Russia from having a navy in the Black Sea region and deprived Russia of its privileges in the Balkans. This clause served Britain's strategic interests chiefly, and France gained nothing and was burdened with the long-term strategic burden of maintaining the treaty. Napoleon III, in his vanity, did not budge on the issue of the neutralization of the Black Sea, which Russia was a great disgrace, and made it impossible for France and Russia to join forces against the unification of Germany. As a result, Prussia, in order to seek Russia's friendly neutrality in the Franco-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars, supported Russia's abrogation of the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Paris. In return for Prussia, Russia deployed 100,000 troops on the Russian-Austrian border during the Franco-Prussian War to prevent Austria from falling over to the side of France. Russia said that if Austria attacked Prussia, Russia would declare war on Austria.

In the great anti-Russian national uprising in Poland, contrary to Bismarck's "dramatic exaggerated posture" on the side of Tsarist Russia to support Russia in suppressing the Polish uprising, Napoleon III tried his best to persuade the Tsar to make concessions to the Polish insurgents, and even tried to persuade Austria to give up the Polish provinces under its rule so that Poland could be restored. Recklessness was a courtesy of politicians, so Napoleon III reaped the "rewards" of Russia at great cost in the Franco-Prussian War. Russia's support was an important factor in Prussia's ability to unify Germany.

Napoleon III joined forces with the Kingdom of Sardinia to wage war against Austria and helped the Kingdom of Sardinia regain the Austrian-occupied region of Lombardy. The Austrian Empire, the pretentious and arrogant empire that survived by the outstanding diplomatic skills of Metternich, the best diplomat of the first half of the 19th century, was regarded by Napoleon III as the greatest threat to France, because Napoleon III was also such a posturing and arrogant figure. Napoleon's strenuous weakening of Austria was in essence the greatest boost to Prussia, and France indirectly cultivated its closest rival. When Napoleon III watched Austria's defeat in the Austro-Prussian War, Thiers, France's veteran statesman and later Imperial Prime Minister, lamented that "Austria's defeat would mean the greatest disaster for France in 400 years." Since then, a trump card has been lost to prevent the reunification of Germany! ”

If Franco-Austrian discord can be seen as a natural consequence of the Bonaparte's anti-Austrian political tradition, Napoleon III, as Italy's benefactor, also fell out with Austria's enemy, Italy, which is a diplomatic comedy. It turned out that Napoleon, although he allied with the Kingdom of Sardinia against Austria, helped Italy achieve the initial unification. However, when the Italian nationalist movement broke out, it greatly broke with Napoleon III's various plans for the territory and distribution of interests in Italy. Napoleon III realized that it was difficult to ride a tiger, so he betrayed his allies like a dragon and negotiated peace with Austria alone. Napoleon III's anticlimactic attitude in Italy is as an Italian proverb goes, "If you want to fart, why clamp your ass and let your asshole suffer?" French troops then moved into Rome to protect the Papal States, defeating the Garibaldi Red Shirts (behind whom the Italian government was behind) several times in an attempt to unify Rome, preventing the final unification of Italy. When France sought a diplomatic alliance with Italy before a duel with Prussia, the only important condition that Italy put forward was the withdrawal of French troops from Rome. However, Napoleon III was pressured by the Catholic Church at home to give up the protection of the Papal States for the sake of religious sentiment and religious interests, and as a result, Italy also stood idly by in the Franco-Prussian War.

Napoleon III was not necessarily unaware of Prussia's ambitions to unify Germany. He once bluntly confessed, "Germany should not be united, it should be divided into three parts, and North and South Germany should be opposed." In this way, France can benefit from it. "The problem is that the duty of a statesman is not to think about problems but to solve them, so who does France intend to rely on in opposing the unification of Germany? When Prussia's unification of Germany was on the verge of victory, Napoleon III declared, "I can guarantee peace only if Bismarck respects the status quo; If he pulls the South German gangs into the North German Confederation, our artillery will fire automatically. "The duty of a politician is not to make a statement, but to act. So what was France going to do with Prussia? Should France's diplomatic front, which has spread out throughout Europe and even around the world, be appropriately contracted to adapt to the new situation of the Franco-Prussian duel? If Napoleon III really had the will and ability to prevent Bismarck from unifying the four states of South Germany, why did he not say anything about Prussia's annihilation of traditional German states such as Hanover after the Austro-Prussian War?

Britain is the wheel of balance in the diplomatic balance of power on the European continent in this century, and Napoleon III learned the lesson of his uncle that all his countries can offend (Russia, Austria), can be betrayed, and can be ignored (Putin), but they will never dare to think anything wrong about Britain. Despite this, France eventually separated from England. Before the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck had hinted that France could gain Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Rhineland in his dealings with Napoleon III, and when Prussia was victorious, Napoleon III demanded that Bismarck fulfill his promise. Bismarck played a trick by asking France to submit the above request in writing. When Bismarck received the diplomatic memorandum from France, he immediately sent it to Britain and Russia, which also wanted to dominate Europe, provoking contradictions between Britain, Russia and France. The Congress of London, in which Britain organized the great powers, made a collective commitment that the Kingdom of Belgium and the Duchy of Luxembourg would always remain neutral and that the great powers would always guarantee their permanent independence from violation, a commitment that completely discouraged Napoleon III from merging the two countries. Although Britain did not participate in the campaign against Napoleon III, British public opinion changed its attitude, and it became less averse to the unification of Germany, and even felt that it could be used to restrain France's ambitions to control the Low Countries.

Napoleon III was indecisive and devastating, and when he realized that he had lost all his diplomatic chips, he took the risk of trying to save face by fighting Prussia to the death. Although Napoleon III offended all the great powers that could be relied upon, these countries were not as retributive as Napoleon III, and they were able to ignore past grievances and be unpretentious on major issues of right and wrong that had a bearing on the balance of power in Europe. At that time, Bismarck was planning to find an opportunity to start a war with France, just as the revolution broke out in Spain, and after the queen was overthrown, Bismarck bribed the powerful figures of the new government with a lot of money, and proposed that Prince Leopold of the Hohenzollern family inherit the Spanish throne. The new Spanish parliament accepted Bismarck's proposal. This move shocked France, and if a member of the Hohenzollern family was officially assumed the throne of Spain, Spain would become an ally of Prussia and France would be at the heart of the enemy. For this reason, France protested to Prussia, and Britain, Austria, and Russia also echoed this protest, which shows that France's position is not without the support of other countries. The other European powers outside Prussia were generally unanimous in their opposition to German reunification and to prevent major changes in the European map. But Napoleon III wasted these last diplomatic resources and did not have the patience to pursue a more balanced and protracted diplomatic strategy, because it was not in his character, and what he liked most was to have immediate results, and to be praised by the newspapers and cheered by the people immediately the day after the policy was formulated. Napoleon III was impatient to declare war, but he fell into Bismarck's trap and France was almost defeated, and thanks to a mysterious help from the East (the "Oriental Magic Box" incident), the war ended with dignity for France, but Germany was united, and France could not do anything about it.

Napoleon III eventually realized his mistake because he was disheartened, and he suffered from arthritis, diabetes, and pneumonia, and abdicated his son Napoleon IV shortly after the war.

This time Lin Yiqing came to France, and also went to pay homage to the abdicated Emperor Napoleon III and Empress Dowager Eugenie, Napoleon III was very happy, and even dragged his sick body to chat with Lin Yiqing for two hours, in the casual conversation, he expressed to Lin Yiqing for the first time his remorse for his reckless actions and gratitude to Lin Yizhe for his help, and hoped that France and Qianguo could "watch and help each other". (To be continued.) )