The Allies were still unable to use Nancy, and their attempts to quickly break through the Western Wall defense line failed; So, Rommel is now beginning to make detailed plans for the Western Front offensive that he has always dreamed of. Pen % fun % Pavilion www.biquge.info

In the first place, he was right, the Allied left flank had only seventy divisions, and it was impossible for them to hold out everywhere on a front nearly five hundred miles long; Second, Rommel was counting on the November weather to put an end to each other's air offensives, at least to greatly weaken the air force threat to their own tanks when the Germans launched their offensive.

Therefore, Rommel was anxious to stop this endless war of attrition between the air forces of both sides in the autumn when the weather began to clear, because the German army on the Soviet front was already very tight, and the air force was too important for the German army.

Since the offensive must be launched in a position where the existing forces are very sure of a breakthrough, it is necessary to choose a weak enemy ground force, whether it is a front-line force or a reserve, anyway, a relatively weakly defended position.

After the breakthrough, the results of the battle will continue to expand until the situation on the entire Western Front turns in favor of Germany. After a thorough inspection of the troops of the Western Front and careful preparation.

Rommel had found a place to launch a large-scale attack on the weak part of the enemy's defensive line, with the Ivel breakthrough and Nancy as the final goal, so that the hundreds of thousands of Allied troops would be completely divided and annihilated.

Rommel, in issuing instructions to several marshals, explained that the offensive had to be launched in a position where the existing forces would certainly be able to make a breakthrough.

Rommel then told them that the Monsau-Echternach (Eifre) area had been selected as the most suitable location for the attack, since the enemy forces there had suffered heavy losses in the previous frontal assault and were relatively weak.

Moreover, the enemy reserves in this area have been moved to the vicinity of the first line, and the supply situation is also precarious. Because the enemy's defense in this area was relatively weak, and the enemy would not have expected the Germans to attack here (and even if they did), it was possible for the Germans to break through quickly if the attack was completely unexpected, and the weather was not conducive to air operations.

A breakthrough would allow the German panzers to gain the initiative, and they would then move forward rapidly, establishing a bridgehead between Liège and Namur on the Maas, and then advancing quickly through Brussels to Nancy to the west.

It is conceivable that as soon as the German armored forces cross the Maas River, they will be able to cut off the rear lines of communication of the US First Army passing through the Maas River valley.

As soon as German armoured forces reached the Brussels-Nancy area, the rear lines of communication of the British 21st Army Group would also be threatened, and they would also be cut off if Nancy was lost.

The enemy army had not yet completely put this Nancy in order, and the defense of Nancy was not very perfect, it was indispensable for the Allies. Allied supplies throughout the Ardennes were transported, transited and stored from Nancy.

The timing of the offensive depended on Rommel's concern that the Allies might soon restore order in the port of Amsterdam and thus give full play to their superiority in men and materials. It was because of this apprehension that Rommel set the start of the offensive for early November.

If the direct target of the offensive had been seized, the Germans would have cut off the supply sources of the US First Army and the British 21st Army Group and would have been in an excellent position in the operation.

If the attack is successful, it will destroy 35 to 50 enemy divisions, and will capture or destroy large quantities of various supplies and equipment. These supplies and equipment had been piled up in the area in preparation for the Allied attack on the Western Wall and the proposed advance on the Rhine.

The breakthrough of the Germans in the entire direction of the offensive was to be carried out by ordinary first-line divisions. When breaking through, progress must be rapid, and conditions must be created for the rapid surrender of armored forces into battle.

Taking advantage of the enemy's panic and confusion, the German armored forces were to immediately advance westward. The fundamental problem was that the Panzer Division must not allow itself to be restrained when advancing towards the Maas River.

They had to bypass well-defended areas and positions that they couldn't take right away, and they couldn't let themselves be hindered by exposed flanks. In short, these were the tactics that were successfully used in the Eastern Front campaign in 1940.

In his instructions to the three commanders, Rommel mentioned November 15 as the day of the offensive, and said that the moon phase was the most favorable on that day. At that time, there will be a new moon, and the darkness of the night will provide further cover for the troops' operations, especially in preparation for aerial reconnaissance.

From the outset, Rommel stated unequivocally: "I have made up my mind that I will not abandon the far-reaching objectives of the offensive, that I will not change the arrangements I have made, and that I will not abandon the use of the forces I have." ”

Rommel went on to outline the tasks of the army group in question, with the following division of labor;

The 6th SS Panzer Army (SS Zepp?) General Dietrich) will break through to the crossings on both sides of Liège on the banks of the Maas and the crossings of its tributary, the Vesare.

Construct a strong line of defense over the fortifications east of Liège, advance to the area between Maastricht and Nancy on the banks of the Albert Canal, and then reach the area north of Nancy, with nine divisions (including four panzer) to achieve this objective.

The 5th Panzer Army (von?) General Mantofil) was to cross the Maas River between Ame and Namur, west of Liège, to prevent enemy reserves from the west from attacking the flanks and rear of the Sixth Panzer Army along the Nancy-Brussels-Dinant line, and for this task the Army would have seven divisions, including four.

The Seventh Army (General Brandenberger), consisting of roughly seven divisions (including one motorized division), would resist attacks from the south and southwest, protecting the flanks of the two Panzer armies acting as assaults.

Its immediate objective was to reach the Maas and its tributary, the Semois, and then to make contact with the Moselle Line in the Luxembourg region, where the army group would have to erect obstacles in order to build a strong line further back.

Six or seven divisions (mostly armored or mechanized) would serve as reserves for this offensive.

Rommel also told the three commanders that, in support of the Ardennes offensive, he would order Army Group D to launch an auxiliary offensive from the 12th SS Panzer Zone, a bridgehead west of Sittard and Gelenkirchen on the Maginot Line.

As soon as the enemy pressed heavily on the flank positions established by the 6th SS Panzer Army, the auxiliary offensive immediately began. The far-reaching objectives of the proposed offensive did not arouse some of the surprise and doubts of the commanders present at the time of the initial directive.

The commanders concerned unanimously agreed that the troops assigned to this task were sufficient to carry out an attack on a 125-mile frontal under autumn conditions, and that it would be sufficient to accomplish the task of annihilating 35 to 50 enemy divisions. (To be continued.) )