On the 18th, the German 11th Panzer Division continued its attack in the hope of clearing the Allied foothold on the Skide River, and a German mechanized corps made a breakthrough on a wide front, and the resistance of the Allied "emergency" forces did nothing. Pen @ fun @ pavilion wWw. ｂｉｑUｇE。 ｉｎｆｏ

Steiner decided to set out immediately, and after a night's march, at dawn the next day, before the Allies could be dispatched, Steiner commanded his troops to attack the Allies.

To this end, the 110th Panzer Infantry Regiment was to pin down the enemy from the front; The 15th Panzer Regiment attacked the enemy's eastern flank; The 111th Armoured Infantry Regiment covered the flank in the right rear, leaving it as a reserve.

At five o'clock on 19 October, when everything was going according to plan, the advance detachment of the 15th Panzer Regiment saw that the Allied forces were marching south in battle formation.

Due to the good shade of the German armored regiment, its only 125 tanks followed behind the Allies, and before the Allies could react, they opened fire on the Allies, destroying 140 Allied tanks in just a few minutes.

Only then did the Allies realize that it was the German tanks that were following them in the second echelon, not their own.

The commanding heights of 148.8 were captured by the Germans, and on the other side of this heights, tanks were also advancing in battle formation, and their actions were almost the same as described above.

The German tanks, commanded by Captain Lestermann, had once again attacked the Allies from behind, and before the Allies could figure out what was going on, they had been wiped out.

In such a surprisingly short period of time, 125 German tanks wiped out 165 Allied tanks without any damage themselves, and the battle overwhelmed the Allied offensive, and the remnants fled in panic and did not dare to resist any longer.

On the night of the 19th, the Allied 3rd Tank Brigade carried out a diversionary attack on the left flank of the German 11th Panzer Division and occupied the position of the 1st Battalion of the 110th Panzer Infantry Regiment, but the 15th Panzer Regiment quickly recaptured this position.

The German 11th Panzer Division continued to advance in order to drive the enemy to the other side of the Sreach River. The advance of the Panzer Division was initially smooth, but by late evening the Allies had launched a fierce counterattack on the division's right flank and broke through to the rear of the 111th Panzer Infantry Regiment, which relieved the danger and destroyed 30 Allied tanks.

Due to the desperate resistance of the Allies, General Steiner decided to consolidate the defensive position on the 21st and ordered the regiments to take advantage of the darkness of the night to adjust their deployment. At 2 a.m. that day, both armoured infantry regiments reported that their defensive positions had been broken by the Allies.

As the moon lit up the land, Allied tanks and infantry broke into German positions while the Germans were adjusting their deployments, and the 15th Panzer Regiment immediately launched a counterattack, and soon the good news came from the Panzer Infantry Regiment.

Steiner sent the 61st Motorcycle Battalion to attack the Allied forces at the junction of the 110th and 111th Panzer Infantry Regiments, which seemed to be the main force of the enemy, and by daylight the situation was clear:

The German 11th Panzer Division achieved a major victory in the defensive battle, the Allies left thousands of corpses in front of the German positions, and the German losses were not small.

In the afternoon of the same day, the Allied 48th Tank Army was quiet on the defensive ground, in fact, the large-scale German offensive on the front line of the Sheldt River had come to an end, and the Allies had already begun to retreat and were actively preparing for a second line of defense.

However, the Allies were now being attacked on all sides, and the Germans were beating more than 100 elite troops around 550,000 Allied troops, and even if the Allies could achieve some victories in a certain area, they still could not change the entire situation of the war.

The collapse of the positions of the Allied 8th Army opened a hole in the left flank of the Allies, through which German troops were entering.

On 21 October, Patton received an order to evacuate the Sheldt Line and move to Kaya, 110 miles to the west. Unless the Allies move fast, they can't save Abo.

Before concluding the narrative of the battle on the Sreach River, it is necessary to pay a few tributes to the natural tank commander, General Steiner, whose panzer division was a "devil's division" throughout the battle.

Faced with an Allied landing field that the infantry could not handle, Steiner slammed the enemy with all the strength of his tank crew, adhering to the old adage: "Don't be stingy, just slam." "He was able to achieve brilliant results because his tanks worked in perfect harmony with the infantry.

Steiner would never allow a single tank to directly support the infantry, as he considered it to be detrimental and wasteful to a much-needed tank. The tactics of mobile warfare often turn the situation from dangerous to peaceful and cause the enemy to suffer heavy losses.

During this period, Army Group B, commanded by Steiner, destroyed more than 1,700 enemy tanks and Allied tanks and armored vehicles.

According to what the Germans had seen and heard, the Germans believed that as long as the Germans had calm and brave soldiers and concentrated tanks and artillery, they could defeat the Allied forces with a large number of troops and weapons.

The German 11th Panzer Division, with its decisive heroism, achieved a brilliant victory on the front line of the Sheld.

If the Allies were able to advance to Arbo, the entire Allied forces in Belgium and Holland would be in unison, which would undoubtedly make it more difficult for the Germans to encircle and annihilate them, and the situation would force the German 11th Panzer Division to do everything in its power to complete the task it was given.

Fortunately, after all the hard battles, the commanders who did not stand the test were all replaced by experienced people, and the commanders who remained were absolutely reliable.

For several weeks in a row, the Germans marched secretly at night to reach positions that were vulnerable to attack the enemy before dawn, a tactic that required a great deal of energy and physical strength, but few casualties, as this practice often took the enemy by surprise.

One of the aphorisms of the German division was "The night march is a lifesaver." "However, one has to ask, what time did the soldiers of the German 11th Panzer Division sleep? I am afraid that there will never be a clear answer to this question.

For the sake of secrecy, the German orders were all dictated without exception. The division commander made a decision that night and gave the necessary orders verbally to the regiment commander on the spot, after which he returned to the headquarters to discuss his intentions with the chief of staff of the army. If approved, a telegram was sent to the regiments: "no change", and everything went according to plan.

In the event of any important change, the division commander went to the regiments that night to re-dictate the order, and he commanded the division's actions from the forward position on the battlefield. The position of the division commander was with the troops who carried out the main assault, and he had to go to the regiment several times a day.

The division headquarters is deployed a little further back, and generally does not change positions during operations. The headquarters is responsible for collecting and sorting out information on the enemy's situation, managing the supply of troops, and mobilizing and reinforcing troops. Communication between the division commander and the command was maintained by radio and only by telephone on a few occasions.

…… (To be continued.) )