At the same time as the defeat of the 5th Army of the Red Army, the 6th Army of the Red Army counterattacked relatively easily, especially the 159th Infantry Division under this group army, after inflicting heavy losses on the 254th Infantry Division of the 4th Army of the Chinese Army, almost hit the national border, while the 4th Mechanized Army (the most powerful mechanized army of the Red Army) attempted to launch a powerful attack in this direction. But the retreat of the 5th Army and the loss of positions exposed the left flank of the 6th Army to the Chinese. In order to prevent being encircled, the 6th Army was also forced to retreat. By April 6, an 80-kilometer gap had formed between the 5th and 6th armies of the Red Army. China's 1st Panzer Group under the command of Admiral Zhang Zhizhong is taking advantage of this gap to advance rapidly.

The failure of the mechanized army's counterattack At this time, the Soviet troops blocking the advance of the Chinese 1st Panzer Group blocked this gap, in addition to the mechanized 15th Army commanded by Karl Biedro (which had previously suffered heavy losses in the battle with the Chinese 11th Panzer Division), which had been severely weakened in the previous battle, there were also the mechanized 8th Army (commander Major General Ryabishev) and the 9th and 19th Mechanized Corps, which had just arrived on the battlefield. For these 3 armies, the process of their transfer was a disaster. _Take, for example, the 8th Mechanized Army. At the beginning of the war, the army had 858 tanks (including 200 "T-34" tanks and 171 KV heavy tanks), which exceeded the strength of any army in the Soviet army except for the 4th mechanized army. But it was also the one that moved the farthest away in border battles. From the beginning of the war to the present, the mechanized 8th Army was exhausted by the conflicting orders of the higher commands. It marched 80 kilometers to the west of the city of Sanda on the orders of the 26th Army, and then to the east of Cherkar; And after being assigned to the 6th Army, the army marched to Nisivov according to the instructions of the new superiors; Immediately afterwards, the 8th Mechanized Army, under the direct command of the command of the South-Eastern Front, quickly rushed to the Orsk region to assemble. On the evening of 5 April, after advancing to the starting point of the above-mentioned attack, the mechanized 8th Army had already marched more than 400 kilometers under the constant attack of Chinese aircraft, and in the process lost about 50% of its tanks and artillery, and the remaining tanks were about to run out of fuel. The corps commander, Major General Ryabishev, later wrote in the operational report: "Where the tank divisions passed, a large number of breakdown heavy tanks were dropped everywhere. ”

The 9th and 19th Mechanized Armies suffered much better than the 8th Mechanized Army in the transfer. The mechanized 9th Army, which lacked transport vehicles, was able to complete the march only thanks to the fact that its commander, Rokossovsky, boldly removed all 200 reserve vehicles of the Front on the first day of the war. If we take into account that the general, who had been persecuted, had just recently been released from the prison of the NKVD (where he had several teeth knocked out), it is impossible not to admit that this man was indeed "daring". In his memoirs, the Soviet general wrote: "On the march, I looked sadly at our old 'T-26' tanks, 'BT-5' tanks and a small number of 'BT-7' tanks. I understand that they can't withstand long battles. To make matters worse, the number of such tanks is only 1/3 of the number of units (285 old tanks). And look at the motorized infantry to which our tank division belongs! There is no vehicle for the preparation of regulations. And since it was nominally motorized, there were neither carriages nor horses. ”

Despite the huge losses, extreme fatigue of personnel, and severe wear and tear of the various armies in the process of mobilization, due to the tense situation, the command of the Southeastern Front not only did not give these mechanized corps any time to prepare, but ordered the mechanized corps to take immediate counterattack actions. According to the plan, the 9th and 19th mechanized armies were to be east of Kustannay; The 8th and 15th Mechanized Armies were to the north of Brody and to the northeast; From northeast of Cherkar, the 4th Mechanized Army launched a counterattack against the advancing Chinese armored forces. Since the necessary contacts between the above-mentioned armies could not be obtained, there was naturally no tactical coordination, and the armies were in fact fighting alone in the counterattack.

The counterattack of the 8th Mechanized Army under the command of Major General Ryabishev was of particular importance throughout the operation, and its success or failure was related to whether it was able to stop the attempts of the Chinese 1st Panzer Group to divide the Southeastern Front. For this reason, Zhukov personally inspected the headquarters of this army on 3 April, and he was well impressed by the high morale displayed by the commander and staff officers of this army during the air raids by the Chinese army. Although the army lost about half of its tanks on the march, it still drove about 400 into battle, including 30 to 40 "KV" heavy tanks. Despite its shortcomings, it is still a force to be reckoned with.

In the early morning of April 6, the 8th Mechanized Army was deployed on a frontal area about 22 kilometers wide, facing the 16th Armored Division of the Chinese Army (about 140 tanks). The 16th Armored Division is a new division formed on the basis of the original 16th Infantry Division, and the commander of this armored division is Major General Zeng Yi. At this time, through reconnaissance planes hovering in the air at all times and close reconnaissance by ground forces, this experienced commander of the Chinese armored forces had understood the intentions of the 8th mechanized army of the Red Army and was fully prepared. His opponent, Major General of the Red Army, Major General Ryabeschev, who had almost no source of intelligence, could only force an attack when the enemy situation was unknown and ammunition and fuel were insufficient. And for unexplained reasons, his mechanized corps had to hand over part of its forces to the command of brigade commissar Pobel, who was very incapable of commanding large-scale operations.

At 9 a.m. on April 6, the Soviet 8th Mechanized Army, which had the advantage in the number of tanks, launched an assault, only to encounter a river that was not wide, but both sides were swampy. Since the Soviet troops, who launched a hasty attack, did not conduct topographical reconnaissance before the battle, the mechanized 8th Army did not know that such a river was in front of it. But now that the fighting has begun, it is no longer possible to re-select the area of departure for the offensive. The commander of the 8th Mechanized Army, Major General Ryabishev, had to send a motorized detachment to occupy the north bank of the river in order to cover the crossing of the tank troops.

Of course, the Chinese, who were always in control of the movements of the Soviet army, did not miss this favorable opportunity. The artillery units of the 57th Infantry Division, which coordinated with the 16th Panzer Division, quickly organized a fierce fire attack, and rows of heavy artillery shells whizzed in to destroy a large number of Soviet tanks crossing the river. At the same time, the Soviet army's vanguard tank unit and the 16th tank company of the Chinese armored division had an encounter, and the scale of the battle immediately expanded. The Soviet tank gunners watched in amazement as the Chinese army's new "Gray Wolf" tank continued to advance without caring after being riddled with bullet marks by them. However, in this battle, the Soviets still claimed to have destroyed and captured 8 Chinese tanks, eliminated 2 Chinese motorized battalions, and advanced 4 to 12 kilometers.

As a result of the long march, the Soviet tanks were almost depleted of fuel. In the air, the attacks of the Chinese 4th Air Force on the mechanized 8th Army, which was barely supported by a single Soviet aircraft, continued to cause the troops of the army, especially the 12th Tank Division on the right flank, to lose a large amount of equipment and personnel, and even the commander of the army, Major General Ryabesev, himself was seriously wounded in the air raid and had to be replaced by the deputy commander.

In contrast, the offensive of the 8th Tank Division on the right flank of the 34th Mechanized Army was relatively smooth. With the powerful firepower and solid armor of the "KV" heavy tanks, the division desperately broke through the positions of the Chinese troops, and then directly threatened the passage of the Chinese armored forces. Faced with a critical situation, the Chinese reacted quickly. They concentrated the 90 mm anti-aircraft guns of the 1st Motorized Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battalion attached to the Air Force near the bridges that the Soviet troops had to pass, and destroyed many Soviet tanks (the Chinese claimed to have destroyed 30 to 40 of them) without infantry cover and without tactical coordination, thus stopping the offensive of the 34th Soviet Tank Division.

That night, the offensive was seriously frustrated, and the 8th mechanized corps of the Red Army, which had suffered heavy losses, was forced to withdraw from the battle. At 4 a.m. on April 7, the Southeastern Front reached the corps with an order to allow it to retreat in general. However, less than three hours later, the mechanized 8th Army, which was already in the process of retreating, received an order from the Front to relaunch the offensive, and then the military commissar of the Front, Vashukin, himself came to the headquarters of the army. The grumpy military commissar aggressively told the army commander, Major General Ryabishev, who was already seriously wounded, that if he did not carry out the order to attack, he would be shot. Ironically, at this time, the command of the Front had revoked the order brought by Vashukin, and neither he nor the mechanized 8th Army, which had been able to communicate with its superiors, knew of this new situation. Therefore, in accordance with this order, which was in fact ineffective, the 8th Mechanized Army changed the retreating rear team to the front team, with 25 tanks of the 12th Tank Division as the lead, followed by the 34th Tank Division and a total of 180 tanks of the 12th Tank Division, and launched a new offensive with the last bit of fuel. The long column of Red Army tanks embarked on a desperate journey.

Although the reconnaissance planes of the 48th Panzer Corps of the Chinese Army discovered the regrouping and attack of the Soviet Mechanized Corps, the position of Zeng Yi's 16th Panzer Division was still more than 30 kilometers under the fierce impact of more than 200 tanks (including a large number of heavy tanks) of the opponent, and the supply line of the 11th Panzer Division of its friendly neighbor was in danger of being cut off, while the Chinese 57th Infantry Division was heavily damaged. But the counterattack of the mechanized 8th Army was, after all, isolated: on the flanks of the army, the counterattacks of the other mechanized corps of the Red Army had actually failed, and the remnants of their forces were retreating under the pursuit of the Chinese army, which had air supremacy. Therefore, the above-mentioned progress of the mechanized 8th Army has put it in danger of being alone and about to be encircled.

The danger soon became a reality. With the cooperation of part of the 11th Armored Division, the 16th Motorized Division and 3 infantry divisions transferred from the 14th Motorized Army, the 16th Armored Division of the Chinese Army quickly blocked the breakthrough of the Soviet Army with absolute superiority, and then surrounded the 8th Mechanized Army, which was fighting alone. At this time, after a long period of fighting, the tanks of the 8th Mechanized Army, which could not be replenished, were almost exhausted in ammunition and fuel, and the Soviet army had to bury those tanks without fuel into the ground and use them as bunkers to resist the attack of the Chinese army. Under the siege of the overwhelmingly superior Chinese army, the army could only organize the last batch of armored vehicles to break through desperately. On 29 June, the breakout force was blocked by Chinese infantry, artillery, and tank units. In the brutal battle, the tank on which Major General Mishanin, commander of the 8th tank division of the 12th mechanized army, was ridden by the Chinese army, and Mishanin himself was killed. Commander Ryabishev witnessed the scene of his tank catching fire after being hit.

Despite heavy losses, some units of the already shattered 8th Mechanized Army were able to break out of the encirclement. However, by the time they withdrew from the encirclement, less than 10 percent of the tanks and 21 percent of the armored vehicles remained, and only about 120 of the more than 700 tanks lost were destroyed by the Chinese army. The 4th, 8th, and 15th Mechanized Armies of the Soviet Southeastern Front added up to just over 100 tanks after the counter-assault. By 20 July, the 16th Panzer Division of the 1st Panzer Group had less than 40 percent of its combatants, the 11th Panzer Division had only 40 percent of its troops, and the 13th and 14th Panzer Divisions were only slightly better off than these two divisions.

The strategic retreat came at a time when the mechanized 8th Army was bogged down in bitter fighting and suffering a crushing defeat, and the command of the South-Eastern Front, which had not long ago rejoiced at the temporary victory achieved by the army, was being gripped by an atmosphere of defeat. Despite all the measures taken, the Front Command was unable to get in touch with the 8th Mechanized Army, and the situation with the other mechanized corps was very bad. The counterattack launched by the 15th and 19th Mechanized Armies, after paying a heavy price, had actually been repulsed by the Chinese by 8 April, and the 4th Mechanized Army did not seem to be able to organize any decent offensive.

The grim situation forced the East-West North Army Command to finally realize that the counter-assault on which they and Moscow had high hopes had been a complete failure. Vashukin, who had strongly advocated this assault and actively supervised its execution, lost the momentum of scaring the commander of the 8th Mechanized Army due to a huge defeat, and fell into despair and shot himself. The brutal truth forced the people who were still alive in the Front command to come to their senses, and they finally understood that it was impossible for the war to advance to the enemy's territory. To save the remaining forces of the Front, it was necessary to retreat back. Moscow has finally realized this. Without waiting for the request of the Southeastern Front, the Soviet High Command issued an order for a strategic retreat.

On the night of April 7, the 26th and 12th Soviet armies were ordered to withdraw from the battle under the cover of night. On the night of April 9, Soviet troops in other directions began to fight and retreat, and completely destroyed the bridges along the way, which was the first time since the beginning of the war that the Red Army successfully destroyed bridges on a large scale. On April 10, the city, which had been abandoned by the Soviet army, was occupied by the Chinese army.

On the same day, the South-Eastern Front, by order of the High Command, withdrew from the salient to the "Stalin Line" in the rear. For the Southeastern Front, the precondition for the execution of this order was that they would be able to reach the defensive line before the 1st Armored Group of the Chinese Army under the command of Zhang Zhizhong. At this time, the units of this armored group were rapidly inserting from between the Soviet 5th and 6th armies to the rear of the Soviet troops. For the Soviet army, which suffered heavy losses and had a low degree of motorization, it was almost impossible to outrace this huge Chinese rapid cluster.

Although the situation was unfavorable, the retreat of the Southeastern Front was still successful in comparison with the Eastern Front. In order to enable the 5th and 12th armies, which were further westerly, to maintain close contact with the other forces, the Front ordered the armies to begin to retreat at different times: the 5th and 12th armies on both flanks began on the night of April 10; The 6th and 26th Armies of the Central Committee began on the night of April 11. In order to prevent the penetration of Chinese troops, the Southeastern Front also designated intermediate areas for each group army to be defended.

At the same time, in order to cover the retreat, the 5th Army of the Red Army under the command of General Potapov was ordered to launch a counterattack on the 1st Panzer Group of China from April 11. For this purpose, the army used four heavily attritional corps: the 27th and 31st Infantry Corps, the 22nd and 9th Mechanized Corps, of which the 27th Infantry Corps had only one infantry division and one regiment, and the other division was gone. They were facing the 1st elite divisions of the 5th Chinese armored group.

As in previous counterattacks, the Soviets hurriedly attacked the Chinese without sufficient equipment time (less than a day and night) and without air cover, and the Soviets, who no longer had many artillery and tanks, used Molotov cocktails in large quantities in the battle (many Soviet distilleries have begun to mass-produce this weapon called "Molotov cocktail"), and the biggest progress they made was that the mechanized 9th Army advanced a mechanized 15 kilometers in 3 days, And it was quickly repelled by the Chinese.

But the battle was not without meaning: after withstanding this series of onslaught and onslaught of the Red Army, the General Staff of the Chinese Army felt that the armored divisions of the Northwest Army Group were very unsafe on the flanks without infantry cover. Therefore, on April 11, the 1st Panzer Group temporarily moved to the defense in anticipation of the arrival of the infantry division. At the same time, the General Staff of the Chinese Army also made an error in its judgment of the situation on the entire southern front: although they had found signs of Soviet retreat as early as 9 April, until 13 April, Jiang Baili, chief of the General Staff, believed that the Red Army High Command would not allow the Southeastern Front to carry out a strategic retreat. Constrained by these factors, the Chinese 1st Panzer Group did not drive into the depths of the Soviet army as originally planned, but slowly advanced in a series of difficult engagements with the rear guard units of the Red Army.

(To be continued)