In order to create an assault group, the two fronts covertly carried out large-scale change deployments. Pen~fun~Pavilion www.biquge.info At the Magnushev and Puvavi landing sites of the 1st Belorussian Front, 13,792 artillery pieces and mortars, 768 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated.

At the Sandomierz landing ground of the 1st Russian Front, 11,934 artillery pieces and pursuit guns, 1,434 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated. In order to successfully accomplish the task, the commanders, commanders, headquarters, and logistics organs are required to carry out intense work.

In the army, specialized training and exercises were conducted for commanders of units and detachments. Party and government work with a clear purpose is of great significance.

In order to widely preach among the local population about the purpose of the entry of Soviet troops into the outskirts of Moscow, some of the army groups created groups of Soviet-Polish Friendship Associations. In preparing for the campaign, great attention was paid to the logistical support of the army.

In January-February 1942, 923,300 tons of transport within the Front and Army Group were carried out by the 1st Belorussian Front alone.

This will enable the armies of all sides to have 3 to 4 bases of ammunition, 4 to 5 bases of gasoline and diesel, and 9 to 14 bases of aviation fuel before the start of the campaign, and supplies for 20 to 30 days.

The actions of the various armies in the Vistula-Oder campaign can be divided into two phases. In the first stage (January 12-17), the Soviet army broke through the German defenses, smashed the basic strength of the group in front of it, and created conditions for the development of the offensive in depth, and the second stage (January 18-February 3).

The 1st Belorussian Front and the 1st Russian Front, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front and the 4th Russian Front, quickly pursued the enemy, routed the German battle reserves, captured the Silesian industrial region, and captured a number of landing sites on the west bank of the Oder River.

According to the base camp plan, the various armies were originally scheduled to move to the offensive on January 20. Later, however, the Supreme Command of the Soviet Army, taking into account the situation of the Allied forces on the Western Front and, at the request of the Allied countries, instructed the commanders of the various armies to speed up preparations for the campaign and switch to the offensive from 12 to 15 January.

On January 12, the battle began when the assault group of the 1st Russian Front launched an offensive from the Sandomierz landing site. Two days later, the 1st Belorussian Front launched an offensive from the Magnushev and Puvavi landings.

By the end of the second day of the offensive, the assault groups of the various armies had advanced 25 to 40 kilometers and routed the German battle reserves that had entered the battle. From 14 to 15 January, the German 9th and 17th Field Armies and the 4th Tank Army began to retreat.

By the end of the day on 17 January, the main forces of Army Group "Center" had been routed. The German defense was broken through on a 500-kilometer front, with a depth of 100-150 kilometers.

On January 17, the outer regions of Moscow were liberated. The current task assigned to the two fronts by the base camp of the Supreme Command, that is, the 10-12 days before the campaign, to the Zhikhlin and Mehuv lines (120-180 kilometers in depth), was completed in 5-6 days.

The tank army, tank army, and mechanized army played a decisive role in accomplishing this task, and the speed of their attack reached 30-45 kilometers per day and night, and the distance from the combined army group was 45-100 kilometers (1st Belarusian Front) and 30-35 kilometers (1st Russian Front), respectively.

On 25 January, the armies of the 1st Belorussian Front crossed the Varta River, broke through the Poznan defenses, and by 26 January they were on the front line of Kreutz and Unrustadt.

On 22-23 January, the 1st Russian Front, attacking in the direction of Breslau, reached a section of the Oder between Keben and Operon and forced its crossing in many sections of the river.

After the liberation of Krakow on 19 January, the armies of the left flank of the Front began the battle to seize the industrial region of Silesia.

In order to open the passage of Moscow as soon as possible, the Soviet high command carried out an encirclement maneuver with the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Army, but the Soviet army's encirclement tactics did not work.

After the 1st Belorussian Front and the 1st Russian Front advanced to the above-mentioned areas, the tasks assigned to them by the headquarters of the Soviet High Command were not completed, so the offensive continued.

Between 26 January and 3 February, the 1st Belorussian Front finally broke through the German fortifications, reached the Oder River, and captured several landing sites in the Küstrin area of the West Bank.

The 1st Russian Front had previously liberated the Silesian industrial zone and consolidated the landing grounds seized in the area south of Breslau and Oprun on the west bank of the Oder.

On 3 February, the 1st Belorussian Front and the 1st Russian Front reached the Oder and captured a number of landing grounds on its left bank, thus ending the Vistula-Oder campaign.

The Germans were now entrenched along the Oder. At the same time, the German Army Group "Vistula" was preparing a counter-assault on the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front in Pomerania.

Germany had enough military strength to launch a counterattack against the Soviet army in the Soviet Union, and although the severe cold limited the movement of German armored forces, Germany had a large number of Soviet liberation forces of all nationalities in its hands.

Stalin, in order to break the German counterattack, the Soviet high command decided to carry out the Battle of East Pomerania. In fact, at this time, the Anglo-American alliance had been completely annihilated by Germany, why did Stalin insist on attacking?

It was not that Stalin was stupid, but that Stalin wanted to take advantage of the severe winter cold to rescue the more than one million regular troops besieged in Moscow, and Stalin, who had only a whole army of more than two million, could not stop the German offensive at all after the beginning of spring.

Therefore, Stalin knew that the Anglo-American alliance was finished, and he would continue to launch an offensive in the winter, which was Stalin's last chance, and Stalin could not give up easily.

Soviet troops had reached the Oder and captured a number of landing sites on the west bank. The Germans held East Pomerania with a force of Army Group "Vistula" (2nd and 11th armies, a total of 22 divisions, 4 tank divisions, 2 motorized divisions, 5 brigades, 8 battle groups, 5 fortress garrisons, commanded by Himmler).

By the beginning of February 1942, a gap of more than 100 kilometers had formed between the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts.

The German High Command was preparing to launch a surprise attack on the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front from the north with Army Group Vistula, crushing it north of the Varta River, fortifying it in Pomerania and stabilizing its position in the outer areas of Moscow.

Taking into account the situation at this time, the headquarters of the Soviet High Command decided that the 2nd Belorussian Front would immediately enter the war, and Stalin ordered it to crush the German army in East Pomerania.

…… (To be continued.) )