[Anti-Japanese Iron Blood King] Chapter 779: Japan is going to negotiate peace (ask for subscription!) , ask for a monthly pass, ask for everything! ）

The second negotiation took place in 1939, when Chiang directly directed the negotiations between Du Shishan of the Fuxing Society and the Japanese Kayano Nagachi and Ogawa Heiyoshi in Hong Kong out of consideration for the soldiers. Pen, fun, pavilion www. biquge。 info

At the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, Lao Chiang decided on the policies of "dissolving the Communist Party," "preventing the Communist Party," and "limiting the Communist Party." Against this historical background, on 4 March, he sent a telegram to Du Shishan, head of the Hong Kong office, instructing him to hold "peace talks" with Japan, with the following principles: "the foundation of peace" and "in particular, we must not ignore the actual state of affairs in China before and after the Lugou Bridge incident."

Subsequently, Song Meiling came to Hong Kong for guidance.

In mid-March, Liu Yunlong, Du Shishan, and Xuanye Changzhi began negotiations in room 350 of the Hong Kong Hotel. Liu Yunlong put forward the following conditions: equality and mutual concession; restore the status quo ante to the Lugou Bridge incident; territorial (integrity), sovereignty (independence); (Japan) withdrawal of troops; signing of anti-communist pact; China is in favor of economic cooperation; not to hold accountable the personnel of the Restoration Government and the Provisional Government; A separate agreement was made with Manchuria.

On March 24, former Japanese Minister of Railways Ogawa Hirayoshi arrived in Hong Kong to participate in the negotiations. The Japanese side did not comment on Liu Yunlong's conditions. Early April. Ogawa Heiyoshi put forward a "prerequisite" issue for the peace talks, that is, he demanded that Chiang change the phrase "tolerate the Communists to resist Japan" to "eliminate the Communists and pro-Japanese", first crusade against the Eighth Route Army, and then implement a partial armistice. At the same time, "peace negotiations" began.

This "pre-requisite issue" was raised in the context of the growing anti-Japanese forces such as the Eighth Route Army, indicating that the Japanese side regarded "currying over the Communists" as the basis for a compromise between Japan and Chiang. This is the obvious difference between the content of the Hong Kong negotiations and the previous peace talks. Du Shishan reported to Song Meiling the "prerequisite issue" raised by Xiao Chuan to discuss the Communist Party first, and Song said that it could be handled by secret appointment.

Subsequently, Du called Jiang for instructions, and Jiang replied to "handle it with a secret agreement".

The treacherous Ogawa tested Chiang's sincerity and pointed out: "The content of the plan is extremely delicate and secret, and it cannot be discussed in detail without a face-to-face meeting with Chairman Chiang's confidants and dignitaries. ”

Lao Jiang heard Xiaochuan's request to send Kong Xiangxi or Ju Zheng to Hong Kong, but he was hesitant. Du Shishan prevaricated Xiaochuan: This negotiation was secretly conducted by Jiang Zhi's "descendants". Liu Yunlong is the son of Chairman Chiang's aunt and directly communicates with Chiang by secret telegram. Moreover, Chen Cheng has sent the chief of staff to Hong Kong to explain the preparations for dealing with Yan'an: Shanxi and Shaanxi provinces have 700,000 troops encircling the ****, and the cadets of the military academies have been expelled.

On May 11, Ogawa Hirayoshi sent a direct letter to ******: "In this difficult situation, resolutely do not be confused, such as wielding a quick knife and cutting the mess, this is what this true hero does. "Please send important officials to Hong Kong, or allow Xiaochuan to go to Chongqing with Xuanye to listen to the teaching.

Xiaochuan's secret letter was transferred to Chongqing, and Chiang submitted it to a meeting of the cadres of his descendants for discussion. However, the Yan'an side and the Gui department learned that the Yan'an side demanded that "the lord and personnel wanted" and that Jiang should fulfill the Xi'an anti-Japanese covenant and not compromise halfway.

At the same time, the Gui faction claimed that if peace was negotiated, the Guangxi army would fight alone.

At a time when Chiang was entangled in the issue of dispatching dignitaries, Wang Jingwei's campaign to descend to Japan had already made progress. Subsequently, the Japanese Government made a statement that it would support Wang Jingwei in establishing a government as its policy policy. As a result, Xuanye Nagachi left Hong Kong, and Japan-Chiang negotiations stopped.

Although the two negotiations failed, the main reason was that on the Japanese side, because of the successive victories on the part of the army, the Japanese side had set its posture too high, so that it was so embarrassed that it felt like it was shooting itself in the foot.

Even though we know that it will be difficult, there is no other way but to negotiate peace. Therefore, it was decided by the Imperial Council that the intelligence department would first send an officer of the rank of Dazuo or below to have limited contact with the Chinese government. If the Chinese government is sincere about the peace talks, then the two sides will negotiate at a higher level.

But the peace talks must be swift, and must not be tied to the government of China, because the empire will not be able to drag on for long.

Under the instructions of the Japanese high-level, the Japanese Suzuki Zhuo Nakasa and Song Ziwen's brother Song Ziliang secretly met in Hong Kong, and the Japanese side began contact with Chongqing.

Prior to this, in mid-December, Suzuki Nakasa had requested a meeting with Soong Ziwen's brother Soong Ziliang through the mediation of Professor Zhang Zhiping of the University of Hong Kong, but Soong Ziliang refused on the grounds that he needed his brother's consent. And this time it was Song who took the initiative to request the talks, so Suzuki Nakasa believes. This may be a reflection of the intentions of Song Ziwen or the Chongqing government.

But in fact, what Suzuki Zhuoer didn't know was that the person who met with him was not the real Song Ziliang, but was pretended to be an agent of the Military Administration.

As a matter of fact, not only did the Japanese side have misgivings about the peace talks, but the Nationalist Government also had doubts about the peace talks with Japan.

With the first two peace talks, Lao Chiang was not very enthusiastic about the Japanese request for peace talks, on the one hand, because he thought that the Japanese had a great appetite and that Lao Chiang's current position in the Nationalist Government could not satisfy his huge ambitions at all.

Moreover, once he made peace with the Japanese army, he himself would face tremendous pressure from both inside and outside the country, and even fall because of it.

Secondly, the performance of the Japanese army on various battlefields is far less than that when the war first began, and the Kuomintang troops have the ability to compete with the Japanese army in some local battles, which also allows Lao Chiang to straighten his waist and speak.

The most important thing is that making peace with Japan is fundamentally contrary to the anti-Japanese strategy formulated by Jiang Baili and others for him before the war, and in Jiang Baili's words, the ultimate outcome of letting the tiger return to the mountains is to raise the tiger for trouble.

Although Lao Chiang was not very active in the peace talks proposed by the Japanese side, it does not mean that Lao Chiang was not moved; on the contrary, Lao Chiang had already had ideas about the peace talks, but the Japanese side has not been able to do so.

In fact, Lao Chiang and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang consortium that supported him cared about the legitimacy of his regime's rule in China, and most importantly, that it could be accepted and supported by the West. Therefore, as long as the Japanese side does not undermine this point, everything else can be discussed, including national sovereignty.

Before the "77 Incident," Japan occupied part of Shandong, northeast China, and violated the sovereignty of Shanghai and other places, and the old Chiang regime not only did not "turn its face" with Japan, but also continued to be "friendly" with Japan, allowing the proportion of its investment and trade volume in China to rise, and even suppressed domestic anti-Japanese words and deeds, allowing Japanese spies to run rampant in China, and allowing Japan to invest in and even control China's iron ore and other strategic industries. After the incident, he never took the initiative to launch an offensive with the purpose of "returning my rivers and mountains".

Now the threat of the Japanese is not small, but in Lao Jiang's view, the domestic threat is also huge, not to mention that the dying **** that has been beaten has been beaten after several years of development, the number of its regular troops has reached four or five hundred thousand, let's just say that the little guy who has risen in the north has made Lao Jiang often wake up from his sleep.

Although the little guy is young, he is not small in ambition, and the army of hundreds of thousands of people is not an opponent, even the Japanese army is a cut below the boss.

The most important thing is that the little guy has the support of the United States and the Soviet Union, which even he cannot compare with as the chairman of the committee. After several battles, Lao Jiang could see that he had no way to take the Suicha Military Region at all.

It is precisely because of these concerns that Lao Jiang actually hopes for peace talks the most. The main reason why he was not active this time was that the two peace talks on the Japanese side made Lao Chiang extremely ugly. Instead of reaching any effective agreement, they admitted to the commotion.

In addition, the person sent by the Japanese side this time is only a small army lieutenant, and the rank of Chinese is just a lieutenant colonel, can a small infantry battalion commander decide the war and peace between the two countries? The answer is obviously no, which is why Lao Jiang behaves so negatively.

Even so, Lao Chiang still did not completely reject the Japanese side. Instead, he ordered Dai Li to deal with the matter and asked him to send agents to pretend to replace Song Ziliang to negotiate with the Japanese side.

At the same time, Lao Jiang quietly released the news, wanting to test Ma Zheng's attitude, after all, most of the north is now decided by Ma Zheng, and his Jiang someone's order in northern China is not comparable to a military order from the Suicha Military Region Headquarters. (To be continued.) )