General Reinhardt's 6th SS Panzer Corps on Guderian's right flank is making slow progress today. The 20th and 21st Panzer Divisions pointed to the confluence of the Metz and Maas rivers. Part of the reason for the slow progress was yesterday with the 2nd Panzer Division. Another reason was that the follow-up infantry divisions had caught up, making the traffic even more chaotic. By noon, it was impossible to figure out the location of the units below the division level, even by radio. Fortunately, they were not subjected to any air raids, and there were no French covering troops on the east bank of the Metz River ahead. By evening, the 20th Panzer Division had crossed the Ardennes Forest and reached the banks of the River Metz (here, the River Metz and the Ardennes Forest are almost directly connected)

In front of General Reinhardt's Panzer Corps was the cavalry of the French 9th Army, which had retreated hastily without permission, which was why they reached the Metz without resistance. The commander of the 9th French Army, General Clapp, immediately realized the seriousness of the problem and ordered the cavalry units to return to their original positions. However, the development of events no longer allows for this. As already mentioned, as a result of their unauthorized retreat, the cavalry cover curtain of the 2nd Army was pushed across the Metz, and now if the cavalry of the 9th Army advances, their own flanks are also lost. By this time, General Clapp had received information that at least one German panzer division was rushing towards his defense. Considering that most of his infantry was still on the road, advancing towards the west bank of the Metz, and had not yet taken position, he ordered all cavalry units to withdraw from the battle, disengage and retreat to the west bank.

By now, the avant-garde operations of the French cavalry units had all ended, and the French high command originally estimated that they could hold out for 5 days, on this basis it was believed that the Germans could only start crossing the river on the 9th day. As a result, the French cavalry unit held out for only two and a half days, and the ensuing forced crossing of the German army was much earlier, which would have serious consequences for the outcome of the battle. It was from this that the pace of the Allies began to lag behind the Germans, and the gap would grow wider.

General Clapp's cavalry units had little problem getting rid of General Reinhardt's Panzer Corps, but in the face of Hort's SS 5th Panzer Corps, the cavalry units suffered great difficulties in disengagement. Flender went fast all the way, chasing and fighting." By noon, groups of unsaddled horses came running back, followed by many wounded horsemen. There was a lot of blood on horses and on people. Many of the horses were already lame and had to shoot them to end their suffering...... "By 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the armored vehicles of Flanders' reconnaissance battalion had reached the east bank of the Mes River. The French units put up a brief resistance, temporarily blocking the reconnaissance battalion. Flender's Panzer Division was adapted from a light division, so there was only one tank regiment instead of the standard two. However, at noon on the 12th, the tank regiment of the backward 18th Panzer Division was also temporarily transferred to his command. By late afternoon, Flender's tank regiment was trying to seize the bridge in pursuit, and both sides showed superhuman valor.

When the German armored vehicles were closely following the retreating cavalry units and preparing to cross the bridge, a British lieutenant pressed the detonation button and did not react. He immediately rushed to the bridge and artificially detonated it. By this time, the 1st German tank No. 4 was almost on the bridge, and an anti-tank shell stopped it. Jumping from the car a German, armed with iron tongs, rushed to the fuse. He was immediately knocked out by the French. Immediately afterwards, the 2nd German tank No. 4 that was heading for the bridge was also destroyed, and the lieutenant had the opportunity to ignite the explosives, and the bridge was blown up. However, the lieutenant was immediately knocked down by the shell and died almost immediately. The cottage 99 did not keep up, which caused the situation where the fourth tank rushed to the front.

Flanders' Panzer Division, having taken full control of the east bank, roughly inspected the river bank. They were overjoyed to discover that a section of the levee near Hauckes had not been completely blown up (the French feared that blowing it would lower the water level and make it easier for the Germans to cross the river). Taking advantage of the darkness of the night, a motorcycle battalion secretly crossed the river, and there were no French troops on the opposite bank. In this way, less than three days after the start of the battle, the Germans had already established positions on the west bank of the Metz River. The smuggling of the Germans at Haucks was quite lucky, first of all, the dense forests hindered the observation of the defenders. Secondly, Hauckes was at the junction of the 2nd and 11th French armies, and in charge of Hauckes was the 18th Infantry Division of the 11th Army, which, according to plan, was supposed to arrive in full on the 14th.

At this time, the division had only six battalions on the west bank of the Metz River, which was very thin. In response to this situation, according to the concerns of General Martin, commander of the 11th French Army, about the Haucks area, a battalion was transferred from the 5th Motorized Division on the left flank of the French 9th Army to temporarily defend Hawks. The battalion received orders on the 11th and arrived at its designated position at 4 p.m. on the 12th. Although they were ordered to defend along the riverbank, they made excuses for not sending troops to the riverbank under the threat of machine-gun fire on the opposite bank, even after dark. This is also the result of the lax discipline of the French ** team seen earlier.

The loose organization of the French army had once again serious consequences, and although the commander of the 5th Motorized Division had already learned of the smuggling of the German army (Flender) at 1 a.m. on the 13th, the situation was not reported to the commander of the 10th Army, General Martin, until 4 o'clock, and the commander of the 9th Army, Clapp, did not learn of this until late on the 13th. By that time, Guderian's offensive at Sedan would attract most of the attention. General Martin had to coordinate the counteroffensive alone.

The French High Command was quite satisfied with the situation today, and most of its attention was still focused on the Belgian direction. In his own words, he spent his day managing the affairs of the organization. Specifically, there were many details, including warning the Maginot Line how to prevent an Emar-style attack. He even planned to transfer the cavalry units of the 9th and 2nd armies to the north to support the 1st Army. However, at 3 p.m. on the 12th, General George's headquarters was alerted by the 2nd Army. In the absence of General George, the chief of staff, General Roden, still decisively ordered the transfer of three divisions from the general reserve to support the Sedang direction. These divisions included the 3rd Panzer Division, the 3rd Motorized Division, and the 14th Infantry Division, all of which were first-class divisions. They will arrive at the front on time on the 14th, exactly one day later than the critical time. In addition, due to the above-mentioned communication reasons, no reinforcements were sent to the 9th Army.

In the middle of the night, the officers and men of the 2nd Army in the Sedang area had no illusions about what would happen the next day. The sound of the engines of countless vehicles on the other side of the river was deafening, and the roads were lined with marching columns with their headlights on, and by this time the German army had abandoned all camouflage. Intelligence had identified the German 17th, 18th, and 19th Panzer Divisions, and the commander of the 2nd Army, General Hunter Zigger, had given an order to the whole army in the evening: every inch of land must be fought, and the honor of commanders at all levels lies in whether they can hold the designated positions. No wavering is allowed, and the Maginot Line is held to the death...... Although General Hunter Zieg was considered one of the most talented commanders in France, the order was still imbued with the spirit of the First World War.

Specifically, the combat readiness of the French 2nd Army was very worrying. The 71st Division, which was part of the French 10th Army, had to travel a long way because of training when it set out on June 10. After two days of forced marching, the division's B-rank reservists were exhausted. By the evening of the 12th, the divisional headquarters of the division had not yet been set up, the communication system was all temporarily set up, and the telephone lines were exposed to the ground. Another division of the French 10th Army, the 55th Division, is also being urgently deployed. The commander of the French 10th Army, General Grandesard, estimated that the army would be ready only by the night of the 13th-14th at the earliest. More crucially, the French commanders at all levels, including General Huntzig, were still skeptical that the Germans would be able to storm with all their might on the second day.

Judging by their own speed, the French estimated that the Germans would be able to cross the river only on the 18th-19th. In terms of artillery, Hunter Zieg allocated two more artillery regiments to the 10th Army, plus the 55th Division itself had twice the normal number of artillery, so on paper, the French army in front of Sedang had 140 heavy guns. However, on the night of the 12th, part of the French artillery in front of Sedan retreated without authorization, and as a result, it was unable to maintain the advance line of the German army and continue firing.

On the night of the 13th, the German command structures at all levels had already determined that Guderian would launch the main attack tomorrow. However, no one expected that Flender, who was only responsible for the flank cover task, would also play his offensive no less.

At 3 o'clock in the morning of the 13th, Flender and his lieutenant came to the river to observe the situation. Before he could reach the river, the French shelling forced him to get out of the car and walk. A lot of tanks have already been hit, parked on the side of the road. Arriving at the river, he found that his infantry regiment was preparing to cross the river in rubber boats to support the motorcycle battalion that had crossed the river last night. The situation was not optimistic, the 6th Infantry Regiment was suppressed by well-concealed fire on the opposite bank, it was almost impossible to observe the French fire points in the morning fog, and the rubber boats were sunk one by one. To provide cover, Flender ordered several houses in the valley to be set on fire to provide smoke screen cover. At this time, a damaged rubber boat went down the river, and a seriously wounded soldier shouted desperately, and no one could save him.

The motorcycle battalion that had been smuggled last night was holding out stubbornly in the West Bank, and several battalion and company-level officers had already been wounded or killed. Under the leadership of the battalion commander, the battalion seized a high ground and a small village. At this time, all communication with the east bank of the river was cut off by French fire, and behind the battalion there were scattered French troops, while resistance on the opposite side was intensifying. At this time, the Germans had not yet crossed the river with a single anti-tank gun, and once the French used tanks to counterattack, the consequences would be unimaginable. Flender then went to Colonel Bismarck's 7th Infantry Regiment on a No. 4 tank. The 7th Infantry Regiment (later killed in North Africa) crossed the river at Bouvigne, 3 km south of Hauckes. Flender arrived that 1 company of the 7th Regiment had already crossed the river, but heavy French fire prevented them from continuing to cross the river. Flender decided to move tanks and artillery to the river to suppress the French army. At this time, the commander of the Panzer Corps, Hort, and the commander of the army group, Kruger, were at the division headquarters, observing with interest the progress of the river crossing.

…… (To be continued.) (To be continued.) )