Volume 14 The Smoke of Gunpowder Chapter 44 The Last Resort

When dealing with the Russian strategic cruise missiles, the strategic early warning satellite has already pointed its lens at the Barents Sea and several other sea areas where Russian strategic submarines may be hidden, and through the inter-satellite data link, the detection information is sent in real time to the interception satellites over these nearby sea areas. 【】

At this time, among Russia's strategic forces, only the strategic submarine is left.

It must be admitted that Russia's strategic response mechanism is still relatively advanced. As early as the beginning of the month, when the situation in Eurasia suddenly became tense, the Russian Navy activated its emergency plan. Let the broken strategic submarine that is resting at the base leave port urgently, and let the strategic submarine that is returning to sea extend the cruise time to the mouth o day. That is, he returned to the base at the beginning of the eighth year. The Russian Navy was able to react so quickly. First thanks to a new generation of strategic submarines nicknamed "Arctic Storm".

This new-generation strategic submarine, codenamed "Godorsky", which is called the "Arctic Storm" by the Western news media, is also the last Russian strategic submarine. At the beginning of the century. After the start of the comprehensive nuclear disarmament talks, the Russian Navy proposed to develop a new generation of strategic submarines to replace the "God of the North Wind" in order to enhance strategic deterrence, and the actual purpose was to build a new generation of strategic submarines before the entry into force of the "Treaty of London," so as not to be restricted by the treaty, and the additional clauses of the treaty clearly stipulate that after the treaty formally enters into force, the countries can only complete the strategic submarines that have already begun to be built, and can only improve the submarines that have already been built. And strategic submarines cannot be redesigned and built. It is in this way that the "Arctic Storm" went from design to construction. It only took 6 years, which was much shorter than the old years of the "God of the North Wind". What's more. As the world's last strategic submarine before the "London Treaty" officially came into force, the "Arctic Storm" started in one breath. That is, it is built in full accordance with the maximum limiting standards for Russian strategic submarines in the treaty. Although the Arctic Storm was not commissioned at the same time due to the progress of the work, with a six-year interval between the first and last ships, the basic performance of the submarine was broadly similar, and both underwent mid-term overhauls between the juvenile and the year of the Liwu in accordance with the agreements negotiated before the start of the third phase of the reduction. After the start of the third phase of the reduction, countries will not be allowed to make further improvements to the performance of strategic submarines.

In general, the "Arctic Storm" is a very advanced strategic submarine.

At the beginning of the design, this strategic submarine was planned to be equipped with a concave ballistic missile canister, thus becoming the most bomb-carrying strategic submarine in the history of the Soviet Union and Russia, and also one of the most powerful strategic submarines in history along with the American "Ohio" class.

The mother is undoubted, increasing the bomb load of a single boat. Contrary to the trend of the exhibition of strategic submarines. You must know that among the strategic submarines of the same era, the American "Michigan" class had only 2o missile canisters, the Republican O type, the French "Victory" class, and the British "Royal Oak" class only had old missile canisters. The reason why a nuclear power is reducing the number of missile canisters for strategic submarines is simple: the London Treaty only limits the number of nuclear warhead carriers, i.e., submarine-launched ballistic missiles, but does not directly limit the number of strategic submarines. Reducing the number of missiles carried by a single boat will enable the construction of more strategic submarines, which will also increase the overall survivability of strategic submarines. Let's keep it simple. It's about avoiding too many eggs in one basket. Instead, try to pack a limited number of eggs in as many baskets as possible.

The number of missiles a submarine carrying on arrival is more appropriate, and it depends on the actual situation.

In addition to the cost-effectiveness ratio, the most important thing is the limitation of the sea-based strategic forces of various countries in the London Treaty. The United States is a major player in sea-based strategic forces, after the completion of the first phase of reduction. It also retains submarine-launched ballistic missiles, even if it is calculated according to the carrying capacity of each boat! Scatter strategic submarines, distribute these strategic submarines evenly between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, and ensure that half of the submarines are on duty, and there are always three strategic submarines on duty in both directions, as long as any strategic submarine in either direction survives the enemy's sudden attack, it can give the enemy a devastating blow. And the probability that six strategic submarines will be sunk at the same time will not exceed one in a million, so there is no need for the United States to continue to reduce the bomb-carrying capacity of a single boat, that is, there is no need to increase the number of strategic submarines. Although the republic is also a large player of sea-based strategic forces. After the completion of the first phase of reduction, young SLBMs were also retained, but the strategic environment of the Republic was much worse than that of the United States. Strategic submarines mainly operate in the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and the patrol area is very narrow, and the probability of survival is naturally much lower, so it is necessary to increase the probability of survival by increasing the number of submarines. Both France and Britain have very limited strategic forces at sea bases, and after the completion of the first phase of reduction, they will each have SLBMs left. If a blade is deployed on one submarine, only three submarines can be equipped, and to ensure that there is a strategic submarine performing combat readiness patrol tasks in any case, at least the strategic submarine needs to be moved in theory, but the strategic submarine also needs to be overhauled. It needs to be maintained normally, so the Sichuan girl asks for much higher, so the two countries set the bomb load of a single boat to sell coins. Guaranteed dodge"Strategic submarinesEven in the third stage, the two countries each have two strategic submarines, which can ensure that at least one strategic submarine is carrying out combat readiness patrol tasks when the gills are in the gills.

It can be seen from this that Russia insists on increasing the bomb-carrying capacity of strategic submarines, and Kenan has its own special reasons.

As we all know, after the completion of the first phase of the reduction of the London Treaty, Russia will be able to retain phantom SLBMs, which will be the third sea-level strategic force after the United States and the Republic.

According to this calculation, Russia should set the bomb load of a single boat as a force, so as to retain a strategic submarine and deploy several in each of the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet, so as to obtain a comprehensive strategic deterrent.

The problem is that it is not just the London Article that determines the number of strategic submarines as bomb-carrying capacity.

For a country like Russia, which has relatively limited national strength but wants to maintain its status as a military power. When developing strategic forces, especially sea-based strategic forces, which cost enormously, the first thing to consider is not the "London Treaty," but the basic national strength.

Among other things, it is enough that the Russian authorities only approved the construction of the "Arctic Storm". Russia's national strength is not enough to support more sea-based strategic forces.

From this. It is not difficult to understand why Russia wants such submarines to have missile canisters.

In the event of a "Arctic storm." When it comes to setting tactical standards. The Russian Navy also has a number of old strategic submarines, among which is the "God of the North Wind". The class has completed its first comprehensive improvement, its performance has been greatly improved, and it can at least be in service for a year, and this "God of the North Wind" class strategic submarine has its own missile canister and occupies a submarine-launched ballistic missile, so the construction of the "Arctic Storm" class, which carries a submarine-launched ballistic missile, has just used up the "quota" of Tian. More importantly, by the end of the calendar year, that is, after the end of the second phase of the cuts, it will be possible to let the ship "God of the North Wind." The level goes on, and will overlook the "Arctic storm." Converting half of the projectile canisters into cruise missile launchers, or improving them by other means, can save military resources to the greatest extent and reduce state expenditures.

This is also true of the fact that the Russian authorities made improvements to the Arctic Storm before the end of negotiations on the third phase of reductions. Although, according to the outcome of the negotiations, it is not possible to simply convert ballistic missile canisters into cruise missile canisters to cope with the treaty, because there is a big loophole in doing so, that is, when necessary. It will certainly be possible to change the cartridge back in a short period of time, rapidly expand the strategic strike capability, and make the "London Treaty" meaningless. However, the negotiations also clearly stipulate that various countries can reduce the number of SLBMs in the form of major reforms, and that the work of overhauling strategic submarines is not restricted without violating the norms of the treaty, but must be completed before the end of the year. Other words. As long as there is no fear that the strategic forces will be affected. Russia can be slow to deal with the "Arctic storm." Make improvements. In fact, it was possible to reach such a negotiated agreement as a result of the efforts of the Russian authorities.

It can be said that if it were not for the intensification of the arms race, it is quite possible that the Russian authorities would have delayed the improvement of the "Arctic Storm" class until before the field year, and after the calendar year, in order to prolong the "god of the north wind". class of strategic submarines for the duration of service to maintain strategic deterrence capabilities. The mother is undoubted. "The god of the north wind. No matter how long the life of the class is, it is also a kind of strategic submarine that has become seriously outdated. Under the trend of an arms race. At the beginning of the year, the Russian authorities adjusted their plans to advance the improvement of the "Arctic Storm" class. Although this will reduce Russia's strategic deterrence capability in previous years. However, it will be able to acquire the full strategic deterrence capability after two years.

Since it has been valued by Godo, improve the natural gold surface thoroughly.

To put it mildly, in order to improve the performance of the only strategic submarine in sight, the Russian authorities basically rebuilt the strategic submarine in the name of improvement.

According to the information published by the Russian authorities. The improved "Arctic Storm" class strategic submarine has only a common rate with the pre-improved one. Other words. The submarine's bowing parts have been changed, including the power system, propulsion system, pressure-resistant shell, missile launch system, and even part of the keel, while the main parts that have little to do with the main performance of the submarine are retained, such as the high-temperature steam stove The ship uses high-temperature steam of hundreds of degrees Celsius for cooking. It will not use natural gas or liquefied gas, the living quarters of officers and soldiers, recreational facilities, and so on, as is the case at home.

Complete the improved "Arctic Storm." In addition to reducing the displacement by many tons, the other properties of the stage have been substantially improved compared with before the improvement. For example, the maximum diving degree is increased from the witch festival to the knot, the maximum diving depth is increased from the persuasion meter to the persuasion meter, and the maximum self-sustaining force is increased from the force day to the day. Even the performance of the SLBMs carried has improved, in fact, the new SLBMs have been specially developed for them, but in order to avoid criticism, the Russian authorities still continue to use the number concave, the maximum range has been increased from the enigma 4,000 kilometers to the old coffee kilometer, and the throwing capacity has been increased from the old ton to the knife ton.

Obviously, the key is not in submarines, but

Like strategic bombers, strategic submarines are actually carriers of missiles. There are no missiles. There is no value in strategically landing.

In the Russian Navy, the SLBM equipped for the "Arctic Storm" is officially designated as an improved model, while the Russian missile industry complex, which developed and produced the missile, is officially designated as the fourth distillation and is a completely new designation. It is precisely this that the Western news media gave the missile the designation. And not according to the naming conventions of the Russian Navy, which is called the Chuanzhong.

For this kind of SLBM with a mass of 1 ton, the maximum range of up to 1,000 meters and the maximum throwing capacity of knife tons are enough to prove that Russia has good SLBM technology. You must know that during the same period, the US Navy's "Thunderbolt" 7 submarine-launched ballistic missile had a self-weight, a range of 4,000 meters, and a flying ton throwing capacity, while the Republic Navy's submarine-launched ballistic missile had an ugly weight, a mileage, a 1,000-kilometer force, and a throwing capacity of tons, which were not much higher than those of Russia.

Among the two indicators of range and throwing ability. The layman pays more attention to the former, while the insider pays more attention.

For a country like Russia, the point of continuing to increase the range of SLBMs after reaching 4,000 meters is not obvious. Although continuing to increase the range can also improve the missile's penetration capability, such as using range. A ballistic missile with a range of only 1,000 kilometers can be used to lower the trajectory and shorten the flight time, while a ballistic missile with a range of only 1,000 kilometers can only be thrown high and is more likely to be intercepted. However, in the face of a national strategic defense system with strong interception capability, the benefits of shortening the flight time are obviously not as obvious as the benefits of bringing a few more decoy warheads. And to carry more decoy warheads, it is necessary to increase the throwing ability.

As a retaliatory weapon, the warhead yield of SLBMs has always been very limited, generally around 2o tons and only old 10,000 tons. The immediate benefit of reducing the yield is the reduction in the mass of individual warheads, which allows them to carry more warheads with the same throwing capacity. It is precisely for this reason that SLBMs tend to carry a higher number of warheads than land-based ballistic missiles of the same period, such as at the beginning of the century. The US Navy's "Trident" can carry a maximum of 10,000 tons of nuclear warheads, while the "Militia Field" can only carry 3 nuclear warheads of the 10,000-ton class. Although the London Treaty clearly stipulates the number of warheads for SLBMs. After the start of the third stage of the cut, SLBMs will be able to carry up to 3 sub-warheads, but with the same throwing capacity, this means that more decoy warheads can be carried. In essence, the penetration efficiency of SLBMs has been improved.

In the case of carrying three nuclear warheads of out of 10,000 tons, it can also carry a total of 10,000 tons of decoy warheads, and the mass of the decoy warhead is generally one-third of that of the real warhead, and the inertia loss caused by the reduction of mass mainly depends on the increase of the miniature booster engine, so it can also carry about one decoy warhead. Compared to not being equipped with a decoy warhead, but carrying 6 real warheads. Under the condition that the enemy's strategic defense system has a certain probability of interception, at least the probability of ensuring the successful penetration of a warhead has increased by a factor of two.

It can be said that if Russia can make greater progress in the miniaturization of warheads, or make a breakthrough in miniature booster rocket technology, make real warheads or decoy warheads smaller, and let the taper carry more decoy warheads, its penetration probability can be greatly improved.

Even so. Russia's strategic submarines can also put a huge strain on the national strategic defense system of the republic.

Look at the total number of missiles that strategic submarines have. If all of them are launched into the air, they will be able to throw warheads that are difficult to distinguish between real and fake. What's more. In order to ensure that some warheads can smoothly penetrate the defense and explode over the enemy's homeland, it is very likely that Russia's submarine ballistic missiles will use the "suicide open path" method of penetration. To put it simply, it is to let some real warheads detonate in outer space, destroy interceptor satellites in low-earth orbit through the strong electromagnetic radiation generated, paralyze the enemy's strategic defense system, and let some real warheads equipped with electrosulfur shielding systems smoothly penetrate defense. Because strategic submarines are the last force to counterattack, not to mention Russia, even the republic's SLBMs have a similar penetration mode. In this way, if you want to thwart Russia's strategic counterattack without fail, you have to shoot down the SLBM before it flies out of the atmosphere. The reason is very simple, even if a nuclear warhead explodes in the atmosphere, because the atmosphere itself absorbs electromagnetic radiation, and the ionosphere can also shield some wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation, the impact on intercepting satellites is not very large, at least it cannot achieve the purpose of paralyzing the strategic defense system.

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles are the same as land-based ballistic missiles. After the shot, it only takes tens of seconds to leave the atmosphere.

To complete the interception mission in such a short time. The usual means of interception are certainly not realistic, and we must find another way to use more effective means of interception!