In order to cooperate with one of the actions, the lead stone points. The Air Force of the Republic of China dispatched hundreds of scheming to provide air support for the 9th and 2nd Combat Units, which were storming Shekhba.

Unlike in the past, this time all combat aircraft went to the skies over the battlefield to provide support to ground troops.

That is, at that time hundreds of fighters appeared in the air on the Southern Front. Because fighter planes will activate the active electromagnetic interference system when carrying out close air support missions, and there are also electronic warfare planes specially designed to deal with the enemy's air defense system following behind the fighter group, so when the fighters of the Republic Air Force "break through," the air defense system of the US-Israeli coalition can only judge that many fighters have appeared over the battlefield, but they cannot judge how many fighters there are and the accurate flight information of these fighters.

It can be said that the situation on the battlefield at that time was very chaotic.

Because it was not expected that the Air Force of the Republic would use such a "fight." So the US-Israeli coalition forces simply did not have time to adjust their air defense deployment. When the battle began, only the Koubang Office rushed to the battlefield in time. Without waiting for these US fighters to aim at Xiaofeng of the Republic Air Force, the little thugs who were carrying out escort missions killed them, and used a batch of interceptor missiles with anti-radiation attack capabilities to make Hui turn off the fire control radar, thus turning a line-of-sight air battle into a line-of-sight air battle, and also making it impossible for the US fighters to pose a threat to the Republic fighters on attack missions.

Of course, the Koguchi group did not leave the field of vision of the US-Israeli coalition.

Threatened by short-range air defense systems, especially individual air defense systems, the Xiaokou aircraft group has been operating at medium and high altitudes above the mouth meter, and even when dropping bombs to attack ground targets, it has not reduced its flight altitude to less than 4 meters. As a result, long-range warning radars deployed in the northwest of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can appear and track the Philippine fleet hundreds of kilometers away. Because these radars are located about a kilometer away from the area of engagement, and the Kingdom of Jordan is in between, the electronic warfare aircraft of the Republican Air Force cannot interfere with them.

The point is, it was not just the thugs who were active on the battlefield at that time.

It can be said that the US-Israeli coalition forces that focused on bombing Shekhba were using it as a cover for attacking the US Navy fleet.

About a few minutes after the bombardment began, it was about a good point. A small Mach 3 from Lake Grande Bariel entered the Jordan Valley and was expected to reach the Dead Sea in the old minutes and enter the Gulf of Aqaba around the ugly point.

In order not to be revealed, the fleet not only reduced the flight altitude to a minimum, but all fighters turned off radio equipment, including the radio altimeter, and the automatic control system relied entirely on the three-dimensional stereoscopic images generated by two low-light cameras mounted on the wingtips to control the flight altitude. In order to achieve absolute concealment, the hundreds of fighters all adopted a terrain matching navigation system, that is, before taking off, they obtained a digital map of the route provided by the reconnaissance satellite, and during the flight, the computer will automatically compare the digital map taken by the low-light camera with the digital map provided by the satellite. Thus determining whether the aircraft is on the correct route. In this way, the aircraft does not emit any detectable signals during the flight.

Of course, terrain matching guidance isn't a surprise.

As early as the early days of Secretary Li, the United States developed the "Tomahawk small." Cruise missiles use this type of guidance. Later the United States reacted to the "Tomahawk." The main reason is that the preliminary preparation of the terrain matching guidance mode is very complicated, and the input program alone takes many hours, so it can only be used to deal with fixed targets.

After the advent of the forced electromagnetic interference system, the terrain matching guidance method reappeared.

In fact, many missiles with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers and low ballistics have adopted the terrain matching guidance method, but they have not yet been used on a large scale on fighter jets.

In any case, the fighter is not very affected by forced electromagnetic interference.

Of course, no one would have imagined that more than four fighter jets would fly to the Gulf of Aqaba along the Syrian-Israeli border, at least not by the air defense units of the Israeli Air Force.

First of all, what are these fighters doing in Yaohba Bay?

Although Israel has a port in the Gulf of Aqaba, Port Eilat, the supplies provided by the United States to Israel and the troops sent to Israel are disembarking at the port in the direction of the Mediterranean Sea and will not go to Eilat.

Of course, one would have thought that the target of this group of aircraft was the American fleet, which was operating in the Red Sea.

The problem is that after attacking the American fleet, "more than four fighters will not want to return home." To be precise, as long as the authorities of the republic do not want to fight to the death with the United States for attacking the American fleet, they will not be able to return the old fighter jets to the air base near the theater of operations. That is, although the republic has air bases in Sudan, these bases are under the surveillance of American reconnaissance satellites. If it's just a few fighters, it's easier to take advantage of the time between the passage of American reconnaissance satellites to land and refuel and then fly to other air bases. The problem is that "it is impossible for more than four fighters to complete this series of operations in half an hour, and they will inevitably be discovered by US reconnaissance satellites."

After the fleet was suddenly attacked, the fool would also link the four or more bull fighters that suddenly appeared in Sudan with the "murderer", even if the United States did not have direct evidence, it would be impossible to eat the multitude

It is precisely because of this that the US Navy and the Israeli Air Force are not overly worried.

To be precise, it was the US Navy that did not consider the republics capable of attacking their fleets.

In the Middle East, the United States has the largest number of allies, in addition to Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and most other Arab countries are allies or quasi-allies of the United States, and even pro-China countries such as Egypt have very good relations with the United States. What's more, the United States has military bases in many Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia's "Prince Sultan Air Base", which is the largest comprehensive military base of the United States in the region. Although many Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan, have maintained absolute neutrality in this war. That is, it does not provide any assistance to the warring parties, but the United States is still able to use military bases in these countries to build an invisible line of defense.

Of course, there is another issue that the US authorities will consider.

As allies and quasi-allies of the United States, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries do not support the United States, but in fact support the republic. In this case. It is unlikely that the authorities of the republic will be able to impose higher demands on these countries. In fact, the republic also did not make higher demands on the Arab countries, and did not even put pressure on Egypt. In this way, the authorities of the republic will certainly restrain military operations on the front line, at least to ensure that the combat forces of the republic will not encroach on neighboring countries, and will not even send combat aircraft into the airspace of neighboring countries.

So far, the authorities of the republic have behaved very cautiously in this regard.

In a certain sense, allowing the group of planes attacking the US fleet to pass along the border between Jordan and Israel is to avoid violating Jordan's airspace, or to play a sideshow.

As a result, it will not be possible for the fleet of the Air Force of the Republic to return to the air base located in Syria.

You must know that even if these planes took off from an air base in southern Syria and carried long-range anti-ship missiles with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers to attack the US fleet operating in the Red Sea, they would fly in a straight line at a distance of more than 1,000 kilometers, and the actual round-trip range must have exceeded 1,000 kilometers. Even a small fighter with a small fighter, carrying 2 anti-ship missiles, will not have a combat radius of more than 10,000 kilometers. From the perspective of the US military, it is better to attack the US fleet operating in the eastern Mediterranean than to bother with attacking the US fleet operating in the Red Sea. In fact, the U.S. Navy attaches great importance to the security of its fleet operating in the eastern Mediterranean, not only allowing heavy fighters deployed in Malta to provide air defense support for the fleet, but also focusing on monitoring all air bases within a kilometer range of the fleet's Wanli that can deploy combat aircraft of the Republican Air Force, and ensuring that intelligence is refreshed every ugly minute. According to the estimates of the US Navy, in order to take out a fleet with a large aircraft carrier, it is necessary to dispatch 34 to 4 fat combat aircraft. Even if these aircraft were to be deployed at an old airfield, it would not be possible to complete the entire work from preparation to take-off in a matter of minutes. That is, the US Navy receives intelligence in a timely manner as long as the Republican Air Force intends to deal with the US fleet operating in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Of course, the US Navy has not forgotten about the strategic strike force of the Air Force of the Republic.

In fact, previous examples of real combat have proven that when striking aircraft carrier battle groups with several large air defense warships, the combat effectiveness of strategic bombers far exceeds that of tactical fighters. Because bombers often use high-pitched anti-ship missiles with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers and a range of more than Mach 1,000 when attacking warships, the strikes are more sudden and can tear through the fleet's air defense net. More importantly, strategic bombers are deployed on the mainland of major countries and cannot appear on airfields in the theater of operations, so it is unlikely that they will be able to deal with strategic bombers in the same way as tactical fighters.

For the US Navy, the only way is to keep a close eye on the strategic bombers of the Republican Air Force.

Because the Republic and the United States are already at de facto war, U.S. intelligence will monitor the Republican Air Force's strategic bombers, even if there is no need for the U.S. Navy.

Of course, the so-called surveillance is not just about staring at the take-off and landing activities of strategic bombers.

As mentioned earlier, the US strategic reconnaissance satellites are now flashing in the eastern part of Iran. After obtaining this information, the U.S. intelligence system will immediately compare the following battle reports, that is, which areas have been bombed, and the distance between the bombed location and the flash area, and deduce whether the bomber has completed the bombing mission. Because reconnaissance satellites cannot be used to track the bombers that are flying, and tactical reconnaissance means cannot monitor bombers thousands of kilometers away from the battle line, the only way to determine whether the bombers have returned home is whether the bombers have completed their bombing mission. Of course, intelligence agencies will compare the various information obtained before and after to determine exactly which area the bomber hit the target.

It can be said that this is a very cumbersome early warning mechanism.

As we all know, the more cumbersome things are, the more likely they are to go wrong.

Because about a few minutes after the flash appeared, Malatya, which was 1,000 kilometers away from the flashing point attacker, was hit by thousands of missiles, so the US intelligence department immediately concluded that the bombers that launched missiles over eastern Iran were going to hit the US-Turkish coalition forces in Malatya.

It is precisely in this way that at the time of the introduction of 3o points, the two fleets of the US Navy relaxed their vigilance.

Needless to say, this negligence was very fatal.

Because the strategic bombers of the Republic Air Force launched missiles over the northwest of the Republic mainland, and not over the eastern region of Iran, they are calculated according to the flight degree of Mach. It would take about a kilometer to reach the U.S. fleet operating in the Red Sea.

If the missile takes a changed course, it will take about old minutes to get into the range of air defense interception of the American fleet.

In fact, there is a big problem here.

Based on the missile fragments recovered by the US Navy from the warring waters after many years, it can be determined that the first to attack the US fleet was the Reputan Navy's Courageous long-range anti-ship missiles. According to the relevant information released by the authorities of the republic, the prototype of this anti-ship missile is actually the investment and development of the Ran Air Force, which is officially equipped with strategic cruise missiles of the strategic aviation force at the bottom of the four bases. It can be seen from the official equipment room that this is a strategic weapon limited by the "London Treaty", and because it will be completely destroyed before the end of the second round, it is impossible for the Republic Air Force to purchase it in large quantities. Of course, if the Air Force of the Republic had purchased it in large quantities, it would have managed to convert it into a weapon of the "tactical" class. In other words, distillation is actually eliminated from the Air Force.

As a strategic weapon, the performance of 3 Mi is beyond doubt. According to the relevant information in the yearbook of weapons and equipment published by the Republic at the end of the year. Bijing is the last strategic cruise missile launched by the Air Force of the Republic of China, and not only has the maximum flight degree reached an astonishing ugly Mach, but because it has passed the first cosmic degree, some people believe that it is a composite ballistic missile that combines the advantages of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, and the maximum range is also more than 4,000 meters, and it can be carried and launched by strategic bombers.

Of course, when used as a strategic weapon, the warhead of the Bijing will not be much larger.

It can be said that this is also the biggest drawback of the 3 relaxation. According to the information published by the Republic, the warhead is a nuclear warhead with an explosive yield adjustable between stew and 10,000 tons. Although no specific signals of the nuclear warhead were announced, according to the US Air Force with similar performance, the Bright Hit Blade Kilogram.

Undoubtedly, when used as a tactical weapon, this warhead is too low in quality.

It is precisely in this way that when the call is turned into a run, the first thing to do is to increase the mass of the warhead. Because the shape of the missile cannot be changed at will, and the total mass cannot be changed at will, the only way to increase the warhead is to reduce the fuel. Reduced range. Of course, in order to ensure the range, the flight can be appropriately reduced. In fact, tactical missiles do not need to break through the enemy's strategic defense system, and the flight degree is not at all necessary to reach about Mach, and the degree of LiMach is enough to break through the air defense network of the vast majority of the fleet.

According to the calculations made by US technicians using the wreckage of the missile, the range of 6 Mi must be within 1,000 kilometers of Wangkou. According to the relevant information published by the Republic. It can also be roughly calculated that the range of distillation is between ugly kilometers and women's kilometers, and it is determined by the degree of flight and flight trajectory. In the case of high ballistics, as well as the cruising flight of the Knife Mach, it is possible to reach the Hungarian Mouth kilometer.

Herein lies the problem, the place where the bomber fired the missile was a kilometer away from the US ship.

That is, the missile must take a short flight course. It also had to fly over several countries that had not entered the war and had long declared strict neutrality, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In this way, the republic has already violated the sovereignty of these countries in the war.

Of course, whether there is a violation of sovereignty is still debatable.

As we all know, the flight altitude of a high-pitched cruise missile that reaches the degree of Limakh is generally above a kilometer, which is the so-called suborbital altitude. In accordance with relevant international law, outer space knows no borders and all States are free to use outer space. The so-called "airspace" refers only to the space of a country in the atmosphere. The question is, is suborbital space outer space, or is it space in the atmosphere? Because suborbital space is a transitional area and is the main area of activity of all aerospace vehicles, the Republic and the United States have ambiguous attitudes on this issue, and both believe that suborbital space should not be counted as territorial airspace.

In this way, the missiles fired by the bombers of those republics did not violate the airspace of the countries along the way.

More importantly, in suborbital space, only strategic reconnaissance satellites deployed in low-earth orbit, that is, reconnaissance satellites equipped with far-infrared detection systems, can display missiles flying at high altitudes, and radars deployed on the ground and satellites will be interfered with by the ionosphere and will not be able to display missiles. As we all know, strategic reconnaissance satellites mainly operate in geosynchronous orbit, and there are very few strategic reconnaissance satellites in near-earth orbit, and these satellites are often sent to monitor extremely important strategic targets and rarely carry out tactical reconnaissance missions. In other words, when thousands of missiles rushed to the US fleet, the US military satellite system and the air defense system deployed in the Middle East did not work.

Of course, in order for a missile to hit a battleship, it had to rush down from a high altitude, and it had to enter the air defense network of the fleet.

With the US air defense warship sounding the air defense alarm, the most representative naval battle began after the Pacific War of World War II, which led to the year of Maeda in the century!