The Mariana Islands Operation Plan of the Japan-US Combined Fleet, officially named "Operation Ma," jointly by the Japanese base camp and Washington, was the brainchild of many people, but its basic outline was the work of the Japanese Combined Fleet's chief staff officer, Kuroshima Kameto. Kuroshima was a theorist who was accustomed to spending long hours in his gloomy cabin meditating. He wrote a manual in which he put forward the tactical theory of the joint Japanese and American fleets using battleships as the main force to conduct a decisive battle of the fleet.

The other staff officers worked out the details of the plan according to their professional division of labor. Rear Admiral Ugaki, chief of staff of the Japanese-American Combined Fleet, who was very energetic and resourceful, had always advocated an offensive against the Ryukyu Islands and gave comprehensive guidance on the drafting of the plan.

The command of the Japanese-American combined fleet, the structure of which is complex. The commander-in-chief is Nimitz, and the deputy commander is Shusan Nagano, a member of the fleet staff, which is the original staff of both sides combined. Although the previous battle of the Coral Sea of Nagano Cultivation Plan was aborted, this time, Nimitz still agreed with the battle plan formulated by the Japanese staff officer and adopted this plan.

However, although this battle plan, that is, the Mariana Islands battle plan, although it was written by the Japanese, it was completely contrary to the thinking and character of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the former commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet.

Yamamoto Fifty-six, in the Japanese Navy, is no less than the emperor in the hearts of soldiers. Many Japanese soldiers asked themselves if a vote had been held among the officers of the Japanese Navy at the beginning of the Pacific War to decide who would lead them as commander of the Combined Fleet. They believe that the vast majority of people will choose Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku.

In fact, later American historians after the war asked a hypothetical question about some officers of the former Japanese Naval Air Force, including many officers of the former Combined Fleet. All of them unanimously replied, "Yamamoto fifty-six."

Yamamoto was one of the main advocates of naval aviation in Japan, so he enjoyed great prestige among naval flight officers. Although Yamamoto himself was not an aviation officer, he was the chief of education of the Kasumigaura Naval Air Force when he received the rank of Grand Admiral of the Navy.

Since then, he has held a number of important positions in naval aviation. At the time, the Naval Air Corps was still in its infancy and was in dire need of a competent leader and advocate. Yamamoto took on the role, showing his extraordinary sharp eye and meticulous attitude in his work.

In Japan, this early stage. Due to the frequent occurrence of crashes. Flying is not particularly appealing. Indeed, many senior naval officers at that time did not even dare to set foot in the plane, if they knew that the plane was going to leave the ground. Until the thirties, Yamamoto's classmate, Admiral Yoshida Zengo, commander of the Combined Fleet, resolutely refused to take the special plane prepared for him.

There are also some high-ranking naval officers. Talk a lot about how important naval aviation is. Young recruits in the Navy are encouraged to join the Air Force. But when it came time to ask their children to become flight officers or their daughters to marry pilots, their enthusiasm suddenly disappeared.

Yamamoto Isoroku is not such a half-hearted person. His belief in aviation is serious and serious. He encouraged his young relatives to join the Naval Air Corps.

Yamamoto's love for pilots did not make him suffer from the same addiction to alcohol as ordinary pilots. He doesn't drink, but likes to gamble on his luck. He was known to be a bold and shrewd player in both bridge and poker. He is a natural gambler with the spirit of "win it all, or lose it all".

If, as many people have said, Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor later embodied the strategy of "winning or losing," then it would be in line with Yamamoto's character. Perhaps, one of the main reasons for the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor was the courage of the gamblers who inspired him to do it.

In addition to his ability to make bold and imaginative decisions, another thing that earned him respect and admiration among the young officers of the Navy was his strong and unambiguous leadership. In this respect, he is unique among admirals.

Perhaps influenced by the British naval tradition, the Japanese Navy from an early age placed great emphasis on instilling gentlemanly manners in officers. Unfortunately, however, this has led to a tendency to equate the attitude of a good gentleman who is not good at presenting himself with a gentlemanly demeanor, and as a result, there are many wise and kind generals, but few true leaders and generals.

The lack of genuine leadership is reflected in many ways. For example, when a fleet or town guard holds an exercise or combat training, the officers often hold a council after the fact, and the commander of the fleet or town guard office presides over such a meeting, but they rarely actively lead the discussion or put forward sharp opinions, so the officers and assistants have no way of knowing whether they are doing the right thing.

In the past, at the Council of the Combined Fleet, Yamamoto always took the lead in the discussion, and if an action was not done properly, he pointed it out and explained what to do after he asked for it. He did not treat his staff as think tanks, but as assistants in carrying out his policies and decisions. His clear instructions made his course very clear, so that his subordinates knew exactly what to do in accordance with the commander's intentions when they had to make their own decisions.

It was precisely because of Yamamoto's strengths that the entire Japanese Navy considered him the most suitable for him to be the supreme commander. Because in war, the fate of the nation may depend on the outcome of one battle, and the success or failure of the battle depends largely on the character and abilities of the Supreme Commander personally.

And rightfully so. Because only by centralizing the power of decision-making can unity of action be ensured, and without unified action, victory is impossible.

It is also because the question of combat operations cannot be discussed at the conference table and decided by a majority, but can only be decided quickly by the commander on the basis of his judgment, but at the same time he should be fully aware that every action, once decided, is irreversible. This requires extraordinary courage and self-confidence on the part of the commander. Yamamoto possessed both of these qualities.

But despite the fact that Admiral Yamamoto had qualities that seemed to make him an unsurpassed supreme commander. The trials of war proved that Admiral Yamamoto also had weaknesses. The obvious evidence is that he insisted on attacking the attack fleet recklessly and without the slightest concession, despite all reasonable opinions that opposed the operation of the Chinese attack fleet in the first place. It cannot but be thought that because he only wanted to prevent air attacks on the Pacific islands, his judgment on the matter of attacking the fleet was paranoid.

If Yamamoto hadn't been overly swayed by this sentiment, he would have shown a lot of flexibility when considering his future strategy.

However, there is no if in the world, and the combined Japanese-American fleet does not have a second Yamamoto Isoroku.

Now, the Allies are in a hurry to plunge into the adventures of the Mariana Islands. It was due to the fact that the Allied top brass was also aware. It is convinced that the balance of naval power between China and the Allies will change in favor of China within a year at most.

Because of the urgency of time, the Allied top brass felt that the only hope of the Allies was a quick victory, so as to induce the enemy to make peace. They hoped that the attack on the Mariana Islands would bring about this decisive battle. The Allied top brass had confided to many admirals and other henchmen that the Chinese Pacific Fleet could be annihilated in the Mariana Islands operation. They intend not to harm the current interests of China. and China set out to test peace.

The Allied top brass believed that it was imperative to seek an opportunity to engage in a decisive battle with the enemy fleet as soon as possible. This judgment is undoubtedly correct.

From a tactical point of view. The Mariana Islands battle plan is an outdated proposition of the faction that advocates a focus on battleships, which is very incommensurate with the top brass of the Japanese-American Combined Fleet, who is said to understand the role of air forces. The Japanese Combined Fleet, which had thought of attacking Pearl Harbor with carrier-based aircraft, did not more quickly and radically reform the formation and tactics of the fleet, making aviation the core of combat forces. This is strange to say the least.

Perhaps the command class of the Japanese-American Combined Fleet has a tendency to be obsessed with the past, or perhaps it feels that old traditional ideas are deeply ingrained and that he is powerless to change them completely at once.

It is often said that war is one in which both sides make mistakes, and victory belongs to the side that makes fewer mistakes. Of course, both China and the Allies have made mistakes, including some that are difficult to explain rationally.

As mentioned above, the Midway operation plan developed by the joint Japanese-American fleet had two main objectives. The first and more limited objective was to occupy Guam as an advance air base in order to detect early enemy forces moving eastward from the Philippines. The second and larger goal is to lure out the Chinese Pacific Fleet, fight it in a decisive battle, and annihilate it.

The Chinese air raids on the Japanese mainland naturally increased the weight of the first objective, but the annihilation of the enemy fleet was still the main purpose of the Guam operation. Nagano and Nimitz and their staff believed that the action against Guam, because it threatened the security of the Philippines, would inevitably force the enemy fleet to respond with all its might. In this way, there will be a situation of "a decisive battle in the Pacific", and this is the concentration point of the Allied naval strategy, as well as the training and preparation of the Japanese Navy for many years.

Judging from the comparison of forces, if the enemy accepts the challenge, there is every reason to believe that the Allies will win. Because at this time the ratio of the number of aircraft carriers was three to one, and the ratio of battleships was six to one.

Because of this great advantage, the Japanese-US Combined Fleet decided to expand the objectives of the Guam operation with confidence, including the simultaneous occupation of important areas in the western part of the Micronesian Islands. But they believe that the permanent occupation of these islands is not necessary, because the threat of Chinese fighters to these places is too great.

However, the strategists of the Combined Fleet estimate that the temporary occupation of these islands would not only destroy the enemy's military installations on the islands, but also protect the northern flank of the fleet's main attack, and contain the enemy's forces, making it difficult to balance the head and tail. Therefore, the general battle plan stipulates that the raiding troops will be withdrawn from Guam, Saipan, and Palikil, and from the beginning of winter to mid-March next year.

In order to carry out this huge two-pronged offensive, the combined Japanese and American fleets decided to devote the maximum number of forces it could muster. With the exception of submarines that are undergoing maintenance and are engaged in attacks on merchant ships in the Indian Ocean, South African waters and in the area of Australia and New Zealand, as well as a number of surface vessels on Australian alert duty, all combat units will be engaged in operations on Guam.

According to the operational plan of the Japanese-US joint fleet, more than 800 ships were dispatched in this operation, including transport ships and auxiliary ships, including 41 battleships, 108 aircraft carriers, 222 cruisers (both light and heavy), 265 destroyers, 121 submarines, and about 7,000 aircraft.

The fuel consumption and sailing mileage of the participating ships will exceed the combined fuel consumption and sailing mileage of the Japanese Navy and the US Navy in peacetime.

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After the on-map exercises and staff meetings on the flagship Musashi. The Musashi sailed from Pillar Island to Pearl Harbor to load supplies and minor repairs. The harbor of this naval base is steaming and full of ships, and small boats carrying supplies shuttle back and forth between the shore and the warships moored in the harbor. Although it was almost summer, the aircraft carriers "Longxiang" and "Hayabusa" assigned to Vice Admiral Xi Xuan's northern forces were conspicuously loaded with a large number of insect repellent potions, clothing, and equipment. It was easy for both the shipboard and the base personnel to guess that part of the force was going to fight on the southern islands.

The commander of the army detachment, Kiyoshi Ichiki, and his staff who participated in the Mariana Islands landing operation came to the Musashi to meet with Chief Nagano and receive instructions on the battle plan. At this point, all the participating units have accepted the combat mission.

The Musashi returned to Midway Island for final preparations for sailing. The next day. Chief Nagano issued a final order stipulating the operational deployment of the Navy's units. in this order. It also includes troop statistics for the Mariana Islands and the Chinese Pacific Fleet.

Mariana Islands area: about twenty-four patrol aircraft, twelve army bombers, and one hundred and twenty fighter jets. Several patrol boats are stationed around the Mariana Islands, and a number of submarines are apparently operating west of the Mariana Islands.

Philippine area: about sixty patrol aircraft, one hundred army bombers and two hundred fighters.

The combat strength of the Navy consists of twenty-four aircraft carriers, two to three escort aircraft carriers, eight super battleships, about one hundred heavy cruisers, and two hundred and fifty light cruisers (anti-submarine destroyers). One hundred and twenty-one destroyers (frigates). The number of submarines is unknown. But no less than two hundred ships are expected.

In addition to the above calculations, according to Japanese spy reports, it is estimated that the defense strength of the Mariana Islands is about 750 marines. Armed with a considerable number of shore guns and anti-aircraft guns. Should it become known that Japan was attempting to attack, the air forces of the Mariana Islands could be quickly reinforced by Philippine forces, and their strength could be doubled. Japanese intelligence also said that enemy aircraft patrolled day and night in a semi-circular arc three hundred nautical miles east of the Mariana Islands.

The judgment of the joint Japanese-American fleet on the strength of enemy aircraft carriers in the Hawaiian Islands is based primarily on the following estimates:

The two aircraft carriers that participated in the air raid on the Marshall Islands have now returned to the lead ship group of the Chinese Pacific Fleet; It is estimated that more than 1,000 of China's 24 aircraft carriers can dispatch fighters.

In addition, considering that China's four huge aircraft carriers may carry China's mysterious jet fighters, China's code name Black Hawk fighters, because of the large aircraft carriers, it is not impossible for such large fighters to be on board. Therefore, once China's Black Hawk fighter formation appears, the Japanese and American alliances must suppress the opponent in numbers; If there are Black Hawk fighters that cannot entangle China, then all carrier-based aircraft will directly attack the Chinese Pacific Fleet, with the core purpose of destroying China's large ships.

At this time, this major sortie was fully prepared. Admiral Nagano and the commanders of the participating units assembled aboard the Musashi and their staff toasted the success of the upcoming battle as they drank rice wine from His Majesty the Emperor on the Musashi.

The launch of the Mariana Islands operation has now reached the implementation stage. The Marine units involved in the battle have been assembled and are ready to sail to their destination.

The second mobile unit of Rear Admiral Kakuji Tsunoda, who was attacking Micronesia, was the first to set off. Tsunoda's flagship is the light aircraft carrier "Ryuchamp".

At noon on November 6, Tsunoda led his troops away from the combined Japanese-American forces and crossed the southwest Pacific to the east. Later that day, in the middle of the night, Tsunoda's troops encountered a thick fog that seemed to be endless. Since none of the warships were equipped with radars and strict radio silence was practiced, it was difficult for the troops to maintain formation.

Even so, the fog is not entirely unwelcome, as it reduces the risk of being spotted by enemy submarines known to be ambushed in the waters east of Micronesia. Officers and sailors were thankful for this, but at the same time they eagerly awaited the day of the air raid on the port of Palikil on 10 November when the fog would dissipate.

The next day, the large forces of the combined Japanese-American fleet began to advance at full speed. There were no signs of detection by enemy submarines.

Many battleship units have not been to sea for five months. During the entire first phase of operations on the Southern Front, battleship units remained in the Hawaiian Inland Sea for rigorous training. In order to play a leading role in the decisive battle with the Chinese fleet in the foreseeable future. The officers and men of these giant warships still believe that their enormous firepower will win future battles.

Now, it seems, they have just had a chance to prove it, and the morale of the crews is high. This expedition was the first battle since the Musashi, which was equipped with the heaviest guns, entered service, and as a result of its participation in the battle, the strength of the troops increased unprecedentedly.

Suddenly, the destroyer on patrol outside reported the sighting of two enemy submarines. The radio spy also reported that a total of six enemy submarines were operating off the coast of the Mariana Islands and four others in the area southwest of the Ogasawara Islands.

Therefore, the anti-submarine ships and aircraft of the Japanese-American joint fleet immediately intensified their anti-submarine activities. It doesn't matter if it's a Japanese warship or an American warship. All were ordered to move on under strict anti-submarine alert. The two units were glad not to have encountered trouble when they passed through the danger zone.

The main force changes its sailing formation. The battleships were lined up in two parallel columns.

Between the two battleships was the light aircraft carrier "Fengxiang", which was busy with the take-off and recovery of anti-submarine patrol aircraft. Eight cruisers and twenty destroyers formed a ring around the battleship, forming a ring of warning at a distance of one and a half thousand meters. Four other light cruisers were located behind the main forces, at a distance of 10,000 meters. In case of enemy submarine tracking. The troops sailed southward and eastward at a speed of 10 knots. Snake every five to ten minutes.

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As the main force on the right flank of the combined Japanese-American fleet. The Second Fleet has a great responsibility.

Saburo Ono was the captain of the aircraft carrier USS Akagi of the Second Fleet, and at the moment he was lying in his cabin, looking at the scenery outside the cabin glass. Stunned.

Naturally, he was preoccupied with the combat activities carried out by this fleet. In particular, I thought of the heavy responsibility shouldered by Vice Admiral Nagumo Tadaichi, the commander of the fleet. His troops fought in the vanguard of this operation. Will Chief Nagumo be able to shoulder the heavy responsibility of Yunyi?

Ono met Nagumo in the 33rd year of the twentieth century. At that time, Ono was a captain captain on the heavy cruiser "Maya" of the 4th Cruiser Squadron of the Second Fleet. In addition to the Maya, the 4th Cruiser Squadron also included Japan's newest cruisers, the Torikai (flagship), the Takao, and the Atago. Nagumo was the chief of the Navy at that time, and he was the captain of the cruiser "Kaohsiung".

Because of his position, Ono had the opportunity to be in frequent contact with Nagumo Navy Osa. He was a technically intelligent and energetic officer, who was among the best of many capable naval officers in the Second Fleet. He belonged to what naval officers called the "red bricks", which means that he held various positions in the Ministry of the Navy.

The origin of this strange name is due to the fact that the buildings of the Navy Province are made of red bricks. He also served in the Military Command Department, as well as as as a staff officer of the Combined Fleet and an instructor at the Naval University. Serving as the captain of a heavy cruiser was the only way to advance to the rank of general. The following year, he would be transferred to the rank of battleship commander and eventually become fleet commander.

The Second Fleet was the forward force in the Combined Fleet combat formation, so Ono's training focused on torpedo attacks and night battles. Nagumo Navy Osa is a veteran of torpedo warfare, and his position as captain of the Second Fleet is the most suitable. Because of the way he excelled in carrying out his difficult tasks, Ono, a junior officer who was simply engaged in flight duty, had feelings of awe and admiration for him. His leadership skills impressed Ono in every way.

His speeches at the Fleet Studies Conference were always logical and instructive, and no one could fail to respect his extraordinary talents. He was frank and sincere, and he was considerate, and he was always willing to help young officers. He is highly respected and fully trusted by Ono.

At that time, sentiment within the Navy for the abrogation of the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty was rapidly rising. In Ono's view, the central government's attitude was weak, and Nagumo Navy Daisa was taking the lead in opposing this attitude. He campaigned among the captains of the ships, lobbying them to come together and urge the treaty to be abrogated at an early date.

As a result of his efforts, a written opinion was drafted, which, after being signed by many officers, was submitted to the Central Committee through the Fleet Command as a reflection of the opinion of the Combined Fleet. This incident was particularly delightful to the young officers of Ono, who were always demanding a tough policy, whatever it might be. Ono's impression of Nagumo Navy Osa at that time was that Ono believed that he would become a great admiral.

Ono and Nagumo Tadashi met again in the 41st year of the twentieth century. By this time he had been promoted to vice admiral and was appointed commander of the 1st Air Fleet. Ono is the flight captain of the aircraft carrier "Akaisei".

Over the years. Especially when Nagumo Tadaichi served as the commander of the 1st Destroyer Squadron as a rear admiral, his prestige grew. Working under him again reminded Ono of seven years ago, and Ono was happy to be his subordinate.

However, it wasn't long before Ono noticed that Nagumo had changed. Ono begins to resentful of his conformist and passive attitude. This is perhaps due to the fact that he is now commanding an aviation force, not his specialty. He was still as passionate and compassionate as he was, but the sassy fighting spirit of the past seemed to have disappeared, and with it his great admiral spirit. On the contrary, he seems to be ordinary, and Ono suddenly realizes that he is old.

In terms of operational command, he does not seem to be as active as before. When making plans. For the most part, he simply agreed to the suggestions made by his staff. His operational staff officer once summed up the situation as follows and said to Ono:

"Anytime. I drafted plans, and he almost always approved them without consideration. For me, it's a lot easier, but it's not. Opposite. The plan I had made was taken without review and then issued as a formal order. It will make me feel uneasy. I believe in myself though. But I'm not so confident that I can make mistakes. I often feel unsure about solving an important problem. Whenever I thought that the fate of the country could be at stake with the stroke of a pen, I almost trembled with fear.

If I had worked under a commander like Rear Admiral Onishi or Rear Admiral Yamaguchi, they would have worked out my plan from all angles. Then return the plan to me along with comments and comments. This way, I can come up with ideas that can also be extreme with more confidence and more freely. ”

Ono fully understood what this staff officer meant, and fully sympathized with him. Unfortunately, this negative attitude is not limited to Nagumo alone, but is a common problem in the Japanese Navy. The commander of the fleet is generally happy to leave the details to the staff officers, and only care about some general outlines.

The execution of the battle plan can hardly reflect the character of the commander. According to the system of the Japanese Navy, those who are qualified enough to become fleet commanders are often appointed to the rank of fleet commanders, but their specific expertise is often not suitable. This situation contributes to the tendency of commanders to rely too much on staff officers.

Nagumo, who specializes in torpedo warfare, holds the post of commander of the 1st Air Fleet, which is an example of this. The professional deficiencies of the officers had to be compensated for by the experts in the staff, and as a result, the influence of the staff officers naturally became very great.

However, this is not to say that staff officers can encroach on the authority of their superiors. The ultimate responsibility for operations always rests with the commander, and every action is decided by him. Indeed, although Nagumo is passive, he does not leave everything to his subordinates. At times, he ignored the advice of his staff and went his own way.

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As the U.S. Combined Fleet was passing through the Central Pacific Ocean that day, the weather began to deteriorate. In the afternoon, the vanguard encountered heavy rain and strong winds. The waves occasionally hit the bow decks of destroyers and cruisers, making navigation so difficult that the speed of the troops was reduced to fourteen knots, and the serpentine movement had to be stopped.

Not only was the weather a good omen, but the Montana radio crew, who was monitoring the enemy's radio communications, intercepted a long emergency telegram from a Chinese submarine heading to the Mariana Islands just in front of the Japanese transport group.

The telegram was sent in cipher, which the Allies could not decipher for a while, but this suggested that the transport ship group could be discovered by the enemy. If this were the case, it stands to reason that the Chinese would have assumed that the convoy would almost certainly sail to the Mariana Islands and attempt to capture the island, since such a large convoy sailed northwest from Midway could not have been seen as a mere supply force bound for the Marshall Islands.

However, the staff officers of the Japanese-American Combined Fleet Command were not worried about this state of affairs. They thought, indifferently, that if the enemy had guessed our intentions, they would have been able to lure the enemy out and annihilate them by sending out their fleets to stop our attack.

On 8 November, the weather in the central Pacific remained severe. Not only the main forces of the Japanese-American combined fleet, but also the aircraft carriers of the Nagumo forces, which are a few hundred nautical miles to the north, encountered strong winds and sometimes rain.

At the same time, the Montana's radio intelligence squad detected signs of Chinese military activity near the Ogasawara Islands, with enemy planes and submarines being particularly active. Admiral Nagano and his aides speculated that China's activities in the Ogasawara Islands region might be a precursor to a naval dispatch in the Ryukyu Islands region. They eagerly awaited the report of the reconnaissance plane sent to the Ryukyu Islands for an adventurous reconnaissance that day.

Two reconnaissance planes, known as Operation K, arrived at the Ryukyu Islands as scheduled. In order to carry out the second "Operation K", Vice Admiral Komatsu, commander of the submarine force, sent six submarines from the advance force, three of which were waiting on the outskirts of the Ryukyu Islands to refuel the reconnaissance aircraft. Another submarine was stationed on a route between the Ryukyu Islands and the Japanese mainland, about 550 nautical miles away, to take up a position and conduct radio alert. The fifth submarine was on standby outside the Ogasawara Islands as a first-aid vessel in the event of a seaplane accident. The sixth submarine patrolled and observed the weather at an area of 80 nautical miles southwest of the Ogasawara Islands.

But this carefully arranged reconnaissance plan has gone wrong. When the IL-123 refueling submarine arrived at the French-Frigget reef, it did not expect to find two enemy ships parked there. The I-123 submarine sent an urgent report to the Japanese-US joint fleet about the situation, and said that it was unlikely that it would be possible to refuel the seaplane here as planned.

There seemed to be a slight problem with the plan, but before the Japanese and American forces could obtain accurate information about the Chinese Ryukyu Islands, the news of the total annihilation of Fletcher's task force reached the command of the Japanese-American Wing. (To be continued......)