Although Nagano issued the order to cancel the Mariana Islands operation at 2:55 on November 11, several of his battleships continued to make a rapid eastward voyage that night in order to join up with Nagumo's and Kondo's forces who had retreated from the combat area. The men aboard the Montana were tragically determined, for everyone knew that this action would put Nagano and Nimitz's forces within enemy range, and that there was a danger that the Japanese would suffer more losses and casualties.

Sunrise at 4:40 a.m. The weather was clear and cloudless, with visibility of more than forty nautical miles. It was the best weather the fleet had encountered in the ten days since it left the mainland.

On this day, the battleships of the combined Japanese-American fleet (with the exception of the four battleships of Vice Admiral Takasu's alert force) were to approach the enemy; Never since the beginning of the war has there been such close proximity to the enemy. All ships were on standby to guard against air attacks by enemy aircraft.

Soon after Hiyama, the warships of Nagano Shusumi and Nimitz's forces saw the main force of Kondo's raiders. They met 320 nautical miles north-west of the Mariana Islands before 7 a.m. and headed north-west.

Nagumo's scattered warships had already retreated in the north-west direction since early morning, and at this time continued to retreat in order to join the main force. According to the original estimate and plan, Nagumo's troops should arrive here at this time to join the main forces. But the Nagumo troops did not appear. So the Fengxiang sent a search plane to look for it, and found the Nagumo force about forty nautical miles north and east of the main force, and by 11:55 most of Nagumo's ships had caught up with the other warships.

The vast vanguard army that set out from Midway was now unrecognizable. Aircraft carriers are gone. The destroyers are also only half of the original number (the other six destroyers are guarding the wounded aircraft carriers). This scene made the people of the Montana deeply feel the misery of this failure.

Around this time. The Wind's search aircraft reported that the drifting husk of the destroyed Wyvern had been discovered. Although the destroyer on alert had delivered the final blow a few hours earlier, the Wyvern had not yet sunk. Vice Admiral Nagumo immediately dispatched the destroyer Tanikaze to rescue those who were reported to be alive on board the Flying Dragon, and ordered the Nagara to send a seaplane to assist in the search.

Nagara's aircraft flew to the reported location of the Wyvern, but no trace of the Wyvern was found. The Gu Feng searched and found nothing.

The Allied ships assembled in the vicinity were not detected by enemy carrier-based bombers. Thus, the transfer of the survivors of the four sunken aircraft carriers from the rescue destroyer was not disturbed. As soon as the destroyer with full personnel approached, it immediately transferred the crew to the battleships Mutsu, Nagato, Haruna, and Kirishima.

Even if the enemy does not attack, this task is difficult enough. The sea is rough and the waves are high. The raging waves prevented the destroyer from getting close to the battleship. The whole fleet was finally suspended. I had to hang the boat to transport it back and forth. Seriously wounded must be carried on stretchers.

It was dark, and the transfer was carried out late into the night, because the clouds were low and not a single star could be seen, and the whole crew worked desperately. This daunting task has finally been accomplished. The sick and sleeping compartments on the battleships were crowded with the wounded. Most of the wounded were burned.

November 12th. In the early morning of the day when the Mariana Islands were to be conquered, the flagship of the Montana had already left the Mariana Islands for more than 600 nautical miles. The weather has gone bad again and visibility is very low. Once again, a thick fog enveloped everything.

Although the main part of the fleet has been out of the range of attack of the Chinese land aircraft, it is still a cause for concern because it does not know where the Chinese Pacific Fleet is. If the Chinese aircraft carrier is tracking, such bad weather provides a good cover against enemy aircraft attacks, and people get some comfort when they think of this.

To the left rear of the Montana was the Nagara, and on its flagpole flew the flag of Vice Admiral Nagumo in disgrace. This flag must also be a fool of the commander. He once asked the world invincible for half a year, and now he has returned with a fiasco.

On the bridge of the USS Montana, the captain gave orders nervously, fearing that enemy planes or submarines would pursue them. Behind the battlefleet, the light aircraft carrier Fengxiang was intermittently sending and retrieving anti-submarine aircraft. In the war room beneath the Montana, uneasiness grew among the staff officers, who gathered around the large table all night long, waiting for the events to unfold, immersed in the troubled thoughts. They fear that the battle is not over.

The early division was unfavorable, whether it was Nagano Shushen or Nimitz, they all knew that the situation of the battle had changed, and the tactics had to be modified. However, the two still have good confidence in future battles, because the combined fleet of Japan and the United States has only lost less than one-tenth of its strength. The US aircraft carriers are very sound.

The situation of war has not reached a desperate situation. However, this did not prevent them from pondering the reasons for the failure of this encounter.

The famous American naval historian Samuel Murphy. Professor E. Morrison called China's victory in the naval battle of the Mariana Islands "a victory of intelligence".

There is no doubt that the Chinese Navy's early detection of the Allied attack plan was the single most important and direct cause of the Allied defeat. From the Allied side, this achievement of enemy intelligence turned into a defeat for the side - without adequate secrecy. Had the secret of the intention to capture the Mariana Islands been as thoroughly concealed as the Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbor, the outcome of the campaign might well have been very different.

However, to say that it is a victory for Chinese intelligence work does not mean much more than that, this time the positive achievements of the enemy's intelligence work are important, but no less important is on the opposite side:

Poor and poor Allied intelligence work. This is most eloquently evidenced by the state of the Military Command. Until the eve of the battle, the Military Command Department had miscalculated and informed the Allied forces on their way to the battlefield that the Chinese Pacific Fleet was fighting in the Solomon area, thus strongly suggesting that the enemy had not yet discovered that the Allied forces were about to attack the Mariana Islands. The intelligence work of the Japanese-American combined fleet is not much better. From October 30 to November 1, the Japanese-American Combined Fleet Command, although noticing the unusual activity of the enemy in the Philippines, did not see this situation as a serious sign that the enemy was preparing to deal with it and needed to warn the Nagumo forces.

Another fundamental reason for the defeat of the Mariana Islands was that the basic plan of the operation itself was wrong. The most prominent and glaring mistake in this regard is the improper deployment of various naval forces. The decision-makers of the battle plan followed their proud one. This time, however, it became a fatal move, that is, the dispersed deployment of troops.

Instead of organizing the Allied forces into an unprecedentedly large mobile force, the Japanese-US Combined Fleet adopted the policy of dispersing forces, with the result that the strength of each unit was relatively weak. Strategically, the dispersed forces deployed in Micronesia were not important, as the purpose of this force was only to destroy the Chinese naval installations there and to occupy a few small northern islands for a short period of time before abandoning them.

From a tactical point of view, the operational purpose of the southern forces was to divert the enemy's attention from the main attack on the Mariana Islands, but at the expense of the definite advantage of concentrating forces in exchange for the uncertain advantage of containing the enemy. Undoubtedly inappropriate. If you want to contain the enemy, you may not be able to contain it. In fact, this is not the case.

Moreover, the dispersal of forces is not limited to two lines, but also in the two regions of Micronesia and the Mariana Islands. In the north, Insta's mobile units fought alone three hundred nautical miles ahead of Takasu's battleship alert troops.

The forces of the Mariana Islands are particularly absurdly dispersed, with Nagumo's aircraft carrier forces in the north and west of the Mariana Islands; The main forces of Nagano Shusei and Nimitz's battleships were three hundred nautical miles behind; Kondo's main forces were to the south or south of the Mariana Islands; Kurita's direct support forces and the Raiders were transported to the Mariana Islands from the southwest.

Forces are not concentrated. Fighting on land, sea, and air is a basic tactical weakness. In the Mariana Islands. This weakness provided convenient conditions for the enemy to annihilate Nagumo's troops. Because the other Allied forces were far away and could not function at all.

Once Nagumo's aircraft carrier was destroyed, the weakness of the Allied side due to the dispersion of forces caused the Japanese army to almost completely lose its combat effectiveness. The opposite is true. The deployment of US troops is very compact and powerful. In this operation, the US troops were concentrated from beginning to end, and they concentrated their forces to the maximum extent possible, both in attack and defense.

As a specific example, the battle could have had been a different outcome if the forces had been deployed wisely, such as if the main force and Nagumo's forces had acted together, and the aircraft carriers would have been covered by several large battleships of Nagano Shufu, which would have greatly strengthened the force.

The tremendous firepower of the battleships and escort ships will repel many of the incoming enemy planes, and will undoubtedly attract some attacking enemy planes away from the hapless aircraft carrier. In addition, Nagano Shushen can also directly control the situation of the battle, and the reason why he can't control the situation is because he is too far away. If the battleship had been used well, it would have been possible to play its true role and power in battle.

Another mistake in the battle plan was that the focus was not firmly on the central goal of the operation - the annihilation of the enemy fleet. The original intent of the battle plan was to attack the Mariana Islands as a means of luring the enemy fleet to come out for a decisive battle.

However, the tactical plan of the Japan-US Joint Fleet has set a fixed schedule for the aircraft carriers to operate and assigned them the task of supporting the Mariana Islands in strategic operations, thus violating this original intention.

As a result, aircraft carriers are deprived of operational flexibility and maneuverability, which are necessary for the success of fleet operations. Perhaps the combined Japanese-American fleet thought it safer to do so, because they were convinced that the enemy fleet would not leave its base until the Mariana Islands were attacked.

However, they should also be prepared in the event of a situation to the contrary. The annihilation of the enemy fleet should be unequivocally set as the primary objective of this operation, and everything else should be subordinated to this goal.

Accordingly, it is natural to postpone the entire operation for some time so that the aircraft carriers Zuihe and Xianghe can complete their preparations in order to strengthen the strength of the mobile forces. However, the Japanese-US Combined Fleet refused to do so because it placed too much emphasis on obtaining the most favorable climatic conditions for the Mariana Islands landing operation.

The search and reconnaissance plan before the offensive was likewise flawed and inadequate. Since the departure of the submarines from the mainland was delayed by two days, it was completely impossible for them to arrive in time to monitor the approach of the enemy fleet to the theater of operations and to alert our fleet.

And even if they can be in position on time, since each submarine is sent in a basically fixed position. Whether they can detect the Chinese troops is also questionable.

It should not only be stipulated that these submarines must arrive on time, but also that they should be ordered to search from the Mariana Islands north-east along the line of the Philippine Islands. The plan for aerial reconnaissance of the Philippines was crucial to the success or failure of the Mariana Islands Raid operation, but it was also very narrow and poorly formulated, and did not provide any other means in the event that this basic plan failed.

As a result of these serious deficiencies in the basic operational plan, the commanders of the Allied forces suffered two major losses at the outset. Even so, if they had not made mistakes in their tactical command, it seemed certain that the results would not have been so disastrous.

It has been said that in a battle both sides make mistakes, and victory belongs to the side that makes fewer mistakes. In the naval battle of the Mariana Islands. Which side makes more mistakes. This is self-evident. Indeed, if we study the situation of the war between the United States and Japan, we cannot but admit that all the mistakes in this operation were made by the Allies.

Vice Admiral Nagumo made the most mistakes, but that doesn't mean he was inferior to other commanders. His luck was bad. Because Nagumo's forces are the only Allied forces that actually engage the enemy. His situation forced him to make decisions that most affected the outcome of the battle.

Other commanders. Including Shusui Nagano and Nimitz, who were believed to command all Allied forces. are in the position of inactive bystanders. Since they don't have to make make-or-break decisions like Nagumo, they can't afford to make mistakes.

Of course, this is not a pioneer for Nagumo Tadaichi. According to the post-mortem review, Nagumo clearly made three serious mistakes.

First, in the early morning of the air raid on the Mariana Islands, he did not make adequate search arrangements. If he had sent out a two-phase search earlier, he might have quickly discovered the undetected Chinese Pacific Fleet, so that Nagumo could strike first and not be beaten. At least after he knew that the search planes of the USS Alaska and the USS Hawaii would not be able to take off on time, he should have immediately sent other planes to fill the gap in the search sector. Of course, Vice Admiral Nagumo cannot be blamed for the failure of the Alaska search aircraft carrier No. 5 to detect the enemy aircraft carrier (although this plane presumably flew over the enemy aircraft carrier).

Nagumo's second mistake was related to the method he used to divide the carrier-based aircraft into the first attack wave and the second attack wave. Each attack wave was made up of proportional aircraft drawn from six aircraft carriers, rather than two aircraft carriers forming the first attack wave and the other two aircraft carriers forming the second attack wave. While the simultaneous use of six aircraft carriers would shorten the take-off and recovery time, the vulnerability to the recovery of the aircraft and in the immediate aftermath of an attack by enemy aircraft would have increased, since all four aircraft carriers were too busy to take off their own aircraft immediately to counter an enemy attack. At the same time, it also means that during this time, mobile forces cannot launch attacks on enemy aircraft carriers, regardless of the urgency of the situation. If Nagumo had only sent planes from three aircraft carriers to attack the Mariana Islands, leaving the planes of the other three aircraft carriers on standby just in case, he would not have found himself tied in the pinching moment of the battle.

Nagumo's third, and perhaps most serious, mistake was that when he discovered that the Chinese Pacific Fleet had an aircraft carrier, he did not immediately attack with all its aircraft. Regardless of whether these aircraft are equipped with the right ammunition or even without fighter cover, they should be sorted. The risks involved in doing so are great, but are they not a little more risky than being attacked by enemy carrier-based aircraft while the planes are swinging on deck, scrambling to refuel and change ammunition? Is there reason for Nagumo to expect the enemy not to attack at this most vulnerable moment? He was reluctant to risk sending bombers with no cover and inappropriate ammunition to attack the enemy, and what was the result? The result of his chosen approach was that his bombers were annihilated by enemy aircraft, until even the ability to fight back to recoup the cost of the losses was lost. Yamaguchi's judgment at this critical juncture was the only correct one. Nagumo chose what he thought was orthodox and safer, but since then several of his aircraft carriers have been doomed.

Nagumo's misjudgment caused his mobile force to be cut off before Nagano could take any action. In other words, the Allied forces were almost completely defeated before the commander of the Japanese-American Combined Fleet could use his judgment to influence the situation. Faced with this grim situation, did Nagano Shusei and Nimitz also make the mistake of being as indecisive as Nagumo? The plan of his staff to save the tide by fighting the enemy at sea at night was clearly a desperate plan and had little hope at all. When he was finally forced to admit that this plan had no chance of success, Nagano Shusei immediately gave up the battle, believing that the defeat was certain and irretrievable.

Nagano Shusei decided not to take that course for reasons that are incomprehensible. He is not the kind of commander who shirks or seeks to mitigate his responsibility for failures. If he is such a person, then one can suspect that he is trying to achieve results in the Micronesian Islands in order to dilute the blow of the crushing defeat of the Mariana Islands.

There were also serious errors in the Mariana Islands operation in the command arrangement, which were the result of the Allied naval tradition that commanders should be on the front lines during operations. So Nagano Shusei hung his general's flag on the Montana and sailed to the sea to boost the morale of the combat troops. Obviously, this outdated concept is not in keeping with the requirements of modern warfare at sea.

It is far more important for the commander to be aware of the overall situation and to be able to inform and maintain control over the entire army under his command, which is far more important than any rustic issues involved.

The Chinese knew and understood this problem, so Admiral Liu Haijiang's Pacific Fleet headquarters was either located ashore or on large aircraft carriers away from the battlefield during the war, initially in the Philippines and later moved to Guam.

Nagano and Nimitz himself were on the Montana, and he was unable to communicate with his subordinate fleets due to the radio silence that had been imposed until the last moment on all ships participating in the operation. Therefore, he could not relay the latest enemy briefings from Tokyo and Washington to Nagumo, nor could he exert any control over the operation in time.

If the headquarters of the Combined Japanese and American Fleet were located ashore, preferably in Tokyo or Hawaii, where the transportation and intelligence centers were located, the use of radio would not be restricted, and Nagano and Nimitz would not only be able to inform their troops of the latest developments in the war and the enemy, but would also be able to maintain a firm grip on the situation of the war. (To be continued......)