"Lure" has a bait play. The Maritime Resistance Army has the response of the Maritime Resistance Army.

Nimitz believed that it was impossible for the Naval Resistance Army to avoid being discovered by the Japanese army by taking this route. Then the next thing is that the Japanese army will inevitably pursue and strike such a fleet, and as long as Yamamoto Fifty-six makes a move, it will inevitably show its head and tail. The US Pacific Fleet naturally has the opportunity to catch cicadas with praying mantises.

Similarly, Li Guang did not think that the naval resistance fleet had the ability, or that it had the luck not to be discovered by the Japanese army. You know, during this 4,000-kilometer voyage, the Japanese army spread all over the airfields on various islands. Moreover, the sea area is not as open as on the ocean, and no matter where the naval resistance fleet is, it is within the strike range of the Japanese land-based fighters. And some of the sea areas that had to be crossed were not even 100 kilometers away from the Japanese airfield.

Nimitz and Li Guang both thought like this, and Yamamoto Fifty-six probably never imagined that such a fleet would take the initiative to step into the dead. And this is where the opportunity for the Naval Resistance Army lies.

During the daytime voyage on the 29th, although the naval resistance fleet was on full alert, it did not encounter a single Japanese fighter.

However, this is not worth any luck. You must know that in the Banda Sea, although most of the islands are occupied by the Japanese army, they are all within the bombing range of US Army fighters. In the second half of 1943, the US Army Air Force led by MacArthur expanded rapidly, and all the islands where the Japanese army was entrenched were inevitably attacked by the US air within the range of fighter planes around the island of New Guinea.

The Japanese army simply could not withstand such attrition, so many islands had empty airfields, but few warplanes were stationed. In addition, there is a more important point, Yamamoto Isoroku is preparing for a decisive battle with the American army. A large number of Japanese fighters deployed in this sea area were transferred.

On the night of the 29th, the Naval Resistance Army fleet suddenly turned around, and instead of advancing in the direction of the Palau Islands and the Mariana Islands in the north, the fleet rushed to the west.

If you look at the map, the route of the Maritime Resistance Force is almost along the northern side of the Nusa Tenggara archipelago, that is, the Pacific side.

This Nusa Tenggara archipelago, and the farther west islands of Java and Sumatra, form a strong line of defense that surrounds and protects the entire South Sea.

Its main island is Bali. Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Aare and Timor.

This turn of the Naval Resistance Army is, in a sense. It's not safe. But according to Admiral Nimitz's arrangement, continuing north is itself more unsafe.

The combat radius of the Japanese fighters was about seven hundred kilometers. The combat radius of US fighters is about 400 kilometers. Since the US military although the radar once spotted the Japanese reconnaissance plane. But in half a month of fighting, not even a single Japanese fighter was found. Therefore, based on these two data, it is estimated that the Japanese fleet or the Japanese land-based fighters should be 1,100 kilometers away from Saipan.

According to Li Guang's judgment, the most likely area for the Japanese army to hide should be the Palau Islands, but the US military must have also reconnoitred here, but did not find the Japanese fleet. The main island of the Palau archipelago is located about 1,500 kilometers from Saipan. This distance was an ideal position for the Japanese to attack. Of course. Thousands of kilometers away from Saipan, there is more than one Palau archipelago. But for the Naval Resistance Fleet, avoiding the Palau Islands, where heavy forces (mostly air power) are most likely to be massed, is more likely to be tightly controlled than along the Japanese army. However, the Nusa Tenggara archipelago, which lacks air power, should be considered the best choice.

Moreover, this chain of islands, according to the intelligence of the Naval Resistance Army, the deployment of the Japanese Army is a little messy, some are a division, some are a mixed brigade, and some are several brigades. And, more importantly, the Japanese troops stationed on these island chains were all army aviation, and almost all of them were hit by the Naval Resistance Army in the six-month dice operation. For its strength, the Naval Resistance Army has some understanding.

On this island chain, the Japanese army adopted a rather conservative defense, or rather the helplessness of a poor country. The Japanese did not have as many fighters to consume, so the number of Japanese fighters on the islands was extremely small. The devil's abacus is very shrewd, only guaranteeing the airport, and replenishing the fighters as needed in wartime.

Therefore, it seems that the naval defense fleet has entered the defense circle of the Japanese army, but in fact, the danger mainly comes from several large islands in Indonesia, which are sheltered by island chains. To put it bluntly, it is similar in nature to the continuous attack of the Japanese troops on the island chain from the direction of the Indian Ocean during the dice operation of the Naval Resistance Army, and of course the degree of danger increases exponentially.

Thirtieth, morning.

The Naval Resistance fleet discovered the first Japanese fleet, fourteen merchant ships of various sizes. In the core area controlled by the Japanese army, the Japanese escort was not strong, and no one thought at all that such a fleet would dare to break through into the Pacific Ocean from this direction.

However, the Naval Resistance Army did not attack. Instead, they continued westward with the Japanese merchant ships.

At noon, the early warning planes of the Maritime Resistance Army spotted two Japanese fighters, but after the fighters of the Naval Resistance Army took off, the Japanese fighters had already gone away. It was considered to be in danger, so as to avoid being discovered early by the Japanese army.

Six o'clock in the evening. The Naval Resistance Army was less than 50 kilometers away from the Japanese fleet, and the task could have been easily accomplished by using escort destroyers. However, the pilots did not fight for many days, and the warm-up opportunity sent to the door could not be missed, so the fleet of naval resistance troops took off, spent 32 bombs, and killed 14 Japanese merchant ships. The hit rate is as high as 88 percent. can have such a high hit rate, mainly because the speed of the little devil's merchant ship is too slow, only about six knots, and there is not a single anti-aircraft gun on more than a dozen merchant ships. It is really not too simple for the pilots of the Maritime Resistance Army to take out these broken ships.

In the early morning of the 31st, the naval resistance fleet had sailed through the southwestern tip of Sulawesi and entered the Makassar Strait.

At 1:00 a.m., the fighters on the aircraft carrier Indian Ocean made a full-deck sortie.

At 3:40 p.m., a group of Maritime Resistance Army planes bombed the Baribaban oil field in Borneo at the first rays of sunlight.

The aircraft carrier squadron of the Naval Resistance Army is really too expert in doing this kind of work, and all the pilots who have participated in battles of this nature have at least 10 or more experiences. In addition to the smoke of the bombing of the oil field, the port attached to the Balibaban oil field, three Japanese warships and six oil tankers were also destroyed in one fell swoop.

The location of the naval resistance fleet is located in the center of the triangle formed by Sulawesi, Borneo, and Nusa Tenggara Islands. That is, it was possible to be hit by the air power of the Japanese army from three directions, and it was like actively jumping into the encirclement of the Japanese army. The crisis of the situation is useless.

When the battle report reached the headquarters of the Japanese Combined Fleet, a certain devil jumped up with a whoop as if a chrysanthemum had been exploded, shouting for an immediate attack on the aircraft carrier of the Naval Resistance Army.

However, when the little devils began to study the strike plan, they did not know the exact location of the naval resistance fleet. The Bariban oil field, which is the strategic core of Japan. The reason why the little devils are at war with the US military is largely because of oil.

If an important area is bombed, it is simply an intolerable loss.

In this regard, Commander Yamamoto 56's performance was indifferent, "Let the army deal with it."

It's not that Yamamoto Isoroku is unaware of the importance of the Bariban oil field, but what can he do? The main forces of the Combined Fleet are now fully preparing for a decisive battle with the US forces, and it is impossible to divide the forces.

In Yamamoto's view: And around Baribaban, not to mention a radius of several hundred kilometers, it is all within a radius of 1,000 kilometers that are within the strike range of Japanese land-based fighters. Although the Japanese army aviation is a little worse, it may be able to take on this task.

As a result, Yamamoto began to consider the impact of the bombing of the Bariban oil field and the bombing of oil tankers on the combined fleet's operational plans. (To be continued......)