In this era, the generals of almost all countries believed that there was absolutely no possibility of success in a large-scale landing operation, which was a misunderstanding of thinking. While the British were carrying out such a large-scale operation in the Dardanelles, it was suffering defeat, and even the Turks were able to hold them back on the Gallipoli peninsula.

Lechelton knew that the reason for the defeat of the British was not the large-scale landing itself, but the fact that the country had chosen the wrong place for them, and that the narrow waterways of the Dardanelles and the narrow terrain of the Gallipoli Peninsula were not conducive to the landing force to attack, but rather to the defending side.

Bolojevich said that the Italian army was not strong, quite capable of breaking through from the front, and then dividing them, and did not need to go on a sea adventure. Although the Italian coast was virtually defenceless, and the Austro-Hungarian navy had gained absolute control of the Adriatic, they considered it a risk.

The city of Ravina is located in northeastern Italy, about 110 km east of Bologna and about 13 km from the sea. The difficulty of landing here was that Ravenna had only a small port, and the transportation and disembarkation of heavy equipment for the army was a big problem. The Admiralty's opinion was to land near the port of Ancona and then occupy the port city, but to do so had little to do with the campaign plan in the Veneto area and amounted to opening up a second theater of battle.

If the Austro-Hungarian army successfully landed here and deployed its troops, it would be equivalent to cutting off the communication between them and Rome in the rear of the Italian army, so that the main army in northern Italy would be encircled, and the Italian army would be attacked on both sides of the battlefield and fall into a flank attack, which would very likely cause the collapse of the Italian army, which was already not strong in combat.

The Austro-Hungarian Navy also carried out two landing exercises before the war, and was able to build a simple pontoon dock on the tidal flats, which could solve the problem of some equipment and personnel going ashore. The problem to be solved was that the coast near Ravena was shallow, large ships could not get close to the coast, and the Admiralty had to recruit enough small transport ships and also ensure the absolute safety of the shipping lanes.

This is not a big problem, as it is only about 110 nautical miles from Bora or Trieste to Ravenna, and it takes only about 10 hours for a transport ship to reach the Italian coast. The most important thing is that with the commissioning of three battleships of the "Grand Duke of Istria", the Austro-Hungarian Navy achieved superiority in the Adriatic, and Admiral Negovan assured that the Navy would be able to assume the responsibility of maritime security.

Lechelton firmly believed that, apart from the heavily defended ports of Venice and Ancona, the Italians did not at all expect the landing of the Austro-Hungarian army from the sea, and there were no defensive preparations at all in the rest of the east coast. The landing at Ravena, although difficult, was not impossible to solve, and although there were certain risks, it did not pose much of an obstacle. If the Austro-Hungarian army landed here, it would be possible to cut off the retreat of the main force of the 1.2 million Italian army in northern Italy, which would make it possible to quickly dissolve the Italians and force them to surrender.

Using his status as crown prince and the prestige he had gained from leading the army and navy to several victories in the war, Lee Hayden eventually persuaded the General Staff and numerous high-ranking generals, including the Germans, to accept his plan.

War is like a gamble, and it is impossible not to take a little risk, the problem is that the risk needs to be kept within an acceptable range.

The battle plan and the deployment of troops were again adjusted, and the 7th Army, the most elite of the Austro-Hungarian army, was transferred to the military ports of Trieste and Bora for standby.

In order to confuse the Italians, on 13 August, the Austro-Hungarian General Command of the Southern Front in Trento was renamed the "General Command of the Defense of the South Tyrol Region", which seemed to show that Austria-Hungary was simply unable to launch a counterattack against Italy.

But Austria-Hungary had already concentrated nearly 1.1 million troops in five army groups in this area.

Bolojevich divided the attacking forces into three directions: the 3rd Army and the newly formed and 12th armies aimed at the Venetian-Padua line, the 6th Army aimed at Verona, and the 8th Army first launched a counterattack on the Isonzo line. The German 12th Army was deployed as a general reserve on the line of the Isonzo River.

Lechelton planned to attack on all fronts after the rainy season in September, but the Italians launched an attack on the Isonzo River without giving the order.

It turned out that the chief of the general staff of the Italian army, General Cardona, had caused a deep political crisis in the country due to the ineffective offensive with huge losses in the past, and a considerable number of parliamentarians threatened to withdraw from the war, which on the contrary aroused widespread support from the peace-loving Italian people in the country. He needs a nationwide victory ahead of the parliamentary elections to alleviate the political crisis.

But the Italian attack suddenly crumbled their already impenetrable defense, and the opportunity to counterattack came.

Cardona's battle plan was to launch a breakthrough from Monfacona to Sagrado by the Italian 3rd Army, and then move up the ladder to attack Doberdo, while the Italian 2nd Army would cross the Isonzo River in Sapotono in an effort to capture a solid bridgehead at the Golts, and then attack Tomino to break through the entire Austro-Hungarian defenses.

It is ridiculous that the Italians still thought that they were facing the under-armed local forces of Tyrol and the Austro-Hungarian 8th Army, ignoring the fact that Austria-Hungary had transferred three armies from the Eastern Front to the south. They took it for granted that the Austro-Hungarian army was moved against the Serbs.

At 6 o'clock in the morning of August 17, the Italian army began to launch a large-scale barrage of fire, and the heavy shelling lasted for seven days, but the damage to the various support points of the Austro-Hungarian army in the mountains was almost negligible. At 7 o'clock on the 24th, with a piercing whistle, the Italian troops swarmed out of the trenches and rushed towards the sure destruction of Miè.

If the Italian artillery bombardment for seven days still had any effect, it was that Boloyevich was able to accurately judge the direction of the Italian army's attack, and he deployed the 3rd and 8th armies in front of the Italian army's offensive direction, and concentrated the 6th and 7th armies in the combined area of the attack of the two Italian armies.

He needed to break through the Italian junction and then move forward quickly, ignoring the flanks.

Boloyevich planned to wipe out the main forces of the Italian army, not to crush them.

On the 23rd, Bolojevich rushed to Berdo with the front command and took over the command of the entire defensive line, and he knew that he would face an opportunity like Radetzky's. He had a step-like defensive terrain that allowed for a hierarchical deployment, and he placed his main reserves behind the peaks of the Alps, so that if a counterattack was required, the Austro-Hungarian army would gain great momentum from a condescending dive.

The Italian 2nd Army began to cross the Isonzo River at six crossings in Zapotono, and they were faced with a very unfavorable terrain, with steep rock walls on the opposite bank of the river, which they had to climb as soon as they crossed the river, and there were no relatively gentle beaches on which they could assemble and establish bridgeheads.

It was a bloody day for the attacking Italians, who simply could not approach the cliffs, and the Austro-Hungarians, lacking artillery, could not destroy the Italian ferries, but this weakness turned into a death trap for the Italians, who crossed the Isonzo in succession but could not climb the cliffs in the face of machine-gun fire at all, and were swept down in pieces, while the Italian officers simply insensitively urged the troops to cross the river, sending groups of soldiers to the Austro-Hungarian machine guns, and then watching them die in the riverThe corpses float in the Isonzo River, and the whole scene is like hell on earth.

The Italian 3rd Army was targeting the relatively low saddle that stretched 20 kilometers from the Monfacona Heights to the Sagrado Heights, which of course was also relative to the surrounding high peaks.

The Italian army swarmed out like a large flock of sheep, staggering towards the saddle, and the fire from the two heights of the Monfacona River and the Sagrado formed a fire trap, and the Austro-Hungarian troops deployed on the saddle ridge just smashed the bundles of grenades downwards without hesitation, and the Italian troops were in a situation where they could not fight back and could not achieve any breakthrough.

After three days of hard fighting, the Italian 3rd Army finally broke through the ridge line, but instead of relaxation and rest, the next higher ridge awaited them.

The Austro-Hungarian army, having inflicted heavy casualties on the Italians, retreated in an orderly manner to higher ridge positions, easily awaiting the Italians. The demoralized Italian army was driven by officers, dragging their exhausted bodies and began to climb again in the rain of bullets.

While the Italians' already weak will to fight was being worn out in the continuous retreat, the 12th Army, the main force of the German army, located in the rear, also began to move to the front line.

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