Widespread misconceptions about World War II (Part II)
4. The mustache and the fat man who carried too much black pot
The mustache's military and strategic talents were far superior to those of many famous German marshals.
The most famous examples are Rakerk and Kyiv.
In fact, at Rakerk, the mustache's order was only to halt the advance of Guderian's tank division for three days in order to wait for the infantry to follow. And the situation on the battlefield at that time was that Guderian's tank division rushed too quickly and was out of touch with the infantry. And the opponent he had to face was the British and French army with thirty divisions supported by naval artillery! In terms of the quantity and quality of tanks alone, he not only did not have an advantage, but even had less than the enemy's. Although the blitzkrieg was very powerful, in that swampy area, the enemy army was compressed into a group, and three tank divisions wanted to completely annihilate the enemy's 30 divisions, which was itself unrealistic. At the time, Montgomery had made a very successful tactical counterattack, and had temporarily stabilized the line and established a line of defense—in fact, it took three or four days for the infantry-backed Lao Gu to break through the line over the next three days, and by that time there were only 60,000 men left in the garrison.
Judging by the situation at that time, even if the mustache went all out, at most half of the British and French troops would remain.
As for Kyiv, many people say that it is wrong for the mustache to go to Kyiv instead of Moscow. But judging from the current perspective, it is really the right decision to fight Kyiv.
Taizu said that if you lose your land, you will die, and if you lose your land, you will live. Ignoring the 670,000 troops of the Southwestern Front, which was already in a desperate situation, and attacking Moscow farther away, was in itself a taboo in the art of war. As for saying that the capture of Moscow will cause the collapse of the Mao army, this is even more of a joke. Everyone knows the nature of the Soviet state, and the loss of Moscow is just the loss of everything, and don't forget that the dwarf emperor did not let them surrender when he conquered there. Only by truly destroying the enemy's living forces can the key to determining the outcome of a war.
If Moscow is really hit, then it will be a real disaster. Moscow, which has been heavily defended, is difficult for the German army to eat immediately, no matter how strong it is. And the enemy here in Kyiv has a respite and makes a mistake in the rear. That's the real front and tail care.
And Ge Fatty, many websites attribute all the failures of the Luftwaffe to him in the early, middle and late stages, which is very unfair.
The series of defeats of the Luftwaffe were more due to their own congenital deficiencies.
In the later period, the number of German pilots was insufficient, and Goering was blamed for saying that Germany's training mechanism was not good.
He can't be blamed for that. Pilots, all come with parts and gasoline poured out. And what Germany lacks most is oil. Before the war, Germany was subject to the Treaty of Versailles, so it could only be sneaky. To be able to cultivate 28,000 flying enthusiasts, Ge Fat Man had already done his best - the mustache's request at that time was 100,000. You know, Germany is an oil-free country, and all oil has to be imported. It is far from being comparable with the two oil-producing countries of rice and the Soviet Union. It's not impossible, it's not possible, it's really powerless.
As for the new generation of aircraft, it is not as good as the enemy, also because of the fuel and the lack of scientific and technological accumulation, which is exactly what I said in the third point, the technology tree is not as good as Miying.
In the later stage, the piston machine lagged behind Britain and the United States, and the first was the backwardness in the research of chemical technology. Britain and Mi have been prescribing higher grades of jet fuel early, and with the advantage of resources, No. 12O fuel and even No. 15O oil can be burned at will, while Germany, which can only rely on coal-based oil technology, is much lagging behind in this regard. This is due to congenital deficiencies. Although Romania produces oil is high-quality oil. But in the opening of high-grade oil, it is always Germany's landing.
The fuel grade could not be improved, coupled with the congenital defect of the lack of intercooler, which restricted the intake pressure of the German new engine and was difficult to increase, and it also affected the opening of the new engine......
This is caused by the dual defects of resources and technology, and has nothing to do with Ge Fatzi.
Note: I have seen a statement before that the motive used by Ta152 finally added an intercooler and a two-stage pressurization, but the authenticity cannot be determined.
5: The problem of insufficient number of tigers and leopards
In fact, this question has to go back to the first point.
The problem of the shortage of tigers and leopards is not in the design, but in the production, and there is a big problem in the industrial layout. Before Speer became Minister of Production, his predecessor was a bastard. Of course, he cannot be blamed entirely for making the whole German military industry a mess, and this is also related to the problem of the national production system of the whole of Germany, which is after all the capitalist factories - similar situations are shared by the United States and the Soviet Union. For example, on the side of the US imperialists, a large number of excellent 76 tank guns were piled up in the rear warehouses and rusted, while the M4 in front was still using the short-barreled 75 guns of garbage and was beaten by tigers and leopards. On the German side, the mustache asked for the barrel of the No. 3 tank to be lengthened early on, but the military equipment turned a deaf ear, and it was not until the situation became thunderous after the mustache inspected the tank unit. On the Soviet side, the production equipment of the famous T34 was almost stillborn due to the interference of the kV developers and the influence of the bureaucracy at the top.
On the British side, they fired the most outstanding liquid-cooled motive of World War II - Merlin, the best anti-tank gun of World War II, 17-pounder gun. But the titles of the best liquid-cooled fighter and the best tank were not on their own. This is completely a problem with the concept of technology tree and weapon development, and it is also very speechless.
In fact, military production is subject to the selfishness of interest groups in various countries, and such an oolong tragedy has been born in the United States, Britain, and even the Soviet Union, but the problem is that Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union have a stronger ability to tolerate fault than Germany. The United States and the Soviet Union could make a few mistakes without being fatal, while Germany, after all, has limited national resources and will make a mistake once and become quite fatal.
In 1941~1942, the output of German tanks in these two years was frighteningly low - less than 4,000 in 41 years, and only 6,000 in 42 years. Germany could not defeat Maozi in 42, and the biggest sinner was this Minister of Production. Under his guidance, the production of aircraft and tanks on its production line plummeted every time a major battle was won at the front. Not to mention the fact that Germany mobilized too late and did not implement the three-shift and leave-free work system early. In the most critical first and second years of the Soviet-German battlefield, the German production department was more like a holiday than a wartime production.
When Speer came to power and began the general mobilization, the Allied strategic bombing of Germany began. Even so, in October 1944, when the rear was blown into a blank slate, the production of German tanks even reached a peak of 2,000 per month - almost no less than the production of the T34 in the same period. If the mobilization can be completed sooner, it will not be too difficult to double the production of Haw Pars.
Regarding the problem that the production of Haw Par cannot be increased, after the discussion, I believe that it is not easy to produce tanks of more than 45 tons with the production technology of World War II at that time, and it is not something that ordinary tank factories can build. And the production of tanks of about thirty tons requires much less equipment. It should also be a reason why Haw Par production has not increased, because there are only a few specialized tank factories in Germany that can produce it. It is difficult for ordinary small factories to produce because the equipment cannot keep up.
In addition, there is another extremely important factor, that is, the layout of German industry, which has a strict problem. Its industrial layout is more akin to a collection of small handicraft workshops than to large-scale industrial production.
I have seen several photos of the tank factories of the United States, the Soviet Union and Germany on the Internet, whether it is the United States or the Soviet Union, the tank factories are dozens or even hundreds of tanks lined up to produce at the same time, and hundreds of tanks are produced on the assembly line at the same time, which looks extremely spectacular.
In Germany, a tank workshop in Nuoda can often only see one or two tanks alone, and the degree of productivity can be imagined.
If it is said that the Haw Par is due to the fact that the production hours are higher than that of the T34 and the production of the T34 is insufficient, then what about the No. 4 tank and the No. 3 tank, which are far inferior to the T34 tanks? In 1941 and 1942, before the Haw Par was put into production, all the tanks produced in Germany at that time were No. 3 and No. 4, but the average output was only 500 per month (in 1941 it was even less than 400). At the same time, the production of Soviet tanks was close to two thousand per month
If we wanted to increase the production of German tanks in a big way, we had to adjust the entire industrial layout of Germany, and this amount of work could only be done by a dictator like Stalin.
Another problem was the fuel problem, even though Germany produced a large number of tanks, there was not enough fuel to move them.
The real reason for the tragedy of the Haw Par was that the battlefield was too poorly maintained, and that Germany's strategic focus changed from offense to defense.
The design of repetitive load wheels is a maintenance problem, and the weight of a 45-ton to 50-ton tank itself determines the maintenance troubles - no matter what, a 30-ton tank is much easier to maintain than a 45-ton tank. What's worse is that Germany has changed from offensive to defensive at this time, and it is often unable to control the battlefield after the war. As a direct consequence, the tanks abandoned on the battlefield become enemy trophies. This is the most important thing, you must know that as long as you can grasp the ownership of the battlefield after the war, the tanks lost in the early stage, as long as they are not martyred, can be recovered and repaired. It is even possible to capture and repair abandoned tanks from the enemy.
I've seen a maintenance report about the early battles of German panzer divisions.
After a major battle, only about 20 of the more than 130 tanks in his division could be put into service. But because of the control zhì held the battlefield. A few days later, the number of tanks that could be put into service was restored to ninety-eight. This can very well illustrate how important the battlefield is to tank maintenance.
That's where the misfortune of the tiger and leopard lies. After 1943, Germany switched from offensive to defensive. In the midst of the battle, a large number of repairable tanks were thrown on the battle line in vain......
6: The so-called winter saved the Mao Army.
In fact, it was winter that saved the Germans. Because of the supply problem, before the big cooldown, the German army on the front line had begun to switch from offensive to defensive. In the winter campaign of 1941, the loss of soldiers due to weather problems was only 3 percent (this number of 3 percent is very controversial and is for reference only. There are also 100 percent, or even 20 percent, on the Internet, but 200 percent is really an overstatement. ).
Bad weather was more favorable for the defending troops. It was the bad weather that affected the counterattack of the Soviet troops, which greatly affected the movement of their troops. It was precisely because of the weather that Moder had the opportunity to stabilize the dìng line and inflict heavy losses on Zhukov.
German logistics have always been problematic, such as the Polish governor-general. There is a cloud of people who have traveled through the world, and if you really go back to the Hans country in World War II, there are a few must-kill characters Ge Fat Man is a (the author thinks that Goering is a little wronged, and the former Minister of Production should be the first. ), the Polish governor was third on the must-kill list, and this person was none other than a key figure in logistics. The former Minister of Production is second on the must-kill list.
Udet had to rush to become the headmaster of the flight school, and his abilities were not at all comparable to his predecessor, and it was not surprising that he committed suicide.
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