The strong counterattack of the Nationalist Government not only effectively contained the frenzied offensive of the Japanese army, but also won a lot of praise for the Nationalist Government in the international community, especially the United States. The U.S. Congress urgently approved a bill to provide the Nationalist Government with $20 million in arms in the short term and equip the Nationalist Government with four U.S. mechanics.

After receiving the telegram sent by the United States, Jiang Daxi was overjoyed: Although the aid this time was only $20 million, which was far from the $500 million promised by the United States before, the United States had so readily promised to provide assistance to the Nationalist Government This was an excellent signal, and the information revealed was gratifying. This also made Lao Jiang's personal self-esteem and self-confidence unprecedentedly inflated, and in the past two days, he met with He Yingqin, Chen Cheng and others in succession, and talked about his anti-Japanese war strategy.

As for whether Lao Chiang has an overall consideration for this war, whether there is a detailed implementation strategy, He Yingqin and others are very clear, before the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, Mr. Baili had taken the lead in formulating a detailed operational plan for the anti-Japanese war, and after the Lugou Bridge Incident, Lao Chiang also told them his idea of the Anti-Japanese War, which has since become the national strategy of the eight-year anti-Japanese war against China.

Although Lao Chiang was a second-rate military commander, his military command ability was equivalent to that of an ordinary infantry battalion commander, but his political skills were extremely clever. He knew exactly what he wanted and how he was going to get it. In the eyes of Western countries, China's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression began in 37, but in fact China's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression began as early as September 18, 1931, after the September 18 Incident.

Lao Chiang had considered the issue of anti-Japanese resistance a long time ago, but he was a person with a strong desire for power. Moreover, the strategic vision was relatively accurate, so he saw a long time ago that it was not the Japanese who could really threaten his rule, but someone else, so Lao Chiang first considered it from the perspective of his personal or political party when formulating the anti-Japanese strategic policy.

As Brian, a well-known contemporary American historian and political biographer, put it: "As a statesman and political leader, Chiang was a tactician rather than a strategist. He is slightly above his competitors and is good at controlling them. But despite the fact that he ruled the majority of the Chinese population. But he actually does not understand the social basis of the regime as a whole. A summary of Chiang's life. Chiang Kai-shek had his own courage, energy and leadership qualities, and he was not only a deeply flawed figure. And in the sense of Greek tragedy. He is also a tragic figure – his tragedy is of his own personal making! ”

Chiang belonged to the rare and extraordinary kind of man: the courage, the ability to work, the personal will, and the energy and the total endurance of the man were beyond the imagination of the average man. The differential influence of such people on their time and future generations depends on the political context in which they operated, the historical legacy they inherited, and the size, power or importance of their country. We are all still under the influence of Lenin and Stalin today. Hitler brought great disaster to his generation. Churchill's defeat of Hitler left his mark on the years to come. Franco and Tito changed the face of their country, just like Mustafa. Kimal has changed a generation like before. ”

It was precisely because he did not understand the basis of society, and because of the political background of Chiang's activities and the historical legacy he inherited, that Chiang's consideration of relations with Japan was extremely inconsistent with the wishes of the people. As a matter of fact, the Nationalist Government had already had a strategy to deal with Japanese aggression. There are four steps to this coping strategy. The first step was to ensure the absolute rule of the party as the first goal and to compromise with Japan under this goal.

In the 14-year War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression that began in 31 years, the Nationalist Government had always taken the rule of its own party as its primary goal. Especially before the July Seven Incident, the purpose of "the outside must first be at home". Internally, we will make every effort to suppress the CCP regime. Externally, a policy of compromise has been pursued as much as possible. Avoid fighting the Japanese.

The second step is to actively carry out reforms, improve the national defense system, and reorganize the armed forces. In the face of the Japanese army's attempt to invade China. While appealing to the League of Nations, the Nationalist Government actively prepared for war. At the Second Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Kuomintang in July 1936, the Regulations on the National Defense Conference were adopted, and at the Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Kuomintang in February 1937, the Regulations on the National Defense Committee were passed, and the National Defense Committee was established in accordance with the Regulations. The National Defense Commission is China's highest military body, which uniformly handles China's national defense operational policy, national troop mobilization, and national defense budget, and has the right to require administrative departments at all levels to cooperate with it in implementing all resolutions.

Beginning in 1936, the previous division-level establishment was changed, and all kinds of weapons within the army were either coordinated or used intensively to enhance the combat effectiveness of various units, and by the end of 1936, a total of 20 divisions had been reorganized. At the same time, the armed forces of various factions were unified and reorganized, and 10 divisions of the Northeast Army and 10 divisions of the Gui Army were reorganized.

At the same time, it is necessary to incorporate the forces of the warlords in various localities and reorganize the armed forces of the whole country, so as to achieve the following: The establishment of the armed forces throughout the country will be unified, the deployment of combat units at all levels and the deployment of various arms will be adjusted, and the personnel transfers of various units will be placed under the unified management of the central authorities. The most important of these was the reorganization of the Sichuan warlords, which were successfully organized by the Nationalist Government from May 1937 to September 1937 in the context of the National War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. The reorganization of more than 160,000 Sichuan troops not only ended the situation of warlord civil strife in Sichuan, but also provided a new force for the resistance against Japan, the Sichuan army participated in almost all the large-scale battles in the future, with a total of more than 600,000 casualties, and made immortal contributions to the resistance against Japan; The success of this reorganization also laid the foundation for the Nationalist Government to move the capital to Chongqing in the future to lead the National War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. Sichuan has a large population and abundant products, close to Liangguang, Lianghu, Yunnan and other provinces, and is the center of the southwest region, which is very suitable for construction as a place for strategic retreat and counteroffensive.

It is necessary to draw a clear line between the various branches of the armed forces and improve the operational policies of the various branches of the armed forces. It has integrated the existing national combat readiness resources, actively purchased advanced weapons and equipment, developed special combat capabilities, and formed a large number of German armament divisions. At the same time, we should vigorously develop the armed forces directly under the central government and introduce foreign training models. It is equipped with 70 divisions of the Central Army, 40 of which are formed with Whampoa cadets as officers and German instructors for training.

The other is the unification of the weapon system, which is very important, and at that time there were various armed guns in various places. For example, the Gui system is British equipment, the Yunnan army is French-style equipment, and the Northeast Army is Japanese-style equipment. The guns and ammunition produced by the arsenals in various places are also varied, which brings great inconvenience to the supply of the front. Therefore, it was decided to unify the standards of several weapons with the highest rate of use and the most widespread use in wartime, especially rifles, machine guns, mortars, etc. Actively expand the output of the military industry and improve the quality of the military industry. Actively imitate advanced foreign weapons and equipment. For example, in terms of light and heavy machine guns, German and Czech equipment were copied, and after the start of the war, Japanese grenadiers were copied.

The third step is to implement the strategy of exchanging space for time, accumulating small victories into big victories, and implementing the strategy of protracted warfare.

On the eve of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Jiang Baili published his "On National Defense," and the strategy toward Japan expounded in his "On National Defense" and other works can be summed up in three ways: First, China is not afraid of swallowing by whales against Japan, but is afraid of encroachment, so it should not retreat step by step toward Japan, but should take the initiative to carry out an all-out war of resistance against Japan, turning the rear of the Japanese army into the front, so that it will have no time to digest the occupied areas, so that Japan will not be able to use the occupied areas to increase its combat strength; Second, it took the initiative to attack the Japanese army in Shanghai and forced the main offensive route of the Japanese army to change from the north-south route of northeast-north-central China-south China to the east-west route along the Yangtze River, so as to make full use of the advantages of mountains and lakes and marshes along the river and offset the advantages of the Japanese army in weapons training. Third, we will trade space for time, engage in a protracted war, and drag Japan down through the consumption of time. The specific method was to drag the Japanese army into the second ridge of China's geography, that is, the junction of Hunan and Sichuan, and engage in a decisive battle with the Japanese army.

In fact, although Jiang Baili died early in 1938, the development of the Sino-Japanese war proceeded exactly according to his expectations, reflecting his accurate grasp of the strength and strategic situation of the two countries. In an article published shortly before his death, he put forward even more eloquently the guiding principle of China's future strategy toward Japan -- "Win or lose, just make peace with it!" ”

After the start of the all-out war of resistance, there was a very large gap in strength between China and Japan. Economically, industrially, in 1937, Japan's industrial output value was $6 billion, while China's was $1.36 billion; Japan's steel output was more than 6 million tons, while China's was more than 500,000 tons; Japan had the world's leading military manufacturing industry, and China could only manufacture basic guns and small-caliber artillery. In terms of troops: In mid-1937, the Japanese army had an army of 600,000 troops and a trained reserve force of more than 1.6 million. China has an army of 2 million and a reserve of 500,000. Although the difference in strength was not large, the number of armor and artillery per division of the Japanese army was much larger than that of the national army. The Japanese navy has 200 large ships, while the Chinese have only 66; The Japanese army and navy have 2,625 combat aircraft, while China has only 305 combat aircraft.

In view of the huge gap between China and Japan in terms of military and national strength, as well as China's characteristics of great depth and large population, the Nationalist Government formulated a strategic policy of exchanging space for time and accumulating small victories into big victories. Exchanging space for time means taking advantage of China's vast territory to wage a protracted war against the enemy and waiting for a change in international and domestic opportunities. Accumulating small victories into big victories means that in each battle, the enemy is gradually eliminated, the enemy is consumed, and the qualitative change is completed with quantitative changes. (To be continued......)