Chapter 743 - Semi-Constitutional Monarchy (Medium)
Those journalists began to look at this so-called "semi-constitutional monarchy" and then began to think in their heads. Because they found that this semi-constitutional monarchy was neither like the parliamentary constitutional monarchy of England, nor like the dual constitutional monarchy of Germany and Japan. In this semi-constitutional monarchy, the monarch has more power than the British parliamentary constitutional monarchy, but it is also smaller than the dual constitutional monarchy. For example, this semi-constitutional monarchy has no legislative power, not only does the constitution have no legislative power, but also does not have the legislative power of other laws.
However, on the other hand, the monarch also has executive power, and there is also a part of the administrative power, and it is the monarch who controls the army. On the other hand, the king is also qualified to issue an edict, but this edict must be countersigned by the prime minister and the ministers of the corresponding ministries before it can take effect.
In terms of appointing heads of government, this power is also less than that of Germany and Japan. For example, in this semi-constitutional monarchy, the prime minister is elected by the parliament, and the prime minister is accountable to the parliament, and the king is generally not qualified to interfere. However, in this case, there is no need to worry too much about being dismissed from the post at will, and since the cabinet members cannot also serve as members, it is not possible to control the executive power while holding the parliament. However, the conditions for the impeachment of the cabinet in parliament have been raised, and the stability of the government has been ensured.
So this quasi-constitutional monarchy is actually a model of the so-called "two giants", one of which is the emperor and the other is the head of government. These two are actually divided together, basically both sides are very flexible, and each can find an opportunity to suppress the other. For example, on the surface, the monarch does not have the power to directly appoint the prime minister, but in case the prime minister is impeached in parliament. The Prime Minister can only choose to ask the monarch to dissolve Parliament in order to win the next round of elections.
But at this time, the main decision lies with the monarch, not with the prime minister. Unlike in the United Kingdom, when the prime minister proposes to dissolve Parliament, it is almost impossible for the monarch to refuse, and this is where the difference in initiative lies. Therefore, the struggle between the two sides is very flexible, unlike other constitutional monarchies. At every turn, the cabinet will be overthrown. The collapse of the British cabinet often comes from within the political party, and the party has staged a "mutiny" within the party, so they are bound to be unlucky. And Germany and Japan often come from the trust of the king, once the king does not trust and wants to unload the mill and kill the donkey, it will inevitably be blown away. In fact, both of these models are very unfavorable to governance.
Judging from the situation in the last years of the Ming Dynasty, the Chongzhen Emperor changed the prime minister faster than he changed his clothes, so could there be no problems? With such a frequent change of prime ministers, every time the prime minister is changed, it will definitely cause a large number of officials to change their blood. In the end, everyone is in danger and has no heart to do practical things. If everyone doesn't have the heart to do practical things, then the country will definitely be in worse trouble. Such a constitutional monarchy on the one hand ensured that the king could not remove the prime minister at will, and on the other hand, it also prevented the "rebellion" of the prime minister's internal political party, and then forced to overthrow the cabinet.
This is conducive to the unity of governance, and there will be no problems due to the frequent change of heads of government, so that those officials can do things with relative peace of mind, and do not think about using their minds crookedly all day long in order to keep their positions.
However, Wang Guorui said to several women in the headquarters: "Do you know why I want to hold the appointment power of local governor-level officials in the examination institute? Because of a policy. In the end, it will still be implemented, if the policy is not implemented. It's bound to be like a castle in the sky. And I set up the Examination Yuan, which is actually the Ministry of Officials in the past, and the Ministry of Officials will be in the hands of the king to a certain extent, and the king has the power to appoint the president of the Examination Yuan, so that the cabinet will have to obtain the king's approval if they want to carry out their economic policies. So that they can execute it accurately. And I have the power to appoint local officials, which means that I control the enforcement of policies, and then even if they have any good policies, they must implement them through the officials appointed by the examination institute. The president of the examination institute is appointed by the king and then serves a five-year term. β
"Husband. So why do you want to set the principle term of office of this examination institute as five years? Why can't a king, once appointed, be abolished? If you could just abolish the dean of the examination institute, wouldn't it be easy to grasp the power to appoint local officials? Zheng Hong asked.
"The rules of the game must still be followed, and in the future, this examination hall will become a place for games between the emperor and the cabinet. The examination institute manages personnel, and the reason why I have to make it impossible to be removed casually within five years is to leave some room for the game. If the king can change the president of the examination institute at will, wouldn't it be easy to grasp the appointment of local personnel at will? Do you know what I set up this semi-constitutional monarchy for? In fact, it is to maintain elasticity, and only things that have elasticity can be the most stable. Steel is easy to break, and the same is true for this. If the power of the king is too great, it will seem very hard in the end, but in the end it will often result in a major uprising or coup d'Γ©tat being completely eliminated. Flexibility is the best, and maintaining a certain degree of flexibility means maintaining room for the game. This will be an important place for future kings and cabinets, who can co-opt the deans of the examiners and then appoint officials, at least at the prefect level, according to their ideas. β
"And if the dean of the examination institute can be replaced at will, then there will be no room for such a game, and then it is likely that the biggest conflict in history will break out in the end. The so-called being a man leaves a line, and if people have hope, they will not think about obtaining it through violent means. If I completely control the examination institute, it means that there is no room for negotiation at all, and those civil cabinets will be completely desperate, and then they will think of another way to solve the problem. When the time comes, either my new empire will be overthrown by the revolution, or the empire will return to that era of absolute monarchy again. Therefore, we must try our best to maintain the state of the game, even if the king suffers a loss for a while and is overridden by the courtiers, it is nothing. In any case, the term of office of the prime minister is less than five years, and the emperor's reign is as little as 20 years, or even more than 30 years. Anyway, if you lose this five years, won't you just find a way to get it back again in the next five years? Who has a longer term? β
"So I left room for the game so that they could be flexible enough not to cause too much concentration of power and eventually cause the whole system to collapse. At that time, as long as they master this examination institute, there will be only two ways, one way is that the cabinet will pay a huge price to pull the president of the examination institute over, so that they can gain the power to govern for five years. Of course, I believe that very few bureaucrats would do that. Because of course, their term of office is only five years, and it is obviously not worth it to pay so much for five years of power, after all, most of them will be replaced immediately after five years. β
"So in my vision, it's more about the king and his courtiers making more deals and compromises on the power to appoint personnel, and keep a certain amount of room for maneuver to keep them flexible. If the courtiers are allowed to completely control the personnel power, then the king will definitely be hollowed out in the end. And if the king completely controls the personnel power, then in the end the constitutional monarchy will also evolve into an absolute monarchy, and finally return to the old way. Since ancient times, the struggle for power in officialdom has been nothing more than a struggle for personnel power. Therefore, I made the personnel power independent and became a game space for the two sides to compete for. The cabinet of the government does not have enough personnel power, and must make deals with the king. However, the king does not have the power to govern directly, so it is necessary to reach a compromise with the government through this personal power. β
In fact, this means that it is the same as the military power in the past, which has the power to transfer troops but does not have the right to command troops, but the generals who command the troops do not have the right to transfer troops. The future emperor had the power to appoint personnel, but he did not have the power to govern directly. However, as a cabinet of government, although it has the power to govern, it has to receive the monarch who is constrained by the power of personnel, and this is a means of maintaining balance. Otherwise, if one side is out of balance, it will definitely fall apart in the end. So this is the method that I think about to generate future game space, that is, personnel rights. In order for the cabinet to carry out its affairs, it must obtain the personnel support of the monarch. However, the monarch does not have direct economic power, which prevents the monarch from having direct power to govern, and then further forming absolute power. β
"At that time, the examination hall will become a place for daily games, and the parliament will become a place for games on strategic matters. As long as there is enough room for the two sides to play, this can maintain stability. β
Outside, after the plan for this semi-constitutional monarchy was announced, those reporters also quickly passed on the plan to all countries in the world, and then all countries in the world began to study the advantages and disadvantages of this plan, and then began to carefully study the advantages and disadvantages of this semi-constitutional monarchy, and then let everyone start to think about how to learn from it and what lessons to be learned. In particular, what are the characteristics of this political system, and what can be learned by everyone, after all, the study of the political systems of different countries is also studied by all countries. (To be continued.) )